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Trump Confesses He Will Bankrupt the Country Unless SCOTUS Lets Him Break the Law

It’s my opinion that Solicitor General John Sauer succeeds because of the political pressure he brings to bear on Justices.

That was my immediate impression upon listening to the hearing in Trump v. US. Sauer was arguing a clearly unconstitutional stance, adopting arguments (in a case where Trump nearly got his Vice President killed) that the President could order SEAL Team 6 to kill his adversaries, and (having not reviewed the actual evidence) the right wing judges accepted his premise that this prosecution truly represented a case of meanie Democrats treating Trump badly under the law.

And based on that, the right wing justices wrote an opinion that gave themselves a preemptive veto over whether a former President could be prosecuted, effectively preventing meanie Democrats from upholding the law.

That’s what I think happened with SCOTUS’ abuse of the emergency docket to both overturn nationwide stays and to rubber stamp unconstitutional deportion practices. With their first ruling on April 7 in JGG, SCOTUS sent a mild rebuke to Stephen Miller’s bid to deport wide swaths of Venezuelans to a concentration camp under the Alien Enemies Act based on their tattoos: the ACLU couldn’t get a nationwide injunction against the practice under the Administrative Procedures Act, but each detainee could get a habeas review. Based on that precedent, the Trump Administration got their biggest slapdown of the term in AARP, where Justices intervened on Easter Saturday to make the government turn around buses rushing to deport more men under the Alien Enemies Act. In between the two, SCOTUS ruled that the government should describe what steps it had taken to return Kilmar Abrego Garcia after deporting him illegally.

None of these were good rulings, holding that Miller’s dragnet was wildly illegal. Rather, they were mild rebukes to Miller and tactical rebukes to courts. But then Sauer was confirmed on April 3 (before these rulings but after they were appealed) and Miller and Trump’s propaganda campaign wailing about nationwide injunctions and judicial coups ratcheted up. And against a background of SCOTUS rubber stamping any and all termination orders — with the single exception of the Fed Chair — SCOTUS engaged in exceedingly outrageous action in DVD, serially overriding a District Court’s effort to, one, enforce his orders and, two, prevent the government from deporting men to regimes like South Sudan pending a constitutional review. All this was done with tactical orders building off SCOTUS’ fondness for allowing the President to fire whoever he wants (except the Fed Chair), which itself was used as precedent to allow Trump to override due process for deportees until the courts could consider the legal niceties of it all.

Steve Vladeck is, of course, the source to read on the law of Emergency Docket. The law sucks. But I argue that the law sucks because SCOTUS is not responding to the law. They’re responding to Miller’s shrieks, John Sauer’s neat packaging up of those shrieks, and how both mirror in the Fox News bubble most if not all of these right wing Justices pickle in.

Which is what Trump is planning on in VOS Selections, the tariff case in which both right and left are trying to overturn Trump’s arbitrary illegal trade war. As I keep noting, this case is unique among all challenges to Trump’s unlawful power grabs, because conservative legal luminaries and NGOs like CATO, AEI, and the Chamber of Commerce have joined Democratic states in opposing the power grab. If SCOTUS will ever start reining Trump it, it is likely to be this case.

Back on May 28, the Court of International Trade ruled for the plaintiffs (along with small businesses like wine importer VOS Selections, a bunch of Democratic states), finding that IEEPA, the emergency authority Trump had invoked to impose or threaten tariffs, didn’t give him that authority.

After the hearing but before the court issued its ruling, DOJ submitted a bunch of declarations from Trump’s top officials (which because of the timing were never tested) claiming that if they lost the stick of IEEPA, it would lead other countries to stop negotiating on trade deals. Then, after the ruling, DOJ asked for a stay, relying on the argument in those declarations. The motion for a stay said that the plaintiffs — again, the lead plaintiff is a wine importer — would not be harmed by the period of uncertainty as this got litigated because if plaintiffs won, the government would simply pay them back.

For any plaintiff who is an importer, even if a stay is entered and we do not prevail on appeal, plaintiffs will assuredly receive payment on their refund with interest. “[T]here is virtually no risk” to any importer that they “would not be made whole” should they prevail on appeal. See Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 2017 WL 65421, at *5 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 5, 2017). The most “harm” that could incur would be a delay in collecting on deposits. This harm is, by definition, not irreparable. See Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs will not lose their entitlement to refund, plus interest, if the judgment is stayed, and they are guaranteed payment by defendants should the Court’s decision be upheld.

Immediately after the CIT order, DOJ asked the Circuit Court of Appeals for a stay, playing really hard on how without a stay Trump wouldn’t have a stick with which to negotiate his trade war.

As members of the President’s Cabinet have attested, the CIT’s order would irreparably harm the economic and national security of the United States. The Secretary of Commerce explained that the injunction “would undermine the United States-United Kingdom trade deal that was negotiated in reliance on the President’s emergency tariff authority,” plus the recent “China trade agreement,” and “would jeopardize the dozens of similar arrangements with foreign-trading partners that” are being negotiated. A76. “Each of these negotiations,” the declaration explained, “is premised on the credible threat of enforcement of the IEEPA tariffs,” and the injunction could compromise that threat, so that “foreign counterparts will have reduced incentives to reach meaningful agreements[].” Id. That could “leave the American people exposed to predatory economic practices by foreign actors[] and threaten national security.”

Again, the government assured the court that plaintiffs — and everyone else who had paid illegal tariffs — would get paid back: “the government will issue refunds to plaintiffs, including any postjudgment interest that accrues.”

The small business importers responded by describing all the reconstitution of markets that would happen during the appeal, but also describing the problem with permitting the President to continue to use illegal leverage during a period of a stay.

The President has legitimate means of conducting foreign policy; imposing illegal tariffs is not one of them. The President cannot act illegally as a matter of policy convenience, be ordered to stop, and then plead prior reliance on his illegal acts. If Defendants’ arguments were adopted, an injunction barring virtually any illegal action could be stayed by virtue of claiming that the illegality might create useful leverage: If the President illegally detained innocent people without due process, he could argue for a stay of an injunction against that action on the ground that detention could be useful leverage against the innocent detainees or their families, and thereby advance some claimed U.S. foreign policy or national security interests.

On June 10, the Circuit Court of Appeals granted that stay without engaging in the relative harm to either side, instead pointing to Wilcox, one of two SCOTUS shadow docket rulings about the President’s authority to fire people which has since undermined stays generally.

Days before the hearing, Trump rushed out a bunch of things called trade “deals,” which were not written down and about which both sides continue to argue. That includes a “deal” with the EU, Pakistan, and Korea. And on July 31, having not made the 90 deals supposedly leveraged with the stay, Trump simply set new tariffs, Liberation Day Two Point Oh.

On July 31 (the same day as those new tariffs), the full Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal. I actually think the judges were far more split than others did (those judges more favorable to the government spoke up later in the hearing), but it was really hard for me to judge given that most judges on the Circuit participated. This is like a mini-Supreme Court ruling before the big one. Still, the conventional wisdom is, I think, that the Circuit will rule against Trump.

Even before that, though, Trump started working the refs.

Even before the hearing, he claimed that America was dead a year ago but was getting rich off tariffs.

A week after the hearing, boasting that the tariffs-not-deals would go into effect that night, Trump said only a “radical left” court could stop him.

Days later he lied about how much money tariffs were bringing in (here’s the reality), and claimed that if a “radical left court” ruled against him, it — not the tariffs — would cause a Great Depression.

Yesterday, he lied that “consumers aren’t even paying these tariffs” (they’re paying about a fifth of them), then lashed out at a Goldman economist who said that would soon change.

Then John Sauer got into the batshittery.

Monday, about the same number of days after the Circuit Court hearing as it was when DOJ submitted the declarations demanding leverage to negotiate deals they ultimately never negotiated, this letter was submitted under Sauer’s name (but not on DOJ stationery). It cited the July 27 EU deal, announced before the Circuit Court hearing, as well as others announced still earlier than that, as an additional authority (which is normally a new Court ruling that might impact a pending one). Most of it derives directly from Trump’s Truth Social bullshit (marked in brackets below), including the President’s claims that America was a shithole country a year ago and that if a court overturns the tariffs, it (and not the underlying illegal actions) will cause a Great Depression. But it presents these in such a way that neither DOJ’s lawyers nor Trump himself can be held accountable to the court for the obvious lies.

[The President believes that our country would not be able to pay back the trillions of dollars that other countries have already committed to pay, which could lead to financial ruin.] Other tariff authorities that the President could potentially use are short-term, not nearly as powerful, and would render America captive to the abuses that it has endured from far more aggressive countries.

There is no substitute for the tariffs and deals that President Trump has made. [One year ago, the United States was a dead country, and now, because of the trillions of dollars being paid by countries that have so badly abused us, America is a strong, financially viable, and respected country again.] If the United States were forced to pay back the trillions of dollars committed to us, America could go from strength to failure the moment such an incorrect decision took effect.

These deals for trillions of dollars have been reached, and other countries have committed to pay massive sums of money. [If the United States were forced to unwind these historic agreements, the President believes that a forced dissolution of the agreements could lead to a 1929-style result. In such a scenario, people would be forced from their homes, millions of jobs would be eliminated, hard-working Americans would lose their savings, and even Social Security and Medicare could be threatened. In short, the economic consequences would be ruinous, instead of unprecedented success.]

Just about the only claim from anyone but Trump is that, “There is no substitute for the tariffs and deals that President Trump has mad,” which was made in the underlying declarations (and so is not a new authority either).

This is Presidential social media tantrum, presented as legal authority.

The small business plaintiffs responded by noting that the government already said this, therefore it doesn’t count as a new authority, reiterating the harm of any stay, and debunking the claim — the only one that comes from DOJ lawyers — that there is “no substitute” for illegal tariffs, such as going to Congress.

If the Court is inclined to consider the substance of the letter, there is no basis for its declaration that there is “no substitute” for “the tariffs and deals that President Trump has made.” Even without IEEPA, the President can obtain ex ante authority to enter into trade agreements, see 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a), or submit agreements for congressional approval, including via fast-track procedures, as prior presidents have done, see 19 U.S.C. § 4501 (implementing the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement).

Scott Bessent gave up the game the other day with Larry Kudlow (around 13:00). When Kudlow, who predictably allowed Bessent to spin a bunch of other bullshit unchallenged, suggested that if the Circuit Court rules against the government, then Trump has other ways of putting together the magical pony economic plan that Bessent had laid out in the interview.

Kudlow: If the tariff court wins on appeal, you’ve got other ways to put this trade and tariff policy together?

Bessent: Larry, good framing here would be if the tariff court rules against us, we will immediately — it will immediately be enjoined, so the tariffs will likely continue. Then it will go to the Supreme Court in October, then we would expect a ruling in January. But I tell you, Larry, the amount of money that’s coming in here, I think the more deals we’ve done, the more money coming in, it gets harder and harder for SCOTUS to rule against us.

As noted, this question — are there other legal ways to do this? — is the only one in Sauer’s letter that doesn’t derive directly from a Trump Truth Social post.

Bessent dodged the question and instead said that if the tariffs are ruled illegal, then they will just draw things out — just like Sauer did with Trump’s criminal case — until the cost of overturning the tariffs would be too big an ask for SCOTUS.

That is, they’re not even claiming any of this is legal.

They’re just boasting that if they can claim the US is paying its bills through inflated claims of tariff revenues, then the Roberts Court won’t dare uphold the law, for fear of being held accountable for the financial ruin Trump is rushing us towards.

And, as batshit as that Sauer letter is, they might well be right.

Update: I’ve annotated the letter.

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The EU Trade Deal: Playing for Time

Yesterday, Trump invited Ursula Von der Leyen for a lecture on windmills and a big announcement of a trade deal.

In theory and as laid out, Trump used threats of 30% tariffs to get the EU to capitulate to his demands, accepting 15% tariffs on goods exported to the United States rather than the 10% he was proposing weeks ago, before the Ghost of Jeffrey Epstein made him feel weak.

“The golf was beautiful,” Trump told reporters. “Even though I own it, it’s probably the best course in the world. And I look over the horizon and I see nine windmills at the end of the 18th. I say, isn’t that a shame?”

Trump said the EU will agree to purchase $750 billion of energy. It will also agree to invest $600 billion more than planned in the U.S.

Von der Leyen said the 15 percent tariff rate would be a ceiling, with the same rate applying to cars, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. The tariff treatment for alcoholic drinks has still to be worked out.

Europe would replace Russian gas with purchases of energy from the U.S. with purchases of $250 billion per year for the rest of Trump’s term, she added. [my emphasis]

While no one seems to be addressing this, the EU reportedly did not budge on EU regulations on tech, one of the things Trump had been pushing for.

US consumers will be taxed on EU goods — with some carveouts. But EU consumers won’t be taxed on US goods (which are already cheaper because Trump is destroying the dollar).

In theory, this creates the same perverse incentive structure as the Japanese deal did, in which Japanese companies pay a lower tariff, 15%, on cars than US producers pay for inputs, 50%. In theory, the Japanese deal could lead Toyota and Honda to move jobs out of the United States. The EU doesn’t have that kind of brand impact in the US, however, meaning Volkswagen is badly hit by the tariffs but not in a strong enough position to simply revert production to Germany (or some place cheaper in the EU).

The tariffs will impose some of the biggest costs on Ireland, since it exports a lot of pharmaceuticals to the US (and that production may be one of the easier things to return to US production). Meanwhile, goods exported from Northern Ireland face a 5% lower tariff.

Meanwhile, France’s Prime Minister is already condemning the deal.

France called a framework trade deal between the United States and European Union a “dark day” for Europe, saying the bloc had caved in to U.S. President Donald Trump with an unbalanced deal that slaps a headline 15% tariff on EU goods while sparing U.S. imports from any immediate European retaliation.

The criticism from Prime Minister Francois Bayrou followed months of French calls for EU negotiators to take a tougher stance against Trump by threatening reciprocal measures — a position that contrasted with the more conciliatory approaches of Germany and Italy.

“It is a dark day when an alliance of free peoples, brought together to affirm their common values and to defend their common interests, resigns itself to submission,” Bayrou wrote on X of what he called the “von der Leyen-Trump deal”.

I can’t help but think that this deal is just a holding pattern. After all, Trump plans to discuss with Keir Starmer today the deal he made with the UK back and May and was signed back in June. Every other deal he has “made” has led immediately to a dispute about what the countries really agreed to. Deals don’t actually get finalized for months after the deal. And Van der Leyen is kidding herself if you think Trump will be locked in to anything.

Meanwhile, as noted above, there’s no deal yet on how much Trump will tax French wines and other fancy European booze.

That’s notable given that Trump’s appeal of lower court rulings that his tariffs are unlawful, in part, because they’re so arbitrary and capricious will be Thursday at 10AM. And the lead plaintiff in that case is a wine importer, still looking for clarity on how much they’ll pay to import wines from, among other places, Austria, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Croatia, and Hungary, over a 100 days after suing.

Plaintiff V.O.S. Selections, Inc. is a 39-year-old New York-based business, founded by Victor Owen Schwartz, that specializes in the importation and distribution of small-production wines, spirits, and sakes from six continents. V.O.S. Selections has made and makes significant direct purchases of wines, spirits, and sakes from Austria, Italy, Greece, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain, France, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina, Germany, Croatia, Hungary, and South Africa. The products it imports are not reasonably available from a producer in the United States.

If the Circuit Court of Appeals upholds (or preferably, improves) the lower court ruling, then this whole process will be thrown back into chaos until SCOTUS tells us whether their expansive view of the presidency extends to roiling international trade agreements every time he gets grumpy about a sex trafficking scandal.

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Jamieson Greer Says Trump’s Trade Deficit Emergency Wasn’t as Serious an Emergency “as Maybe Thought”

Against the background of empty ports, stalled shipping traffic, and impending business failures, Trump has capitulated on his trade embargo with China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will announce an even bigger rollback of tariffs than the 80 or 50% tariffs Trump floated last week, to 30% (which is the 10% tariffs imposed worldwide, plus the 20% that purports to be a punishment for China’s role in providing precursors for fentanyl).

The U.S. and China agreed to slash punishingly high tariffs on each other’s goods, a major thaw in trade relations that resets the tone between the world’s two largest economies from outright conflict to constructive engagement.

After weekend talks in Geneva:

  • President Trump’s “reciprocal” tariff on China will fall to 10% from 125%.
  • A separate 20% tariff the president imposed over what he described as China’s role in the fentanyl trade will remain.
  • Beijing will cut its retaliatory levies on U.S. goods to 10% from 125%.
  • The U.S. said the reductions would last for 90 days while the two sides begin further talks.

The agreement lowered tariffs levels more than Wall Street expected and came after just two days of talks.

In announcing this “deal,” Greer offered up thin excuses for capitulating within hours.

It’s important to understand how quickly we were able to come to an agreement, which reflects that perhaps the differences were not so large as maybe thought. That said, there was a lot of groundwork that went into these these two days.

Just remember why we’re here in the first place is the United States has a massive $1.2 trillion trade deficit. So the President declared a national emergency, and imposed tariffs. We’re confident that the deal we struck with our Chinese partners will help us to resolve — work toward resolving that national emergency.

“Perhaps the differences were not so large as maybe thought” — thought by whom, Greer doesn’t say. But Greer does note that the President was the guy who declared those differences that were not so large as maybe thought to be an emergency.

Trump thought it was an emergency. Now Greer says it wasn’t, as it turns out.

Once it became clear that Trump had caused a far bigger emergency by declaring one, it took just hours to rethink the claimed emergency.

The focus on the emergency may cause the Administration headaches going forward (which may be why Greer attempted to offer an excuse).

That claimed emergency is the basis via which Trump usurped Congress’ authority to set tariffs.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that underlying conditions, including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States. That threat has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States in the domestic economic policies of key trading partners and structural imbalances in the global trading system. I hereby declare a national emergency with respect to this threat.

A series of lawsuits challenging Trump’s tariffs — in this case, one brought by a wine importer, VOS Selections, and other small businesses, supported by right wing funders, in which Greer is a named defendant — have argued the trade deficit is not an emergency. [docket]

The President has no authority under IEEPA to issue the tariffs. IEEPA does not even mention tariffs. No other President has asserted this authority. IEEPA was passed to limit the President’s emergency powers. If Congress wanted to grant the President the authority to issue tariffs in IEEPA, it could have, as it has done so elsewhere. But when Congress does give the President tariff authority, it does so subject to strict statutory limits.

Legitimate use of IEEPA is limited to cases of emergencies where there is an “unusual and extraordinary threat.” But the national emergency the President has declared—the existence of bilateral trade deficits with some countries—is not an emergency, nor is it unusual or extraordinary. The United States has had some amount of trade deficit in goods for most of the last century, while having the most economic success of any country in history.

Moreover, the power claimed by the President here is extreme: he claims the power to unilaterally impose infinite tariffs of his choosing on any country he chooses—even countries with which we run a trade surplus. Any grant of such authority by Congress to the President should qualify as a major question subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny—which this claim of authority under IEEPA cannot survive.

The government, in response, has argued that it — like other Executive authorities — is not subject to court review.

More to the point, courts have consistently held that the President’s emergency declarations under the National Emergencies Act, and the adequacy of his policy choices addressing those emergencies under IEEPA, are unreviewable. “Although presidential declarations of emergencies . . . have been at issue in many cases, no court has ever reviewed the merits of such a declaration.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2020) (emphasis in original). And the Federal Circuit has recognized that an inquiry to “examine the President’s motives and justifications for declaring a national emergency” under IEEPA “would likely present a nonjusticiable political question.” Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 896 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 579 (“courts will not normally review the essentially political questions surrounding the declaration or continuance of a national emergency”); United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023) (refusing to review declaration of emergency under IEEPA); In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 777 F. Supp. 2d 529, 575 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that whether the government of Iran’s actions and policies constituted an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” was an unreviewable judgment “reserved to the executive branch”); Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-95 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that whether Nicaragua posed sufficient threat to trigger the President’s IEEPA power to impose an embargo on the country was a nonjusticiable political question).

Reviewing the legitimacy of the underlying emergency—a foreign-affairs and nationalsecurity matter constitutionally and statutorily committed to the President—would require “the court to assess the wisdom of the President’s judgment concerning the nature and extent of that threat, a matter not susceptible to judicially manageable standards.” Beacon Products, 63 F. Supp. at 1195. Thus, the President’s “motives, his reasoning, his finding of facts requiring the action, and his judgment, are immune from judicial scrutiny.” Florsheim, 744 F.2d at 796; see United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) (“For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive domains.”).

Normally, such an argument would carry a lot of sway with courts.

But in a parallel invocation of Presidential authority, judges already are pointing to Trump’s fickleness as evidence that his justifications for exercising Executive authority are bullshit. In her opinion granting Perkins Coie summary judgement against Trump’s attack on the law firm, Beryl Howell noted that the only thing that happened between the time Trump claimed Paul, Weiss lawyers could not be trusted with security clearances and when he decided they could be was their agreement to provide $40 million in pro bono legal services. [docket]

Second, and tellingly, the Paul, Weiss EO contained a virtually identical security clearance review provision to the one at issue in this case. Compare EO 14230 § 2, 90 Fed. Reg. at 11781, with Paul, Weiss EO § 2, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13039. As discussed, see supra Part III.B.1(b), the Paul, Weiss EO was revoked only seven days after its issuance when President Trump reached a “deal” with that firm. See generally Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, 90 Fed. Reg. 13685. While the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order summarized that firm’s agreement to, inter alia, “adopt[] a policy of political neutrality with respect to client selection and attorney hiring; tak[e] on a wide range of pro bono matters representing the full political spectrum; commit[] to merit-based hiring, promotion, and retention . . .; dedicat[e] the equivalent of $40 million in pro bono legal services during [President Trump’s] term in office . . .; and other similar initiatives,” none of these agreedupon policy or practice changes appear to explain or address how any national security concerns sufficient to warrant the Paul, Weiss EO could have changed so rapidly. Id. § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. at 13685. The speed of the reversal and the rationale provided in the Paul, Weiss Revocation Order, which focused only on agreements to advance policy initiatives of the Trump Administration, see id., further support the conclusion that national security considerations are not a plausible explanation for Section 2.

As Roger Parloff noted, Paul Clement made a similar point in arguing that the EO against Wilmer Hale must be overturned (I’m fairly certain he has made this more general observation about how the Paul, Weiss flipflop made the retaliatory EOs more vulnerable).

I think it’s crystal clear, he proceeds, that it’s all tied together. Section 1 explains what motivated all the sections.

What happened with the law firm of Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison adds further support for viewing the order as a whole, he argues. Paul Weiss faced the same operative provisions in an executive order issued on March 14. But on March 21, a later executive order repealed the whole thing. It didn’t keep, say, the security clearances or restrictions on government buildings while rescinding other sections.

Clement thinks that’s particularly telling with respect to the security clearances, he says. When you look to the agreement Paul, Weiss made with the president, there wasn’t anything specific mentioned about national security or the national interest or anything else. It was mostly about providing $40 million in pro bono services that were more to the president’s liking.

This trade deficit emergency Trump declared remains the claimed basis for the 10% tariffs still levied against China and most other countries in the world (as a wine importer, tariffs on those other countries, not China — Austria, Italy, Greece, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain, France, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina, Germany, Croatia, Hungary, and South Africa — are the ones that pose a problem for VOS Selections).

And now his Trade Representative has gone on TV to proclaim that maybe what was claimed to be an emergency was “not so large as maybe thought.”

I look forward to plaintiffs invoking Greer’s admission going forward.

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