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Confirmed: Official Administration Policy Is to Continue Foreclosures

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The Federal Housing Administration Commissioner, David Stevens, has joined David Axelrod in stating that the Administration sees no reason to halt all foreclosures. That’s not a surprise in itself–it was pretty clear that Axe’s statement reflected official Administration policy.

But I’m particularly interested in how Stevens justified this position in an email sent to the WaPo.

“We believe freezing foreclosures for all banks in all states, whether we have reason to believe them to be in error or not, is simply not the prudent step to take in this fragile housing market,” he said.

With approximately one in four homes sold in the second quarter in foreclosure, administration officials worry that a moratorium could have a significant impact on the economic recovery.

“While we understand the eagerness to make sure that no American is foreclosed upon in error, we must be careful not to over-reach and apply a remedy that will make the underlying problem of foreclosures worse,” he added.

First, note where Stevens places the benefit of the doubt. If the Administration has no reason to believe foreclosures to be in error, then it will assume they are not. That, in spite of the mounting evidence that the paperwork problem for homes sold during the bubble is systemic.

Foreclosures have been halted in places where there is an easy means (judicial foreclosures) to expose the fraud underlying the bubble era housing sales, or for companies (like Bank of America) that were pressured to vouch for the whole system. But there is no reason to believe the loans Wells Fargo acquired from Wachovia are any more sound than what BoA has on its books; on the contrary, they’re probably worse. But the Administration position is that we should just carry on with the foreclosures, ignoring the evidence of systemic fraud.

Which is probably, itself, just an effort to avoid admitting to the evidence of systemic fraud.

While the interim paragraph in Stevens’ response to the WaPo is not a direct quote, it seems that he is saying the Administration doesn’t want to halt all foreclosures because they don’t want the housing market to lose a quarter of its sales. That is, they seem to believe that the housing market will freeze up if it doesn’t have a ready supply of below market properties to entice buyers who otherwise would be unable or uninterested in buying.

Now, first of all, it’s not entirely clear that the housing market hasn’t effectively frozen up in any case. Things are so volatile it’s not clear that this quarter would resemble the second quarter in any case.

But given everything else, is it really a good idea to encourage reluctant buyers to buy now? (I say that with a house on the market.)

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“Creative” Wall Street and Money-Laundering

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I have long maintained that we will eventually learn that Citibank took over where BCCI and then Riggs Bank left off: serving as a money laundering vehicle used by drug cartels and other organized crime, terrorists, and spooks. But this article (h/t scribe) on the role of big banks in laundering Mexican drug money reports that–while Citibank has been implicated in money laundering (but took the appropriate regulatory steps in response)–there are a number of other banks deeply implicated:

  • Wachovia (now owned by Wells Fargo)
  • Bank of America
  • American Express
  • HSBC
  • Banco Santander

Most of these banks were implicated in Mexican legal filings. But in March, Wachovia entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the government that reveals some of the details behind its money laundering.

The DPA lays out the means by which Wachovia enabled money laundering as follows:

  • Allowing Mexican Casas de Cambio (exchange houses) to wire through Wachovia. From May 2004 through May 2007, Wachovia had processed at least $373 billion in CDC wire activity.
  • Offering a “bulk cash” service, in which Wachovia would arrange physical transport of large amounts of US dollars collected by the CDCs into the US. From May 2004 through May 2007, Wachovia processed over $4 billion in bulk cash for the CDCs.
  • Providing a “pouch deposit” service, in which CDCs would accept checks and travelers checks drawn on US banks, aggregate them into a pouch, and then forward them to Wachovia for processing. By May 2005, Wachovia had set up a digital scan system for this service. From May 2004 through May 2007, Wachovia processed $47 billion in digital pouch deposits for all its correspondent banking customers, including what it did for the CDCs.

The DPA also describes how Wachovia helped telemarketers steal directly from victims’ accounts–the subject of an unrelated lawsuit going back some years.

So here are two key details of this.

First, it appears that Wachovia deliberately got deeper into money-laundering for CDCs in 2005 even as the government issued more alerts about the way drug cartels were using CDCs.

As early as 2004, Wachovia understood the risk that was associated with doing business with the Mexican CDCs. Wachovia was aware of the general industry warnings. As early as July 2005, Wachovia was aware that other large U.S. banks were exiting the CDC business based on [anti-money laundering] concerns.

Despite these warnings, Wachovia remained in the business. And in September 2005, Wachovia purchased the right to solicit the international correspondent banking customers of Union Bank of California (“UBOC”). Wachovia knew that UBOC was exiting the CDC market due to AML problems. Wachovia hired at least one person from UBOC who had a significant role in the CDC business at UBOC. After UBOC exited the CDC business, Wachovia’s business volume increased notably.

September 2005 was definitely before most people realized the giant shitpile–of which Wachovia held more than its fair share–was going to explode. But Wachovia was already deep into it.

So $373 billion in wire services (some of which were surely legal), $4 billion in bulk cash services, and some portion of $47 billion in digital pouch services (again, some of which is surely legal and may pertain to remittances). Compare those numbers to the $40 to $60 billion or so in Wachovia subprime losses Wells Fargo ate when it took over Wachovia. Was Wachovia laundering money for drug cartels because it was so badly exposed in mortgage-backed securities, or was it so heavily involved in products that could be used for money laundering just for fun?

Now, for all of this, DOJ made Wells Fargo pay $160 million: $50 million that is an outright fine, and $110 million for what DOJ said it had identified as clear drug proceeds laundered through Wachovia. Now, granted, DOJ is fining Wells Fargo (beneficiary of huge amounts of free money from the Fed in recent years and the recipient of huge tax deductions for taking over Wachovia), not Wachovia. And granted, this was the largest fine ever for money laundering. But as the Bloomberg story notes, that’s less than 2% of Wells Fargo’s profits last year. And isn’t even as much as Wachovia got in deposits–$418 million–from the fraudulent telemarketing scheme.

Then there’s the bigger question. Who else was using these vehicles? Banks that enable this kind of money laundering tend to be indiscriminate about their client base. And as I noted when I started this post, money laundering for drug cartels tends to go hand in hand with money laundering for other organized crime, terrorists, and spooks. Given the scale of what Wachovia was doing, where are the other busts?

And while we’re looking for those other busts, note that the investigation of Wachovia started in May 2007, 17 months before the government brokered the Wells Fargo takeover. Is there any chance that Treasury, which would have been involved in this, was unaware of the massive amounts of money laundering Wachovia had been engaged in when they brokered that deal? Recall, too, the weirdness over the competition between Citi and Wells Fargo for the privilege of taking on the Wachovia shitpile. The Federal government was at one point prepared to take on a portion of Wachovia’s shitpile to allow Citi to take over the bank for a dollar a share. And when Citi CEO Vikram Pandit lost out on the deal, Andrew Ross Sorkin reported in Too Big to Fail, he told Sheila Bair, that “This isn’t just about Citi … There are other issues we need to consider. I need to speak to you privately. … This is not right. It’s not right for the country. It’s just not right!”

I don’t want to get too tinfoil about this. But it strikes me that the efforts to keep Wall Street and all its celebrated creativity intact serves to make it easier for banks like Wachovia to engage in widespread money-laundering. That is, it’s not just shadow banking as it is politely understood, but banking for entire shadow networks, both our own and our enemies.

Update: Aaron v. Andrew fixed–thanks SaltinWound.

Update: Here’s the full Bloomberg story.

Grading on a Curve

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The Obama Administration has reversed its approach from earlier this week and last, and decided it will reveal the results of stress tests. But it warns that it will be grading on a curve to make sure all the zombie banks can pass into the next grade and eventually graduate (rumor has it that JP Morgan Chase also wants to be cleared to play football).

The administration has decided to reveal some sensitive details of the stress tests now being completed after concluding that keeping many of the findings secret could send investors fleeing from financial institutions rumored to be weakest.

While all of the banks are expected to pass the tests, some are expected to be graded more highly than others.

Understand, though, at least as David Sanger tells it, the Adminstration is not revealing the results of the stress test because it decided transparency is good. Rather, it is doing so because Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo forced its hand.

The administration’s hand may have been forced in part by the investment firm Goldman Sachs, which successfully sold $5 billion in new stock on Tuesday and declared that it would use the proceeds and other private capital to repay the $10 billion it accepted from the government in October.

That money came from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, and Goldman’s action was seen as a way of predisclosing to the markets the company’s confidence that it would pass its stress test with flying colors.

[snip]

Citigroup and Bank of America made positive statements about the current quarter weeks ago, and last week, John Stumpf, the chief executive of Wells Fargo, said the bank was in good shape and expected a $3 billion profit this quarter. The Wells Fargo statement appeared to frustrate some Treasury officials, and regulators clearly fear it will be more difficult for them to issue negative assessments of banks that have already proclaimed that they are in good shape.

A Wells Fargo spokeswoman, Janis Smith, said the company would not comment on interactions with its regulator.

At this point, the Obama Administration needs to realize something else about their plans to bring back the banking industry. These banksters believe they will be and can be immune from regulation. They are treating their gravy train and regulator like a doormat. 

So it’s probably a good idea to impose the new regulations now, before doling out more money in PPIP. Because until Read more →

Geithner to Banks: “Ix-Nay on the Solvency-Inay”

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I suppose, if Wells Fargo boasted wildly in its earnings report that it not only made a profit, but passed its stress test with flying colors, and Bank of America and Citi remained silent about the results of their stress tests in their earnings report, then we all might conclude that Bank of America and Citi had fared rather poorly on their tests.

As opposed to all of us concluding that Bank of America and Citi failed their no-fail stress test based on the FDIC want ads and the way Geithner has been wandering around saying "Shhhhhhh!" all week.

Still. Isn’t it bad form for the Treasury Department to order financial institutions to hide data about their financial health on their earnings reports? (h/t Stephen)

The U.S. Treasury Department is asking banks not to mention the regulatory "stress tests" as part of their first-quarter earnings results, according to a source familiar with government discussions.

If I were a BoA or Citi stockholder, I’d be finalizing my suit against Geithner right now to avoid the rush.

CEO’s Eating Their Own Toxic Products

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We’ve got competing CEOs on the all-Congress channel today, with the Peanut CEO in front of Commerce Committee and the Bank CEOs in front of Financial Services.

There will be some scuttlebutt from the Bank CEOs–as when a few of them admitted they’ve been raising credit card rates since they started sucking on the federal teat.

But the news coverage will open today with Stewart Parnell (CEO) and Sammy Lightsey (Plant Manager) of the Peanut Corporation of America.

Both of them came in, got sworn in, and repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment. Neither of these guys appear to be as bright as their Wall Street counterparts–I got the sense that Parnell, and especially Lightsey–were under very strict orders to say nothing beyond "On the advice of my counsel, I respectfully decline to answer your question based on the protection afforded me under the US Constitution" Lightsey, in particular, was struggling with all the legalese.

But the highlight of the hearing came when Congressman Greg Walden (R-OR) offered up a plastic bin wrapped with big yellow CAUTION ribbons–with Peanut Corporation peanut material inside. Walden asked Parnell and Lightsey if they would be willing to eat some of their own product right there, before the Sub-Committee.

"On the advice of counsel, I uh respectfully exercise my rights Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."

A simple yes or no might have sufficed.

In any case, there’s real irony with the competing CEOs show. The ones before the Financial Services Committee, after all, have done far broader damage than the Peanut Corporation–and their actions may well lead to many more deaths than the salmonella outbreak (which is not to minimize the grief of the families affected by the peanut outbreak). 

But no one is asking those CEOs–the bank CEOS–to eat their own toxic products.