Posts

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

The Doxing of Equation Group Hackers Raises Questions about the Legal Role of Nation-State Hackers

Update: I should have caveated this post much more strongly. I did not confirm the names and IDs released in the dump are NSA’s hackers. It could be Shadow Brokers added names to cast blame on someone else. So throughout, take this as suspected doxing, with the possibility that it is, instead, disinformation. 

In 2014, DOJ indicted five members of China’s People Liberation Army, largely for things America’s own hackers do themselves. Contrary to what you’ve read in other reporting, the overwhelming majority of what those hackers got indicted for was the theft of information on international negotiations, something the US asks its NSA (and military industrial contractor) hackers to do all the time. The one exception to that — the theft of information on nuclear reactors from Westinghouse within the context of a technology transfer agreement — was at least a borderline case of a government stealing private information for the benefit of its private companies, but even there, DOJ did not lay out which private Chinese company received the benefit.

A month ago, DOJ indicted two Russian FSB officers and two criminal hackers (one, Alexey Belan, who was already on FBI’s most wanted list) that also worked for the Russian government. Rather bizarrely, DOJ deemed the theft of Yahoo tools that could be used to collect on Yahoo customers “economic espionage,” even though it’s the kind of thing NSA’s hackers do all the time (and notably did do against Chinese telecom Huawei). The move threatens to undermine the rationalization the US always uses to distinguish its global dragnet from the oppressive spying of others: we don’t engage in economic espionage, US officials always like to claim. Only, according to DOJ’s current definition, we do.

On Friday, along with details about previously unknown, very powerful Microsoft vulnerabilities and details on the 2013 hacking of the SWIFT financial transfer messaging system, ShadowBrokers doxed a number of NSA hackers (I won’t describe how or who it did so — that’s easy enough to find yourself). Significantly, it exposed the name of several of the guys who personally hacked EastNets SWIFT service bureau, targeting (among other things) Kuwait’s Fund for Arab Economic Development and the Palestinian al Quds bank. They also conducted reconnaissance on at least one Belgian-based EastNets employee. These are guys who — assuming they moved on from NSA into the private sector — would travel internationally as part of their job, even aside from any vacations they take overseas.

In other words, ShadowBrokers did something the Snowden releases and even WikiLeaks’ Vault 7 releases have avoided: revealing the people behind America’s state-sponsored hacking.

Significantly, in the context of the SWIFT hack, it did so in an attack where the victims (particularly our ally Kuwait and an apparent European) might have the means and the motive to demand justice. It did so for targets that the US has other, legal access to, via the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program negotiated with the EU and administered by Europol. And it did so for a target that has subsequently been hacked by people who might be ordinary criminals or might be North Korea, using access points (though not the sophisticated techniques) that NSA demonstrated the efficacy of targeting years earlier and which had already been exposed in 2013. Much of the reporting on the SWIFT hack has claimed — based on no apparent evidence and without mentioning the existing, legal TFTP framework — that these hacks were about tracking terrorism finance. But thus far, there’s no reason to believe that’s all that the NSA was doing, particularly with targets like the Kuwait development fund.

Remember, too, that in 2013, just two months after NSA continued to own the infrastructure for a major SWIFT service bureau, the President’s Review Group advised that governments should not use their offensive cyber capabilities to manipulate financial systems.

Governments should not use their offensive cyber capabilities to change the amounts held in financial accounts or otherwise manipulate the financial systems;

[snip]

[G]overnments should abstain from penetrating the systems of financial institutions and changing the amounts held in accounts there. The policy of avoiding tampering with account balances in financial institutions is part of a broader US policy of abstaining from manipulation of the financial system. These policies support economic growth by allowing all actors to rely on the accuracy of financial statements without the need for costly re-verification of account balances. This sort of attack could cause damaging uncertainty in financial markets, as well as create a risk of escalating counter-attacks against a nation that began such an effort. The US Government should affirm this policy as an international norm, and incorporate the policy into free trade or other international agreements.

No one has ever explained where the PRG came up with the crazy notion that governments might tamper with the world’s financial system. But since that time, our own spooks continue to raise concerns that it might happen to us, Keith Alexander — the head of NSA for the entire 5-year period we know it to have been pawning SWIFT — is making a killing off of such fears, and the G-20 recently called for establishing norms to prevent it.

A number of the few people who’ve noted this doxing publicly have suggested that it clearly supports the notion that a nation-state — most likely Russia — is behind the Shadow Brokers leak. As such, the release of previously unannounced documents to carry out this doxing would be seen as retaliation for the US’ naming of Russia’s hackers, both in December’s election hacking related sanctions and more recently in the Yahoo indictment, to say nothing of America’s renewed effort to arrest Russian hackers worldwide while they vacation outside of Russia.

While that’s certainly a compelling argument, there may be another motive that could explain it.

In a little noticed statement released between its last two file dumps, Shadow Brokers did a post explaining (and not for the first time) that what gets called its “broken” English is instead operational security (along with more claims about what it’s trying to do). As part of that statement, Shadow Brokers claims it writes (though the tense here may be suspect) documents for the federal government and remains in this country.

The ShadowBrokers is writing TRADOC, Position Pieces, White Papers, Wiki pages, etc for USG. If theshadowbrokers be using own voices, theshadowbrokers be writing peoples from prison or dead. TheShadowBrokers is practicing obfuscation as part of operational security (OPSEC). Is being a spy thing. Is being the difference between a contractor tech support guy posing as a infosec expert but living in exile in Russia (yes @snowden) and subject matter experts in Cyber Intelligence like theshadowbrokers. TheShadowBrokers has being operating in country for many months now and USG is still not having fucking clue.

On the same day and, I believe though am still trying to confirm the timing, before that post, Shadow Brokers had reacted to a Forbes piece asking whether it was about to be unmasked (quoting Snowden), bragging that “9 months still living in homeland USA USA USA our country theshadowbrokers not run, theshadowbrokers stay and fight.” Shadow Brokers then started attacking Jake Williams for having a big mouth for writing this post, claiming to expose him as a former Equation Group member, specifically invoking OddJob (the other file released on Friday that doxed NSA hackers, though not Williams), and raising the “gravity” of talking to Q Group, NSA’s counterintelligence group.

trying so hard so helping out…you having big mouth for former member what was name of.

leak OddJob? Windows BITS persistence? CCI? Maybe not understand gravity of situation USG investigating members talked to Q group yet

theshadowbrokers ISNOT in habit of outing members but had make exception for big mouth, keep talking shit your next

Which is to say that, four days before Shadow Brokers started doxing NSA hackers, Shadow Brokers made threats against those who’ve commented on the released Shadow Brokers files specifically within the context of counterintelligence investigations, even while bragging about having gone unexposed thus far even while remaining in the United States.

Whatever else this doxing may do, it will also make the investigation into how internal NSA files have come to be plastered all over the Internet more difficult, because Shadow Brokers is now threatening to expose members of TAO.

Which is not to say such a motivation, if true, is mutually exclusive of Russia retaliating for having its own hackers exposed.

All of which brings me back to the question of norms. Even as the US has been discussing other norms about hacking in recent years, I’ve seen next to no discussion about how state hackers — and remember, this post discusses NSA hackers, including uniformed members of the Armed Services, government contractors, spies, and criminal hackers working for a state (a practice we do too, though in a different form than what Russia does) — fit into international law and norms about immunities granted to individuals acting on behalf of the state. The US seems to have been proceeding half-blindly, giving belated consideration to how the precedents it sets with its offensive hacking might affect the state, without considering how it is exposing the individuals it relies on to conduct that hacking.

If nothing else, Shadow Brokers’ doxing of NSA’s own hackers needs to change that. Because these folks have just been directly exposed to the kind of international pursuit that the US aggressively conducts against Russians and others.

Because of international legal protections, our uniformed service members can kill for the US without it exposing them to legal ramifications for the rest of their lives. The folks running our spying and justice operations, however, apparently haven’t thought about what it means that they’re setting norms that deprive our state-sponsored hackers of the same protection.

Update: I forgot to mention the most absurd example of us indicting foreign hackers: when, last year, DOJ indicted 7 Iranians for DDOS attacks. In addition to the Jack Goldsmith post linked in that post, which talks about the absurdity of it,  Dave Aitel and Jake Williams talked about how it might expose people like them to international retaliation.

SEC Says Hackers Like NSA Are Biggest Threat to Global Financial System

Reuters reports that, in the wake of criminals hacking the global financial messaging system SWIFT both via the Bangladesh central and an as-yet unnamed second central bank, SEC Commissioner Mary Jo White identified vulnerability to hackers as the top threat to the global financial system.

Cyber security is the biggest risk facing the financial system, the chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on Tuesday, in one of the frankest assessments yet of the threat to Wall Street from digital attacks.

Banks around the world have been rattled by a $81 million cyber theft from the Bangladesh central bank that was funneled through SWIFT, a member-owned industry cooperative that handles the bulk of cross-border payment instructions between banks.

The SEC, which regulates securities markets, has found some major exchanges, dark pools and clearing houses did not have cyber policies in place that matched the sort of risks they faced, SEC Chair Mary Jo White told the Reuters Financial Regulation Summit in Washington D.C.

“What we found, as a general matter so far, is a lot of preparedness, a lot of awareness but also their policies and procedures are not tailored to their particular risks,” she said.

“As we go out there now, we are pointing that out.”

Of course, the criminals in Bangladesh were not the first known hackers of SWIFT. The documents leaked by Snowden revealed NSA’s elite hacking group, TAO, had targeted SWIFT as well. Given the timing, it appears they did so to prove to the Europeans and SWIFT that the fairly moderate limitations being demanded by the Europeans should not limit their “front door” access.

Targeting SWIFT (and credit card companies) is probably not the only financial hacking NSA has done. One of the most curious recommendations in the President’s Review Group, after all, was that “governments” (including the one its report addressed, the US?) might hack financial institutions to change the balances in financial accounts.

(2) Governments should not use their offensive cyber capabilities to change the amounts held in financial accounts or otherwise  manipulate the financial systems;

Second, governments should abstain from penetrating the systems of financial institutions and changing the amounts held in accounts there. The policy of avoiding tampering with account balances in financial institutions is part of a broader US policy of abstaining from manipulation of the financial system. These policies support economic growth by allowing all actors to rely on the accuracy of financial statements without the need for costly re-verification of account balances. This sort of attack could cause damaging uncertainty in financial markets, as well as create a risk of escalating counter-attacks against a nation that began such an effort. The US Government should affirm this policy as an international norm, and incorporate the policy into free trade or other international agreements.

After which point, James Clapper started pointing to similar attacks as a major global threat.

I don’t mean to diminish the seriousness of the threat (though I still believe banksters’ own recklessness is a bigger threat to the world financial system). But the NSA should have thought about the norms they were setting and the impact similar attacks done by other actors would have, before they pioneered such hacks in the first place.

The Persistent Concerns about Altered Financial Data

Remember that weird passage in the President’s Review Group Report warning against changing the account numbers in financial accounts as part of offensive cyberattacks?

(2) Governments should not use their offensive cyber capabilities to change the amounts held in financial accounts or otherwise manipulate the financial systems;

Second, governments should abstain from penetrating the systems of financial institutions and changing the amounts held in accounts there. The policy of avoiding tampering with account balances in financial institutions is part of a broader US policy of abstaining from manipulation of the financial system. These policies support economic growth by allowing all actors to rely on the accuracy of financial statements without the need for costly re-verification of account balances. This sort of attack could cause damaging uncertainty in financial markets, as well as create a risk of escalating counter-attacks against a nation that began such an effort. The US Government should affirm this policy as an international norm, and incorporate the policy into free trade or other international agreements.

It was the kind of warning that left the strong impression that the US had already been engaged in such books-baking.

It’s back again, in James Clapper’s Global Threats Report (curiously, it was not in last year’s Global Threats Report).

Integrity of Information

Most of the public discussion regarding cyber threats has focused on the confidentiality and availability of information; cyber espionage undermines confidentiality, whereas denial-of-service operations and data-deletion attacks undermine availability. In the future, however, we might also see more cyber operations that will change or manipulate electronic information in order to compromise its integrity (i.e., accuracy and reliability) instead of deleting it or disrupting access to it. Decisionmaking by senior government officials (civilian and military), corporate executives, investors, or others will be impaired if they cannot trust the information they are receiving.

  • Successful cyber operations targeting the integrity of information would need to overcome any institutionalized checks and balances designed to prevent the manipulation of data, for example, market monitoring and clearing functions in the financial sector.

Altering data to misinform decision-makers is not new — part of the Stuxnet attack involved making the Iranians believe everything was going swimmingly even though centrifuges were spinning out of control (though it’s not clear how much of this involved data and how much visuals).

But the persistent concern that the US not engage in such behaviors and now the apparent rising concern that someone would do the same to us sure raises questions about which financial institutions have already had their books cyber-cooked.

Where Does the Bulk Collection Under NSLs Happen?

Back in January, I noted that both the President’s Review Group and those behind the Leahy-Sensenbrenner USA Freedom Act seemed very concerned that the government is using NSLs to conduct bulk collection (which is the term I used, based off the fact that both made parallel changes to Section 215 and NSL collection). Both required (recommended, in the case of PRG) that the government fix that by requiring that NSL’s including language asserting that the particular information sought has a tie to the investigation in question, and some limits on the amount of information collected.

Here’s how the PRG phrased it.

Recommendation 2 We recommend that statutes that authorize the issuance of National Security Letters should be amended to permit the issuance of National Security Letters only upon a judicial finding that:

(1) the government has reasonable grounds to believe that the particular information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation intended to protect “against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities” and

(2) like a subpoena, the order is reasonable in focus, scope, and breadth.

The thing is, because NSLs haven’t shown up in any troves of leaked documents, we don’t know why USA Freedom original backers and PRG are so concerned NSLs today collect data beyond reasonable breadth (though IG reports done years ago raised big concerns, many of them about whether FBI was meeting the legal standards required).

We don’t know what kind of bulk collection they’re engaging in.

Because FBI — not NSA — primarily uses NSLs, we don’t know what the problem is.

I raise this now because — in addition to having planned on writing this post since January — of questions about whether the HjC HJC and HPSCI “reform” bills will really end what you and I (as distinct from the Intelligence Community) would consider bulk collection.

And NSL reporting — unlike that for Section 215 — provides some hints on where the bulk collection might be.

Here’s what the most recent FISA report to Congress says about (most) NSLs issued last year.

Requests Made for Certain Information Concerning Different United States Persons Pursuant to National Security Letter Authorities During Calendar Year 2013 (USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177 (2006))

Pursuant to Section 118 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 109-177 (2006), the Department of Justice provides Congress with annual reports regarding requests made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pursuant to the National Security Letter (NSL) authorities provided in 12 U.S.C. § 3414, 15 U.S.C. § 1681u, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, 18 U.S.C § 2709, and 50 U.S.C. § 436.

In 2013, the FBI made 14,219 requests (excluding requests for subscriber information only) for information concerning United States persons. These sought information pertaining to 5,334 different United States persons.2

2 In the course of compiling its National Security Letter statistics, the FBI may over-report the number of United States persons about whom it obtained information using National Security Letters. For example, NSLs that are issued concerning the same U.S. person and that include different spellings of the U.S. person’s name would be counted as separate U.S. persons, and NSLs issued under two different types of NSL authorities concerning the same U.S. person would be counted as two U.S. persons.

The report would seem to say that the 14,219 requests were based off requests about 5,334 US persons. That’s not really bulk collection, at least on its face! So where is the bulk collection PRG and USAF seem worried about?

It’s possible this report hides some bulk collection in a different Agency. The law requiring this report only requires DOJ to report on the number of requests DOJ made in the previous year.

 In April of each year, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress an aggregate report setting forth with respect to the preceding year the total number of requests made by the Department of Justice for information concerning different United States persons under–

(A) section 2709 of title 18, United States Code (to access certain communication service provider records), excluding the number of requests for subscriber information;

[the law goes on to list the other NSL provisions]

While DOJ’s report should cover both FBI and DEA, I suppose it’s possible that some other entities — not just NSA but also Treasury, NCTC, and CIA — are submitting NSLs themselves, particularly in the case of financial records (though I think Treasury doesn’t have to use NSLs to do this).

The other obvious place the language of the report hides bulk collection is in subscriber records. The law exempts subscriber information requests from the reporting pertaining to US persons. The FBI could be applying for what amount to phone books of all the subscribers of all the phone companies and Internet service providers in the United States and it wouldn’t show up in this report, even though those requests might pertain to hundreds of millions of US persons.

I assume to some extent it is doing this, because there must be a reason subscriber records were excluded from this law. And this would count as bulk collection even according to the Intelligence Community definition of the term.

Via the PRG, we can get a sense of how many such subscriber requests there are. It says FBI issued 21,000 NSLs in FY 2012.

FBI issued 21,000 NSLs in Fiscal Year 2012, primarily for subscriber information.

While the reporting period is different, DOJ reported that FBI obtained 15,229 NSLs in 2012. Which means the balance — so around 5,500 NSLs — would be for subscriber data. Even if only a significant fraction of those are for all of companies’ subscribers, that’s still a fairly comprehensive list of subscriber information across a broad range of providers.

Those 5,500 requests could each be 50 US persons or 120 million US persons; we don’t know. That would be pretty significant bulk collection. But not the same kind of privacy risk PRG seems to have in mind (and if that were the only problem, why change all 4 NSL statutes, as USA Freedom Act did and to the extent it makes a difference still does)?

Still, we know that even the other NSLs — the ones for which we have real data about how many US persons the NSLs “pertained to” — affected far more US persons. That’s because the Exigent Letters IG Report made it clear that two providers (one of these is AT&T, which did it routinely; see page 75ff) provided community of interest information — multiple hops of call records — in response to NSLs. In discovering that, DOJ’s IG complained that FBI was routinely getting information — the derivative call records — that it had not done a relevancy determination for, but it didn’t object across the board.

That concern about ensuring that records obtained via a national security request are “relevant” according to the plain meaning of the term sure seems quaint right now, doesn’t it?

But the potential that FBI is using NSLs to obtain derivative records off of the original selector would sure explain why PRG and Pat Leahy and others are concerned about NSLs (and what we would call — but IC wouldn’t — “bulk collection”).

I assume they can only do this with complicit providers (and I suspect this explains the rise of Section 215 orders with attached minimization requirements in recent years).

But if it happens in significant number at all, it would explain why Leahy and PRG consider it an equivalent problem to Section 215. Because it would mean FBI was using NSLs — not just with telecom and Internet records, but possibly with other things (though I don’t see how you could do this on credit reports) — to get data on associations several levels removed from the target of the NSL.

Here’s the immediate takeaway, though.

Aside from the phone book application (which is significant and I think would be curtailed given the HJC bill, unless FBI were to make requests of AT&T using “AT&T” as the selection term) and financial records (which I’m still thinking through), NSLs appear to include a great deal of “bulk” collection (that is, collection of innocent persons’ data based on association). But they appear to do so from specific identifiers.

And that will not be curtailed by the HJC bill, not at all. It is clear these requests for NSLs are already currently based off selectors — it shows in this reporting.

So at least for two uses of NSLs — credit reports and call details (but not subscriber records) — the House bill simply codifies the status quo.

Update: Here’s the financial records language on NSLs:

Financial institutions, and officers, employees, and agents thereof, shall comply with a request for a customer’s or entity’s financial records made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or the Director’s designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director) certifies in writing to the financial institution that such records are sought for foreign counter intelligence  [2] purposes to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

It’s clearly intended to work for things that would be a selection term — “customer” or “entity” (which in this context would seem to be different from a customer!) — but I’m not sure it requires that the collection be based off the customer selection term.