As Journalism and Democracy Struggle, New America Caves to Google

In my analysis of the role of outside influence peddling on last year’s election, I harped on a number of issues. In addition to focusing on the long-standing right wing noise machine (Breitbart didn’t need Vladimir Putin to learn how to rat-fuck), I also noted that all of our politics is too easily driven by paid influence, whether from Russia, Qatar, or Defense Contractors. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to the extent that fake news affected the election, it did so because the United States has allowed a handful of companies — chiefly, Facebook and Google — to concentrate power in Silicon Valley.

So to sum up this part of my argument: First, the history of journalism is about the history of certain market conditions, conditions which always get at least influenced by the state, but which in so-called capitalist countries also tend to produce bottle necks of power. In the 50s, it was the elite. Now it’s Silicon Valley. And that’s true not just here! The bottle-neck of power for much of the world is Silicon Valley. To understand what dictates the kinds of stories you get from a particular media environment, you need to understand where the bottle-necks are. Today’s bottle-neck has created both what people like to call “fake news” and a whole bunch of other toxins.

If we’re going to account for the weaknesses of our democracy, we need to account for the way our discourse gets channeled through two enormous companies whose primary interest is profit, not democracy.

Recent events at New America, which describes itself as “a think tank and civic enterprise committed to renewing American politics, prosperity, and purpose in the Digital Age,” demonstrate the risk.

When one of the leading commenters on the risk of concentration, Barry Lynn, applauded the EU’s judgment against Google — which is a major funder for New America — the think tank pulled his statement and fired him and his team.

The New America Foundation has received more than $21 million from Google; its parent company’s executive chairman, Eric Schmidt; and his family’s foundation since the think tank’s founding in 1999. That money helped to establish New America as an elite voice in policy debates on the American left.

But not long after one of New America’s scholars posted a statement on the think tank’s website praising the European Union’s penalty against Google, Mr. Schmidt, who had chaired New America until 2016, communicated his displeasure with the statement to the group’s president, Anne-Marie Slaughter, according to the scholar.

The statement disappeared from New America’s website, only to be reposted without explanation a few hours later. But word of Mr. Schmidt’s displeasure rippled through New America, which employs more than 200 people, including dozens of researchers, writers and scholars, most of whom work in sleek Washington offices where the main conference room is called the “Eric Schmidt Ideas Lab.” The episode left some people concerned that Google intended to discontinue funding, while others worried whether the think tank could truly be independent if it had to worry about offending its donors.

Those worries seemed to be substantiated a couple of days later, when Ms. Slaughter summoned the scholar who wrote the critical statement, Barry Lynn, to her office. He ran a New America initiative called Open Markets that has led a growing chorus of liberal criticism of the market dominance of telecom and tech giants, including Google, which is now part of a larger corporate entity known as Alphabet, for which Mr. Schmidt serves as executive chairman.

Ms. Slaughter told Mr. Lynn that “the time has come for Open Markets and New America to part ways,” according to an email from Ms. Slaughter to Mr. Lynn. The email suggested that the entire Open Markets team — nearly 10 full-time employees and unpaid fellows — would be exiled from New America.

New America insists that Google didn’t pull the plug on some of the most important (and still meager) work criticizing concentration.

New America’s executive vice president, Tyra Mariani, said it was “a mutual decision for Barry to spin out his Open Markets program,” and that the move was not in any way influenced by Google or Mr. Schmidt.

But this is in no way the first time they’ve catered to Google’s preferred policies. I’ve run up against it indirectly in surveillance fights, and others have far more directly.

So here we have a think tank which is doing necessary work carving out space on the left for policy. But it can’t investigate one of the most basic threats to our democracy, because doing so would quickly identify the danger of Google.

I get the need to attract and keep funding. But if this lefty think tank can’t research one of the forces that led to the election of Donald Trump, what good can it do?

Update: Here’s a link to Lynn’s new site

Thursday Morning: Don’t Feel Bad

While I am sorry a family has lost their father, I can’t mourn the bizarre passing yesterday of Chesapeake Energy CEO Aubrey McClendon.

McClendon had been indicted Tuesday for price fixing on real estate related to natural gas and oil development. Charges against him had been expected since 2012 when the violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act came to light.

But for a Michigander like me, this is not a remote and abstract story. Property over the Collingwood Shale formation in Northern Michigan was included in collusion between McClendon and Encana Oil & Gas executives to “avoid bidding up” prices. Between Chesapeake and Canadian corporation Encana, the two businesses owned nearly a million acres of Michigan — a chunk of land the size of Rhode Island.

Imagine it: two corporations buying a state-sized mass of land at rigged prices within a state. And all of it with underground water connected to a couple of the largest freshwater bodies in the world, much of it earmarked for fracking.

Energy visionary“? That’s what other resources leeches might call McClendon, who was at the heart of a dispute over Lake Michigan shoreline property. The land had been willed to “the children” of Benton Harbor by former residents J.N. and Carrie Klock, in memory of their daughter Jean, for use as a public park. In dedicating the land, J.N. Klock said, “…See to it that the park is the children’s.”

It was the only such lakefront park for Benton Harbor, a financially-challenged city with 89% African American residents. But the property adjoined the intended development of a Jack Nicklaus golf course, and the McClendon family as well as other notable figures (like Rep. Fred Upton and Whirlpool CEO Jeff Fettig) lived in the neighborhood of both the intended golf course and Jean Klock Park. The dispute caused considerable heartburn for Benton Harbor residents. It still boggles my mind that wealthy parasites like McClendon simply felt they could ignore the intent of the Klocks’ intentions, their proxies arguing the pricey (read: unaffordable to the average Benton Harborite) golf course would meet the standard of public access.

Note also, that Benton Harbor was among the Michigan cities to which an emergency financial manager had been appointed because of its municipal financial crisis — just like Flint, Michigan.

I can only imagine what other parasitic nonsense will emerge in the debris field left by McClendon. Good riddance to bad rubbish.

Quick hits

That’s enough damage for now. Be anti-parasitic and do something nice for others today.

Legal Analysis of OmniCISA Reinforces Cause for Concern

Among all the commentaries about CISA published before its passage, only one I know of (aside from my non-lawyer take here) dealt with what the bill did legally: this Jennifer Granick post explaining how OmniCISA will “stake out a category of ISP monitoring that the FCC and FTC can’t touch, regardless of its privacy impact on Americans,” thereby undercutting recent efforts to increase online privacy.

Since the bill passed into law, however, two lawyers have written really helpful detailed posts on what it does: Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr and former NSA lawyer Susan Hennessey.

As Kerr explains, existing law had permitted Internet operators to surveil their own networks for narrowly tailored upkeep and intrusion purposes. OmniCISA broadened that to permit a provider to monitor (or have a third party monitor) both the network and traffic for a cybersecurity purpose.

[T]he right to monitor appears to extend to “cybersecurity purposes” generally, not just for the protection of the network operator’s own interests.  And relatedly, the right to monitor includes scanning and acquiring data that is merely transiting the system, which means that the network operator can monitor (or have someone else monitor) for cybersecurity purposes even if the operator isn’t worried about his own part of the network being the victim. Note the difference between this and the provider exception. The provider exception is about protecting the provider’s own network. If I’m reading the language here correctly, this is a broader legal privilege to monitor for cybersecurity threats.

It also permits such monitoring for insider threats.

[T]he Cyber Act may give network operators broad monitoring powers on their own networks to catch not only hackers but also insiders trying to take information from the network.

This accords with Hennessey’s take (and of course, having recently worked at NSA, she knows what they were trying to do). Importantly, she claims providers need to surveil content to take “responsible cybersecurity measures.”

Effective cybersecurity includes network monitoring, scanning, and deep-packet inspection—and yes, that includes contents of communications—in order to detect malicious activity.

In spite of the fact that Hennessey explicitly responded to Granick’s post, and Granick linked a letter from security experts describing the limits of what was really necessary for monitoring networks, Hennessey doesn’t engage in those terms to explain why corporations need to spy on their customers’ content to take responsible cybersecurity measures. It may be as simple as needing to search the contents of packets for known hackers’ signatures, or it may relate to surveilling IP theft or it may extend to reading the content of emails; those are fairly different degrees of electronic surveillance, all of which might be permitted by this law. But credit Hennessey for making clear what CISA boosters in Congress tried so assiduously to hide: this is about warrantless surveillance of content.

Hennessey lays out why corporations need a new law to permit them to spy on their users’ content, suggesting they used to rely on user agreements to obtain permission, but pointing to several recent court decisions that found user agreements did not amount to implied consent for such monitoring.

If either party to a communication consents to its interception, there is no violation under ECPA, “unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act.” 18 USC 2511(2)(d). Consent may be express or implied but, in essence, authorized users must be made aware of and manifest agreement to the interception.

At first glance, obtaining effective consent from authorized users presents a simple and attractive avenue for companies and cyber security providers to conduct monitoring without violating ECPA. User agreements can incorporate notification that communications may be monitored for purposes of network security. However, the ambiguities of ECPA have resulted in real and perceived limitations on the ability to obtain legally-effective consent.

Rapidly evolving case law generates significant uncertainty regarding the scope of consent as it relates to electronic communications monitoring conducted by service providers. In Campbell v. Facebook, a court for the Northern District of California denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss charges under ECPA, rejecting the claim that Facebook had obtained user consent. Despite lengthy user agreements included in Facebook’s “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” and “Data Use Policy,” the court determined that consent obtained “with respect to the processing and sending of messages does not necessarily constitute consent to … the scanning of message content for use in targeted advertising.” Likewise in ln re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, the same district determined that Google did not obtain adequate consent for the scanning of emails, though in that case, Google’s conduct fell within the “ordinary course of business” definition and thus did not constitute interception for the purposes of ECPA.

Here, and in other instances, courts have determined that companies which are highly sophisticated actors in the field have failed to meet the bar for effective consent despite good faith efforts to comply.

Hennssey’s focus on cases affecting Facebook and, especially, Google provide a pretty clear idea why those and other tech companies were pretending to oppose CISA without effectively doing so (Google’s Eric Schmidt had said such a law was necessary, but he wasn’t sure if this law was what was needed).

Hennessey goes on to extend these concerns to third party permission (that is, contractors who might monitor another company’s network, which Kerr also noted). Perhaps most telling is her discussion of  those who don’t count as electronic communications service providers.

Importantly, a large number of private entities require network security monitoring but are not themselves electronic communication service providers. For those entities that do qualify as service providers, it is not unlawful to monitor communications while engaged in activity that is a “necessary incident to” the provision of service or in order to protect the “rights or property” of the provider. But this exception is narrowly construed. In general, it permits providers the right “to intercept and monitor [communications] placed over their facilities in order to combat fraud and theft of service.” U.S. v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In practice, the exception does not allow for unlimited or widespread monitoring nor does it, standing alone, expressly permit the provision of data collected under this authority to the government or third parties.

Note how she assumes non-ECSPs would need to conduct “unlimited” monitoring and sharing with the government and third parties. That goes far beyond her claims about “responsible cybersecurity measures,” without any discussion of how such unlimited monitoring protects privacy (which is her larger claim).

Curiously, Hennessey entirely ignores what Kerr examines (and finds less dangerous than tech companies’ statements indicated): counter–er, um, defensive measures, which tech companies had worried would damage their infrastructure. As I noted, Richard Burr went out of his way to prevent Congress from getting reporting on whether that happened, which suggests it’s a real concern. Hennessey also ignores something that totally undermines her claim this is about “responsible cybersecurity measures” — the regulatory immunity that guts the tools the federal government currently uses to require corporations to take such measures. She also doesn’t explain why OmniCISA couldn’t have been done with the same kind of protections envisioned for “domestic security” surveillance under Keith and FISA, which is clearly what CISA is: notably, court review (I have suggested it is likely that FISC refused to permit this kind of surveillance).

I am grateful for Hennessey’s candor in laying out the details that a functional democracy would have laid out before eliminating the warrant requirement for some kinds of domestic wiretapping.

But it’s also worth noting that, even if you concede that permitting corporations such unfettered monitoring of their customers, even if you assume that the related info-sharing is anywhere near the most urgent thing we can do to prevent network intrusions, OmniCISA does far more than what Hennessey lays out as necessary, much of which is designed to shield all this spying, and the corporations that take part in it, from real review.

Hennessey ends her post by suggesting those of us who are concerned about OmniCISA’s broad language are ignoring limitations within it.

Despite vague allegations from critics that “cybersecurity purpose” could be read to be all-encompassing, the various definitions and limitations within the act work to create a limited set of permissible activities.

But even if that were true, it’d be meaningless given a set-up that would subject this surveillance only to Inspectors General whose past very diligent efforts to fix abuses have failed. Not even Congress will get key information — such as how often this surveillance leads to a criminal investigation or how many times “defensive measures” break the Internet — it needs to enforce what few limitations there are in this scheme.

All of which is to say that people with far more expertise than I have are reviewing this law, and their reviews only serve to confirm my earlier concerns.

Classified Briefings: For When Your Public Claims Don’t Hold Up to Scrutiny

As I laid out when he gave his speech at Brookings, Jim Comey’s public explanation for needing back doors to Apple and Android phones doesn’t hold up. He conflated stored communication with communication in transit, ignored the risk of a back door (which he called a front door), and the law enforcement successes he presented, across the board, do not support his claim to need a back door.

So yesterday Comey and others had a classified briefing, where no one would be able to shred his flawed case.

FBI and Justice Department officials met with House staffers this week for a classified briefing on how encryption is hurting police investigations, according to staffers familiar with the meeting.

The briefing included Democratic and Republican aides for the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, the staffers said. The meeting was held in a classified room, and aides are forbidden from revealing what was discussed.


Comey called for Congress to revise the law to create a “level playing field” so that Google, Apple, and Facebook have the same obligation as AT&T and Verizon to help police.

National Journal listed out those companies, by the way — Facebook, for example, did not appear in Comey’s Brooking’s speech where he used the “level the playing field comment.”

I was puzzled by Comey’s inclusion of Facebook here until I saw this news.

To make their experience more consistent with our goals of accessibility and security, we have begun an experiment which makes Facebook available directly over Tor network at the following URL:


[ NOTE: link will only work in Tor-enabled browsers ]

Facebook Onion Address

Facebook’s onion address provides a way to access Facebook through Tor without losing the cryptographic protections provided by the Tor cloud.

The idea is that the Facebook onion address connects you to Facebook’s Core WWW Infrastructure – check the URL again, you’ll see what we did there – and it reflects one benefit of accessing Facebook this way: that it provides end-to-end communication, from your browser directly into a Facebook datacentre.

All that got me thinking about what Comey said in the classified briefing — in the real reason he wants to make us all less secure.

And I can’t help but wonder whether it’s metadata.

The government aspires to get universal potential coverage of telephony (at least) metadata under USA Freedom Act, with the ability to force cooperation. But I’m not sure that Apple, especially, would be able to provide iMessage metadata, meaning iPhone users can text without leaving metadata available to either AT&T (because it bypasses the telecom network) or Apple itself (because they no longer have guaranteed remote object).

And without metadata, FBI and NSA would be unable to demonstrate the need to do a wiretap of such content.

Ah well, once again I reflect on what a pity it is that FBI didn’t investigate the theft of data from these same companies, providing them a very good reason to lock it all up from sophisticated online criminals like GCHQ.

Why Isn’t FBI Investigating the Hackers Who Broke into Google’s Cables?

At his Brookings event yesterday, Jim Comey claimed that there is a misperception, in the wake of the Snowden releases, about how much data the government obtains.

In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, the prevailing view is that the government is sweeping up all of our communications. That is not true. And unfortunately, the idea that the government has access to all communications at all times has extended—unfairly—to the investigations of law enforcement agencies that obtain individual warrants, approved by judges, to intercept the communications of suspected criminals.


It frustrates me, because I want people to understand that law enforcement needs to be able to access communications and information to bring people to justice. We do so pursuant to the rule of law, with clear guidance and strict oversight. 

He goes onto pretend that Apple and Google are default encrypting their phone solely as a marketing gimmick, some arbitrary thing crazy users want.

Both companies are run by good people, responding to what they perceive is a market demand. But the place they are leading us is one we shouldn’t go to without careful thought and debate as a country.


Encryption isn’t just a technical feature; it’s a marketing pitch. But it will have very serious consequences for law enforcement and national security agencies at all levels. Sophisticated criminals will come to count on these means of evading detection. It’s the equivalent of a closet that can’t be opened. A safe that can’t be cracked. And my question is, at what cost?

He ends with a plea that “our private sector partners … consider changing course.”

But we have to find a way to help these companies understand what we need, why we need it, and how they can help, while still protecting privacy rights and providing network security and innovation. We need our private sector partners to take a step back, to pause, and to consider changing course.

There’s something missing from Comey’s tale.

An explanation of why the FBI has not pursued the sophisticated criminals who stole Google’s data overseas.

At a recent event with Ron Wyden, the Senator asked Schmidt to weigh in on the phone encryption “kerfuffle.” And Schmidt was quite clear: the reason Google and Apple are doing this is because the NSA’s partners in the UK stole their data, even while they had access to it via PRISM.

The people who are criticizing this should have expected this. After Google was attacked by the British version of the NSA, we were annoyed and so we put end-to-end encryption at rest, as well as through our systems, making it essentially impossible for interlopers — of any kind — to get that information.

Schmidt describes the default encryption on the iPhone, notes that it has been available for the last 3 years on Android phones, and will soon be standard, just like it is on iPhone.

Law enforcement has many many ways of getting information that they need to provide this without having to do it without court orders and with the possible snooping conversation. The problem when they do it randomly as opposed to through a judicial process is it erodes user trust.

If everything Comey said were true, if this were only about law enforcement getting data with warrants, Apple — and Google especially — might not have offered their customers the privacy they deserved. But it turns out Comey’s fellow intelligence agency decided to just go take what they wanted.

And FBI did nothing to solve that terrific hack and theft of data.

I guess FBI isn’t as interested in rule of law as Comey says.

Google’s Payoff from DOD: 20 Cheap Fuel Flights to Tortola

Screen shot 2013-09-13 at 1.47.45 PMGiven that I’m very interested in the carrots and sticks the government uses to get tech companies to help spy on us, I find it rather interesting that from 2007 until August 31, DOD was allowing Google to pay for jet fuel at Moffett Field near Google’s HQ in Mountain View at DOD’s substantially discounted rate.

Granted, this arose because Google provided a light airplane to perform scientific flights for Ames Research Center.

NASA officials have pointed to a related agreement by the Google executives to perform scientific flights and other NASA-related transport. That mostly has involved flights by an Alpha jet, a small trainer bought by the Google executives and used by NASA to measure atmospheric greenhouse gases and ozone.


[T]he contract between H211 and the Pentagon stated that the fuel was supposed to be used only “for performance of a U.S. government contract, charter or other approved use,” and said violations could trigger civil or criminal penalties. There is no indication of any such investigation.

Flight records from the Federal Aviation Administration suggest that the vast bulk of the flights by the Google executives’ fleet have been for non-NASA purposes.

The main jets in the fleet—a Boeing 767, Boeing 757 and four Gulfstream V’s—have departed from Moffett a total of 710 times since 2007, FAA records show. The most frequent destinations were Los Angeles and New York, but the planes also flew 20 times to the Caribbean island of Tortola; 17 to Hawaii; 16 to Nantucket, Mass.; and 15 to Tahiti.

This agreement went into place before Google joined PRISM, for example (though I’m sure Google was already helping NSA on its storage challenges before that). Though I really look forward to Google defending these fuel purchases because so much of what they do is “for performance of a U.S. government contract.”

This is peanuts to a company as rich as Google; access to the airport is probably worth more to Google execs than the cheap gas.

Still, it’s a perk. The kind of perk that might explain why Eric Schmidt believes all this spying is just the nature of society. (h/t Kevin Gosztola)

There’s been spying for years, there’s been surveillance for years, and so forth, I’m not going to pass judgment on that, it’s the nature of our society.

Spying is the nature of society in the same way as special perks for those who help in it, after all.

Obama’s Kabuki Jobs Council, Brought to You By “Nut on China” Jeff Immelt

When Google announced that Eric Schmidt was stepping down yesterday, I joked that Schmidt must be leaving to lead Obama’s campaign economy — the one he’ll use to get re-elected with. After all, Schmidt is one of the Obama’s closest CEO buddies, and he’s leaving at the same time as Jim Messina and Patrick Gaspard are leaving to take over the campaign infrastructure. The decision to close the Office of Political Affairs seems to indicate a decision to stop governing and start spinning wildly to ensure re-election. There’s no area where Obama will need to spin more wildly than with the economy, right?

Turns out, I wasn’t far off.

What else can you conclude from the news that Obama is replacing his President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, led by Paul Volcker, with a President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, led by General Electric CEO Jeff “Nut on China” Immelt?

President Obama has asked me to chair his new President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. I have served for the past two years on the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, and I look forward to leading the next phase of this effort as we transition from recovery to long-term growth. The president and I are committed to a candid and full dialogue among business, labor and government to help ensure that the United States has the most competitive and innovative economy in the world.

Aside from the tired DC trick of renaming the Council with the latest buzzwords — jobs and competitiveness — there’s all the things GE has done under Immelt that make the U.S. less competitive. I noted the other day that GE had signed a big deal with China that will involve us sharing our jet technology with China, which will ultimately help China compete with both GE and — China has said explicitly — Boeing. Then there’s the fact that, even as Immelt has been calling for manufacturing in the U.S., his company has been shutting U.S. plants to move the work to China.

While Immelt was calling for manufacturing to stay in the U.S., his company was at the same time shipping manufacturing jobs overseas by canceling an order with an American-based wind turbine maker, ATI Casting Service in LaPorte, Ind., so that GE could instead buy the parts from a factory in China.

Recently, ATI made $30 million worth of investments to buy, convert, and modernize a shuttered factory in economically ravaged Michigan so the company could provide more parts to GE as the green economy expands with federal stimulus funding. But a Chinese firm underbid ATI, and the factory faced having to lay off 302 union workers and shutter the plant.

In an aggressive bid to keep the factory open, ATI offered to match the price of the Chinese producers. GE once again said they would prefer to buy from China. The ATI plant is now closed, the jobs gone.

Then there is Immelt’s call for Free — not Fair — Trade in his op-ed announcing the Kabuki Council.

Free trade: America cannot expand its manufacturing base without greatly increasing the volume of goods it sells overseas. That is why I applaud the free-trade agreement recently concluded between the United States and South Korea, which will eliminate barriers to U.S. exports and support export-oriented jobs. We should seek to conclude trade and investment agreements with other fast-growing markets and modernize our systems for export finance and trade control. Those who advocate increasing domestic manufacturing jobs by erecting trade barriers have it exactly wrong.

And then, finally, there’s the little detail that GE managed, alone of “manufacturing companies” in the U.S., to turn itself into a Too Big To Fail overleveraged finance company in need of a $16 billion bailout from the government (as has happened with all the TBTF finance companies, bailouts have made GE’s financing business profitable again).

In short, no matter how many times Immelt gets up on a podium or in an op-ed and feigns an interest in American jobs, his actions make him the poster child for everything wrong with the U.S. economy right now.

And that’s what Obama is rolling out, as he moves into campaign mode, to convince Americans he’s going to do a damn thing about jobs.

Eric Schmidt: PATRIOT Means You Have No Privacy

When Gawker posted a clip of Eric Schmidt telling Maria Bartiromo that you shouldn’t do anything you want to keep private…

I think judgment matters. If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place. If you really need that kind of privacy, the reality is that search engines — including Google — do retain this information for some time and it’s important, for example, that we are all subject in the United States to the Patriot Act and it is possible that all that information could be made available to the authorities.

… Gawker focused on the hypocrisy of Schmidt making such a statement.

That’s what the Google CEO told Maria Bartiromo during CNBC’s big Google special last night, an extraordinary pronouncement for such a secretive guy.

The generous explanation for Schmidt’s statement is that he’s revolutionized his thinking since 2005, when he blacklisted CNET for publishing info about him gleaned from Google searches, including salary, neighborhood, hobbies and political donations.

But I’m rather more interested in Schmidt’s focus on the PATRIOT Act:

we are all subject in the United States to the Patriot Act and it is possible that all that information could be made available to the authorities

This is the CEO of Google–a company that, four years ago, fought to avoid letting Alberto Gonzales get its searches in the name of preventing pornography–telling you that everything you do on Google “could be made available” to the authorities. Which I presume means it is being made available…