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John Bolton Versus Navy Versus Egan

John Bolton filed a motion opposing the government’s legal actions against him last night (it is both a memorandum in opposition to the Temporary Restraining Order as well as a motion to dismiss). It is particularly interesting because of some things Jack Goldsmith and Marty Lederman laid out in this post. As they note, the judge presiding over today’s hearing has no tolerance for Executive Branch bullshit, even on classified matters; the government’s own description of what happened raises lots of questions about regularity of the claim of classification, particularly as respects to whether there any compartmented information (SCI) remains in Bolton’s book; and the scrutiny of the government will be particularly stringent here, since it wants to censor something before publication.

This, however, might be a case in which a judge rejects or at least refuses to countenance the government’s classification decisions, at least for purposes of the requested injunction. That’s because of a confluence of unusual factors.  They include:

  • Several years ago, Judge Lamberth declared at a conference of federal employees that federal courts are “far too deferential” to the executive branch’s claims that certain information must be classified on national security grounds and shouldn’t be released to the public.  Judges shouldn’t afford government officials “almost blind deference,” said Lamberth.
  • The decision to classify material here appears to be highly irregular.  The career official responsible for prepublication review at the National Security Council determined after a long process that Bolton’s manuscript contained no classified information.  A political appointee who had only recently become a classifying authority, Ellis, then arrived at a different conclusion after only a brief review.  It is even possible that Ellis classified information in Bolton’s manuscript for the first time after Bolton was told by Knight that the manuscript contained no classified information.  At a minimum there were clearly process irregularities in the prepublication consideration of Bolton’s manuscript.
  • The D.C. Circuit in dicta in McGehee stated that the government “would bear a much heavier burden” than the usual rationality review of executive branch classified information determinations in cases where the government seeks “an injunction against publication of censored items”—i.e., in a case like this one.  Although it’s not clear whether that’s right, the First Amendment concerns raised by this case, in this setting, may affect how credulous Judge Lamberth is of the government’s classified information determinations and of the unusual way in which Bolton’s prepublication review was conducted.

Bolton’s motion answers a lot of questions that Goldsmith and Lederman asked in their post. For example, they ask whether Ellen Knight consulted with other top classification authorities before she verbally told Bolton the book had no more classified information in it; Bolton’s motion describes that on the call when Knight told Bolton the book had no more classified information, she, “cryptically replied that her ‘interaction’ with unnamed others in the White House about the book had ‘been very delicate,’ and that there were ‘some internal process considerations to work through.'”

Goldsmith and Lederman lay out a lot of questions contemplating the likelihood that Michael Ellis claimed the manuscript had SCI information after Knight informed Bolton that it had no more classified information, of any kind (remember, Ellis is likely the guy who moved Trump’s Ukraine transcript onto the compartmented server after people started raising concerns about it, so there would be precedent). Bolton’s brief lays out an extended description of why, if this indeed happened, it doesn’t matter with respect to the way his SCI non-disclosure agreement is written, because based on the record even the government presents, Bolton had no reason to believe the manuscript had SCI in it, and plenty of reason to believe it had no classified information of any type, when he instructed Simon & Schuster to move towards publication.

However, in its brief, the Government asserts for the first time that Ambassador Bolton’s book contains SCI and, therefore, that the SCI NDA applied to his manuscript and required that he receive written authorization from the NSC to publish it. See Doc. 3 at 12–14. This surprise assertion that the book contains SCI, even if true, would not alter the conclusion that the SCI NDA is inapplicable to this case.

The Government is not painting on a blank canvas when it asserts that Ambassador Bolton’s book contains SCI. Rather, the Government’s assertion comes after a six-month course of dealing between the parties that informs whether and how the NDAs apply. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981); see also id. § 223. Ambassador Bolton submitted his manuscript for prepublication review on December 30, 2019. Over the next four months, he (or his counsel) and Ms. Knight exchanged more than a dozen emails and letters, participated in numerous phone calls, and sat through more than a dozen hours of face-to-face meetings, painstakingly reviewing Ambassador Bolton’s manuscript. Yet, in all that time, Ms. Knight never asserted—or even hinted—that the manuscript contained SCI, even as she asserted that earlier drafts contained classified information. 102 After conducting an exhaustive process in which she reviewed the manuscript through least four waves of changes, Ms. Knight concluded that it contains no classified information—let alone SCI—as the Government concedes. Doc. 1 ¶ 46.

Nor did Mr. Eisenberg assert in either his June 8 or June 11 letters that the manuscript contains SCI. Nor did Mr. Ellis assert in his June 16 letter that the manuscript contains SCI. Indeed, not even the Government’s complaint asserted that the manuscript contains SCI, even as it specifically alleges that it contains “Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret” information. Doc. 1 ¶ 58. The first time that anyone in the Government so much as whispered that the manuscript contains SCI to either Ambassador Bolton or the public was yesterday, when the Government filed its motion. For nearly six months, it has been common ground between the NSC and Ambassador Bolton that his manuscript does not contain SCI. Only now, on the eve of the book’s publication and in service of seeking a prior restraint, has the Government brought forth this allegation.

And here is the key point: Ambassador Bolton authorized Simon & Schuster to publish his manuscript weeks ago, not long after receiving Ms. Knight’s confirmation that the book did not contain classified information and long before the Government’s first assertion yesterday that the book contained SCI. 103 Thus, at the time Ambassador Bolton proceeded with publishing his book—a decision that has long-since become irrevocable—he had absolutely no reason to believe that the book contained SCI. Indeed, quite the opposite: the Government had given him every reason to believe that it agreed with him that the book did not contain SCI. And if the book did not contain SCI, the SCI NDA did not apply when Ambassador Bolton authorized the book’s publication.

Yet the Government now argues that the SCI NDA did apply based on its discovery of alleged SCI six months after the prepublication-review process began. If that argument is sustained—if, that is, an author may be held liable under the SCI NDA even though neither the author nor the Government believed that the author’s writing contained SCI through four months of exhaustive prepublication review—it would mean that any federal employee who signs the SCI NDA would have no choice but to submit any writing, and certainly any writing that could even theoretically contain SCI, and then await written authorization before publishing that writing. The risk of liability would simply be too great for any author to proceed with publishing even a writing that both he and the official in charge of prepublication review believe, in good faith, is not subject to the SCI NDA.

What Goldsmith and Lederman don’t address — but Bolton does at length in his brief — is the role of the President in these matters. Bolton lays out (as many litigants against the President have before) abundant evidence that the President was retaliating here, including by redefining as highly classified any conversation with him at a very late stage in this process.

Yet, the evidence is overwhelming that the Government’s assertion that the manuscript contains classified information, like the corrupted prepublication review process that preceded it, is pretextual and in bad faith:

  • On January 29, the President tweeted that Ambassador Bolton’s book is “nasty & untrue,” thus implicitly acknowledging that its contents had been at least partially described to him. He also said that the book was “All Classified National Security.”112
  • On February 3, Vanity Fair reported that the President “has an enemies list,” that “Bolton is at the top of the list,” and that the “campaign against Bolton” included Ms. Knight’s January 23 letter asserting that the manuscript contained classified information.113 It also reported that the President “wants Bolton to be criminally investigated.”114
  • On February 21, the Washington Post reported that “President Trump has directly weighed in on the White House [prepublication] review of a forthcoming book by his former national security adviser, telling his staff that he views John Bolton as ‘a traitor,’ that everything he uttered to the departed aide about national security is classified and that he will seek to block the book’s publication.”115 The President vowed: “[W]e’re going to try and block the publication of [his] book. After I leave office, he can do this.”116
  • As described in detail above, Ambassador Bolton’s book went through a four-month prepublication-review process with the career professionals at NSC, during which he made innumerable revisions to the manuscript in response to Ms. Knight’s concerns. At the end of that exhaustive process, she stated that she had no further edits to the manuscript,117 thereby confirming, as the Government has admitted, that she had concluded that it did not contain any classified information.118
  • At the conclusion of the prepublication-review process on April 27, Ms. Knight thought that Ambassador Bolton was entitled to receive the pro-forma letter clearing the book for publication and suggested that it might be ready that same afternoon.119 She and Ambassador Bolton even discussed how the letter should be transmitted to him.120
  • During that same April 27 conversation, Ms. Knight described her “interaction” with unnamed others in the White House about the book as having “been very delicate,”121 and she had “some internal process considerations to work through.”
  • After April 27, six weeks passed without a word from the White House about Ambassador Bolton’s manuscript, despite his requests for a status update.122
  • When the White House finally had something new to say, it was to assert its current allegations of classified information on June 8, in a letter that—by the White House’s own admission—was prompted by press reports that the book was about to be published.123
  • Even though the manuscript was submitted to NSC on December 30, 2019, and despite the exhaustive four-month review and the six weeks of silence that had passed since Ms. Knight’s approval of the manuscript on April 27, the White House’s June 8 letter gave itself until June 19—only four days before the book was due to be published—to provide Ambassador Bolton’s counsel with a redacted copy of the book identifying the passages the White House purported to believe were classified.
  • On the eve of this lawsuit being filed, in response to a question about this lawsuit, the President stated: “I told that to the attorney general before; I will consider every conversation with me as president highly classified. So that would mean that if he wrote a book, and if the book gets out, he’s broken the law.”124 The President reiterated: “Any conversation with me is classified.”125 The President added that “a lot of people are very angry with [Bolton] for writing a book” and that he “hope[d]” that Ambassador Bolton “would have criminal problems” due to having published the book.126
  • On June 16, the NSC provided to Ambassador Bolton a copy of the manuscript with wholesale redactions removing the portions it now claims are classified. Consistent with President Trump’s claim, statements made by the President have been redacted, as have numerous passages that depict the President in an unfavorable light.127

It is clear from this evidence that the White House has abused the prepublication-review and classification process, and has asserted fictional national security concerns as a pretext to censor, or at least to delay indefinitely, Ambassador Bolton’s right to speak.

While Goldsmith and Lederman focused, with good reason, on Ellis’ role, Bolton is focused on President Trump’s role. Bolton lays out abundant evidence that the reason this prepublication review went off the rails is because the President, knowing how unflattering it was to him, made sure it did.

And that raises entirely new issues because under a SCOTUS precedent called Navy v. Egan, the Executive has long held that the President has unreviewable authority over classification and declassification decisions. That doesn’t change contract law. And–given that the courts have already granted the President a limited authority to protect the kinds of things being called SCI here under Executive Privilege–it raises real questions about whether Trump is relying on the proper legal claim here (which may be a testament to the fact that Executive Privilege holds little sway over former government officials).

Still, courts have sanctioned a bunch of absurdity about classification under the Navy v. Egan precedent, arguably far beyond the scope of what that decision (which pertained to clearances) covered. Yet, I would argue that Bolton has made Navy v. Egan a central question (though he does not mention it once) in this litigation.

Can the President retroactively classify information as SCI solely to retaliate against someone for embarrassing him — including by exposing him to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act? That’s the stuff of tyranny, and Royce Lamberth is not the judge who’ll play along with it.

Let me very clear however, particularly for the benefit of some frothy leftists who are claiming — in contradiction to all evidence — that liberals are somehow embracing Bolton by criticizing Trump’s actions here: Bolton’s plight is not that different from what whistleblowers claim happens to them when they embarrass the Executive Branch generally. Their books get held up in review and some of them get prosecuted under the Espionage Act.

What makes this more ironic, involving Bolton, is that he has been on the opposite side of this issue. Indeed, the Valerie Plame leak investigation focused closely on whether Dick Cheney’s orders to Scooter Libby to leak classified information — after which he leaked details consistent with knowing Plame’s covert status, as well as details from the National Intelligence Estimate — were properly approved by George Bush. Bolton was a party to that pushback and his deputy Fred Fleitz was suspected of having had a more active role in it. In that case, the President (or Vice President) retaliated for the release of embarrassing information by declassifying information for political purposes. But in that case, the details of what the President had done have remained secret, protected by Libby’s lies to this day.

In this case, Bolton can present a long list of evidence — including the President’s own statements — that suggest these classification decisions were retaliatory, part of a deliberate effort to trap Bolton in a legal morass.

So Bolton isn’t unique for his treatment as a “whistleblower” (setting aside his cowardice in waiting to say all this). He’s typical. What’s not typical is how clearly the President’s own role and abusive intent is laid out. And because of the latter fact — because, as usual, Trump hasn’t hidden his abusive purpose — it may more directly test the limits of the President’s supposedly unreviewable authority to classify information. So, ironically, someone like Bolton may finally be in a position to test whether Navy v. Egan really extends to sanctioning the retroactive classification of information solely to expose someone to criminal liability.

In 2003, OLC Doubled Down on Unlimited (de)Classification Authority for the President

One of the tactics those in DOJ attempted to use in 2004 to put some controls on Stellar Wind, it appears from the DOJ IG Report, was to point to legal requirements to inform Congress (for example, to inform Congress that the Attorney General had decided not to enforce particular laws), which might have led to enough people in Congress learning of the program to impose some limits on it. For example, Robert Mueller apparently tried to get the Executive to brief the Judiciary Committees, in addition to the Gang of Four, about the program.

On March 16, 2004 Gonzales wrote a letter to Jim Comey in response to DOJ’s efforts to force the Administration to follow the law. Previous reporting revealed that Gonzales told Comey he misunderstood the White House’s interest in DOJ’s opinion.

Your memorandum appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the President’s expectations regarding the conduct of the Department of Justice. While the President was, and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed definitively for the Executive Branch in the Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the law.

This appears to have led directly to Comey drafting his resignation letter.

But what previous reporting didn’t make clear was that Gonzales also claimed the Administration had unfettered authority to decide whether or not to share classified information (and that, implicitly, it could blow off statutory Congressional reporting requirements).

Gonzales letter also addressed Comey’s comments about congressional notification. Citing Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) and a 2003 OLC opinion, Gonzales’s letter stated that the President has the constitutional authority to define and control access to the nation’s secrets, “including authority to determine the extent to which disclosure may be made outside the Executive Branch.” (TS//STLW//SI/OC/NF) [PDF 504]

I’m as interested in this as much for the timing of the memo — 2003 — as the indication that the Executive asserted the authority to invoke unlimited authority over classification as a way to flout reporting mandates (both with regards to Stellar Wind, but the implication is, generally as well).

The most likely time frame for this decision would be around March 25, 2003, when President Bush was also rewriting the Executive Order on classification (this EO is most famous because it gave the Vice President new authorities over classifying information). If that’s right, it would confirm that Bush’s intent with the EO (and the underlying OLC memo) was to expand the ability to invoke classification for whatever reasons.

And if that OLC opinion was written around the time of the March 2003 EO, it would mean it was on the books (and, surely, known by David Addington) when he counseled Scooter Libby in July 2003 he could leak whatever it was Dick Cheney told him to leak to Judy Miller, up to and including Valerie Plame’s identity.

But I’m also interested that this footnote was classified under STLW, the Stellar Wind marking. That may not be definitive, especially given the innocuous reference to the OLC memo. But it’s possible that means the 2003 opinion — the decision to share or not share classified information according to the whim of the President — was tied to Stellar Wind. That would be interesting given that George Tenet and John Yoo were declaring Iraq and their claimed conspirators in the US were terrorists permissible for surveillance around the same time.

Finally, I assume this OLC memo, whatever it says, is still on the books. And given how it was interpreted in the past — that OLC could simply ignore reporting mandates — and that the government continued to flout reporting mandates until at least 2010, even those tied specifically to surveillance, I assume that the Executive still believes it can use a claimed unlimited authority over classification to trump legally mandated reporting requirements.

That’s worth keeping in mind as we debate a bill, USA F-ReDux, celebrated, in part, for its reporting requirements.

Navy v. Egan, not Just Branzburg v. Hayes, Needs Fixed

Today, 340 new journalists will join the 10 or so who have been covering the Bradley Manning prosecution closely for the last several years; his trial starts today at Fort Meade.

Expect to see a bunch of essays on secrecy to mark the beginning of the trial.

This one, in which Steven Coll calls for the Supreme Court to revisit the Branzburg v. Hayes decision that established a spirit but not a law protecting press sources, has already generated a lot of attention.

In the long run, to rebalance the national-security state and to otherwise revitalize American democracy, the United States requires a Supreme Court willing to deepen protections for investigative reporters, as the majority in Branzburg would not.

Among some other minor factual inaccuracies (including what the AP UndieBomb 2.0 leak was originally about), it includes this claim.

[Obama’s] longest-serving advisers are disciplined and insular to a fault; press leaks offend their aesthetic of power.

While I agree Obama’s advisors are insular to a fault, and agree they revel in an aesthetic of power, they do not despise all press leaks. Even aside from the typical policy debate leaks of classified information, the White House has long reveled in “leaking” classified information to selected members of the press, to get the information out there on its own terms. The tactic is not new — it is precisely the A1 cut-out approach the Bush Administration used to get us into the Iraq War. But the Obama Administration may have expanded its use (that is actually the reason Republicans in Congress were demanding investigations of the leaks that followed the AP story, the ones that, unlike the AP, exposed our mole).

Which is why Coll proposes an inadequate solution to what I agree is the key problem.

Obama inherited a bloated national-security state. It contains far too many official secrets and far too many secret-keepers—more than a million people now hold top-secret clearances. Under a thirty-year-old executive order issued by the White House, the intelligence agencies must inform the Justice Department whenever they believe that classified information has been disclosed illegally to the press. These referrals operate on a kind of automatic pilot, and the system is unbalanced. Prosecutors in Justice’s national-security division initially decide on whether to make a criminal case or to defer to the First Amendment. The record shows that in recent years the division has been bent on action.

I’m not opposed to establishing clearer laws about when a journalist’s sources may be protected. But that can be used — as Dick Cheney tried to use it — as a screen for his exposure of Valerie Plame. Protecting journalists’ sources will not only protect real whistleblowers, but it will also protect the system of official leaks that both Bush and Obama have used to accrue power and avoid accountability.

So not only is fixing Branzburg v. Hayes not enough to fix our “unbalanced … bloated national security state,” it doesn’t get at the underlying problem

As a threshold measure, journalists should be calling for the limitation or repeal of the Espionage Act, which is the real stick Obama is using to cut down on unsanctioned leaks. It’s bad enough for whistleblowers to risk losing their clearance, and with it, a well-compensated livelihood. But as soon as you start talking extended prison sentences, as soon as you start accusing whistleblowers of being worse than an enemy’s spy because they shared damning information with the public generally, that’s going to silence unsanctioned leaks.

Just as importantly, this entire structure of abuse of power rests on a different SCOTUS decision, Navy v. Egan, which gives the Executive absolute control over security clearances (and therefore the less powerful leverage usually wielded against whistleblowers, the ability to strip their clearance), but which has been interpreted by Bush and Obama to give the Executive unfettered authority to determine what is secret and what is not. This decision — which is precisely what David Addington told Scooter Libby he could rely on to justify outing Plame on Cheney’s order — is also what the Obama Administration cited when it refused to litigate al-Haramain and in so doing granted the Bush Administration impunity for illegal wiretapping. The Executive’s claim to have unlimited authority to decide what is secret and not is also what prevents the Senate Intelligence Committee from declassifying the torture report on its own authority. It is also the basis for the authority to stall releasing video of US helicopters gunning down a Reuters team to Reuters under FOIA, which led to Manning leaking it to WikiLeaks himself.

The Obama and Bush Administrations have claimed that no one — not Congress, not the Courts — has the authority to review their arbitrary use of secrecy to accrue more power. That claim is an expansive reading of Navy v. Egan, but thus far not one anyone has challenged before SCOTUS. And that is what has enabled them (with the limited exception of the Plame outing) to avoid all consequences for their asymmetric use of leaks.

So, yes, it would be useful if SCOTUS decided that journalists and others engaging in legitimate investigation can protect sources, especially when investigating national security. But until the underlying system — the Executive’s claim that it can abuse secrecy to protect itself — is changed, secrecy will remain a cancer rotting our democracy.

Appeals Court Treats Commissary Gatorade Supplies as a “Clear and Present Danger”

Navy v. Egan–the SCOTUS case Executive Branch officials always point to to claim unlimited powers over classification authority–just got bigger.

Berry v. Conyers extends the national security employment veto over commissary jobs

The original 1988 case pertained to Thomas Egan, who lost his job as a laborer at a naval base when he was denied a security clearance. He appealed his dismissal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which then had to determine whether it had authority to review the decision to fire him based on the security clearance denial. Ultimately, SCOTUS held that MSPB could not review the decision of the officer who first fired Egan.

The grant or denial of security clearance to a particular employee is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call that is committed by law to the appropriate Executive Branch agency having the necessary expertise in protecting classified information. It is not reasonably possible for an outside, nonexpert body to review the substance of such a judgment, and such review cannot be presumed merely because the statute does not expressly preclude it.

Unlike Egan, the plaintiffs in this case did not have jobs that required they have access to classified information. Nevertheless, plaintiffs Rhonda Conyers (who was an accounting clerk whose “security threat” pertained to personal debt) and Devon Haughton Northover (who worked in a commissary and also charged discrimination) were suspended and demoted, respectively, when the government deemed them a security risk.

In a decision written by Evan Wallach and joined by Alan Lourie, the Federal Circuit held that the Egan precedent,

require[s] that courts refrain from second-guessing Executive Branch agencies’ national security determinations concerning eligibility of an individual to occupy a sensitive position, which may not necessarily involve access to classified information.

That is, the Federal government can fire you in the name of national security if you have a “sensitive” job, whether or not you actually have access to classified information.

As Timothy Dyk’s dissent notes, the effect of this ruling is to dramatically limit civil service protections for any position the government deems sensitive, both within DOD–where both Conyers and Northover work–and outside it.

Under the majority’s expansive holding, where an employee’s position is designated as a national security position, see 5 C.F.R. § 732.201(a), the Board lacks jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of any removal, suspension, demotion, or other adverse employment action covered by 5 U.S.C. § 7512.

[snip]

As OPM recognizes, under the rule adopted by the majority, “[t]he Board’s review . . . is limited to determining whether [the agency] followed necessary procedures . . . [and] the merits of the national security determinations are not subject to review.”

In doing so, the dissent continues, it would gut protection against whistleblower retaliation and discrimination.

As the Board points out, the principle adopted by the majority not only precludes review of the merits of adverse actions, it would also “preclude Board and judicial review of whistleblower retaliation and a whole host of other constitutional and statutory violations for federal employees subjected to otherwise appealable removals and other adverse actions.” Board Br. at 35. This effect is explicitly conceded by OPM, which agrees that the agency’s “liability for damages for alleged discrimination or retaliation” would not be subject to review. OPM Br. at 25. OPM’s concession is grounded in existing law since the majority expands Egan to cover all “national security” positions, and Egan has been held to foreclose whistleblower, discrimination, and other constitutional claims.

Tracking Gatorade supplies can now represent a “clear and present danger”

There are a couple of particularly troubling details about how Wallach came to his decision. In a footnote trying to sustain the claim that a commissary employee might be a national security threat, Wallach argues that Northover could represent a threat in the commissary by observing how much rehydration products and sunglasses service members were buying.

The Board goes too far by comparing a government position at a military base commissary to one in a “Seven Eleven across the street.”

[snip]

Commissary employees do not merely observe “[g]rocery store stock levels” or other-wise publicly observable information. Resp’ts’ Br. 20. In fact, commissary stock levels of a particular unclassified item – sunglasses, for example, with shatterproof lenses, or rehydration products – might well hint at deployment orders to a particular region for an identifiable unit. Read more

Security Clearance Tyranny

Let’s review three data points on security clearances. They’ll show that our system of security clearances are increasingly becoming an arbitrary system of control that does more to foster cowed national security employees than to foster actual national security.

We’ve already discussed one of these data points: James Clapper’s decision to add an as-yet undefined question to Intelligence Community polygraphs probing unauthorized (but not authorized) disclosure of classified information.

First, those agencies within the IC that have mandatory lie detector tests will add an unspecified question about “unauthorized disclosure of classified information.”

(1) mandating that a question related to unauthorized disclosure of classified information be added to the counterintelligence polygraph used by all intelligence agencies that administer the examination (CIA, DIA, DOE, FBI, NGA, NRO, and NSA).

Not only does this cover just some who might have access to classified information, leaving some agencies, contractors, Congressional employees, and White House employees, not to mention our international intelligence partners, in the clear. But it also brackets off the “authorized” disclosure of classified information.

It’s a bad decision because it doesn’t end the asymmetrical abuse of classified information and it’s a bad decision because polygraphs are unreliable.

But it’s also unreliable because at least one of the IC agencies involved slated for this new question–the National Reconnaissance Office–has already been conducting fishing expeditions during polygraphs to find sensitive information.

The National Reconnaissance Office is so intent on extracting confessions of personal or illicit behavior that officials have admonished polygraphers who refused to go after them and rewarded those who did, sometimes with cash bonuses, a McClatchy investigation found.

The disclosures include a wide range of behavior and private thoughts such as drug use, child abuse, suicide attempts, depression and sexual deviancy. The agency, which oversees the nation’s spy satellites, records the sessions that were required for security clearances and stores them in a database.

As McClatchy reports, the NRO pursued such confessions–which are outside the scope of what they’re supposed to ask–even after they were warned to stop.

What’s particularly troubling is that the NRO is not using this information–or not in the most obvious way, by prosecuting those who reveal past crimes. Read more