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In addition to the apparent miscommunication between Mark Udall and Acting (and presumably soon to be confirmed) DOJ National Security Division Head John Carlin, there was an even more telling exchange in today’s hearing. In it, Martin Heinrich asked whether DOJ had yet written down its radical new policy of giving notice to defendants caught […]
Way back in 2013, in Marty Lederman’s review of the NSA Review Group’s Report, he pointed to the Report’s suggestion that Section 702 collection was limited to use with counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and cybersecurity. The Report contains an interesting clue about how the government is presently using Section 702 that I do not recall being previously disclosed—and raises […]
I’m going to have a few posts on the Leahy-Sensenbrenner bill, which is the most likely way we’ll be able to rein in NSA spying. In addition to several sections stopping bulk collection, it has a section on collection of US person data under FISA Amendments Act (I’ll return to the back-door loophole later). But […]
There’s a section of DiFi’s FakeFISAFix bill, called “Restrictions on the Querying of the Contents of Certain Communications,” that purports to put new limits on the searches of data collected under Section 702 for US person information. (m) QUERIES.— (1) LIMITATION ON QUERY TERMS THAT IDENTIFY A UNITED STATES PERSON.—A query of the contents of communications […]
Over four months ago, I noted that the most impressive success touted in James Clapper’s fact sheet on Section 702 pertained to cybersecurity, not terrorism. Communications collected under Section 702 have provided significant and unique intelligence regarding potential cyber threats to the United States, including specific potential network computer attacks. This insight has led to […]
Update: To help Joshua Foust understand this topic, I did a second, really basic version of this post here. So if you’re fairly new to all this stuff, you might start there and then come back. Update: Alexander’s office has conceded Udall and Wyden’s point about the classified inaccuracy. It also notes: With respect to […]
The AP has a story about the way algorithms control Section 702, the legal program for which PRISM provides NSA analysts acces. And while he also admits that Obama “had expanded the scope of the surveillance,” Michael Hayden makes this false claim (which he actually said on FNS). Michael Hayden, who led both the NSA […]
Some company successfully argued that, under FISA 702, if they don’t have access to your data, they can’t be compelled to provide US spooks assistance to get to it.
There’s a physical search FISA order released with the FISA 702 one that sounds like it pertains to a cybersecurity application.
My Modest Proposal to fix the FISA 702 impasse is to require the FBI to obtain probable cause warrants for the target of surveillance — possibly from the FISA court — for data they want to search.
