(PDF 13) The report reveals that OPR had not yet finished its review of John Yoo’s hackery in authorizing the illegal wiretap program.
(PDF 13) The report was scoped only to include communications, so the financial and other collections would not be included.
(PDF 16/17) Discussion of USP metadata being masked.
(PDF 14) Wolfowitz, Card, Addington, Cheney, Ashcroft, Yoo, and Tenet refused to cooperate with the IG Report.
(PDF 15) IG Report says policy is only to disseminate foreign SIGINT. But actually that policy was changed in EO 12333 the previous year (almost certainly reflected the status quo before).
(PDF 17) DOJ redacted why Hayden didn’t think he could approve a law for this spying.
(PDF 16/17) Hayden talking about value of access metadata with one end in US.
(New PDF 18) Redaction with something before “international terrorism” in targeting permission.
(New PDF 18) Discussion of new dissemination permissions.
(PDF 19/20) They changed the title of the scary memo from one focused on OBL to a more general one in June 2002.
(PDF 25) Redaction of discussion of Fourth Amendment OLC memo.
(PDF 31) NSA decided only going out 2 hops useful.
(PDF 30/31) There were 3 metadata violations reported.
(PDF 32) The fact that the program released content analysis was not included in the unredacted IG Report. But this report still redacts at least one kind of reporting — which may be way the data feeds back into other analysis (they would redact that because it would create ongoing poison tree problems).
(PDF 33) “She noted Hayden took personal responsibility for the program and managed it carefully.”
(PDF 33) The description of the delegation hides a much more strained process as described in the NSA IG Report.
(PDF 34/35) Among the tasked selectors were “international terrorist threats” not tied to al Qaeda (and at a time before Somalia or AQAP would have been considered separately).
(New 35) Note the overcollection until 2004, “discovered” in late 2008, treated in IOB in 2009 (check). That may reflect the selectors against whom there was no RAS.
(PDF 36) The discussion of IOB records is cynically inadequate, for the reasons I lay out here.
(PDF36) Note the reference to collection continuing to 2004. This may be related to the hospital confrontation. Is this the Iraq-related collection?
(PDF 39) The tippers originally came in through TAU. Which means they likely got mixed up with exigent letters. The resulting ECs would come with instructions that they be used for lead purposes only and not be used in proceedings. That system likely still exists intact!
(PDF 40-41) Describes how tippers led to threat assessments (which Savage described in his article). On top of what this says about investigative process, realize it means that if your number gets tipped you also get a back door search of any communications.
(PDF 43) The discussion of the threat assessments neglects to mention that they used info derived from torture.