https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Logo-Web.png00emptywheelhttps://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Logo-Web.pngemptywheel2007-01-01 11:12:002007-01-01 11:12:00The Opportunity Cost of War, Part III
Anonymous says:
E.W…Thanks for the discussion. It pains me that America is not having this discussion on a wide scale.
What ever happened to the old philosophical argument about socialism vs capitalism? It’s as if we cannot even bring it up.
I can remember as a child my father arguing the point about the problems with socialism. I remember him holding up countries like Denmark, and Sweden and how horrible the quality of life was for folks in those countries because of high taxes. I chuckle today when I think of it. Why don’t we have this discussion anymore?
Anonymous says:
A hypothetical: China expands its middle class; middle class in China votes to taper industrial payola; UN pressure adds world opinion to partisan influences upon Chinese as well as US lawmakers, to work on global warming amelioration instead of cronyist profiteering. I would be interested in the Argentine views you once developed, ew. It is an extreme on the continent of S.America; but having delved into Iberian civil government history, as well as ethnology there, I see the rich-poor dualism in politics in Latin America as reflective of millenial patterns. Developing a middle class in Latin America may be fostered best by allowing illegal immigration in the US, though this seems a contrarian way to accomplish what would be best done approached directly: through leadership from the White House, rather than Bush’s dispersed corporate governance technique. At the December 2006 American Geophysical Union meeting one paper described disappearance of the arcitic ice cap by 2046, with resultant hastening of climate change. The amicus brief authored by professor Hansen in the MA v EPA case in the Supreme Court in autumn 2006 is a precision 18-page primer on why it is important to accomplish changes in global warming policy immediately. I wonder what leadership is forthcoming from the new UN Secretary General BKM, with respect to climate change.
Anonymous says:
With the ascendancy of Nancy Pelosi to the speakership, her hometown paper the SF Chronicle, and its political reporters, have become must reading. Today the Chron reports that Bush and Pelosi can be expected to try to seek some accommodation on some issues, and mentions energy policy and by association global warming as possibilities.
â€He’s all into switch grass,†said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Walnut Creek, who co-chairs the moderate New Democrat coalition, describing Bush’s fresh fascination with alternative fuels. Tauscher said Bush pointed out that he was the first president to acknowledge America’s â€addiction to oil†and seemed â€very engaged and wants to move forward†on a new approach to energy.
Stranger things have happened. Ironically, global warming may have some real appeal for Bush as it is in almost every way easier than Iraq. I marvel at how it has seeped into the national consciousness since Gore’s film as an accepted problem for all but the most benighted. Easier in the sense that there are baby steps to be taken like subsidizing alternative fuels and maybe even more stringent mpg standards that will have much support. With Toyota eating Ford’s and GM’s lunches, maybe there will finally be a willingness to move on that front.
Anonymous says:
Re: Toyota, etc.
Um, this is where I bemoan my state’s politicos, who treat low cafe standards the same way Charlton Heston treats a gun.
Anonymous says:
John Lopresti
The Argentine crisis is just the most recent of a century plus history of exposure to bad trade policies. Argentina’s import substitution might have worked after WWII if 1) the US hadn’t made grain/beef imports from there impossible, and 2) the US hadn’t made it nearly-impossible for Argentina to collect the money England owed it. To say nothing of the earlier century British-invested elite.
But I think you could go a long way to improve LA economies if you imposed a kind of economic sovereignty which made it difficult for the elite of those countries to pull money out of the country into Swiss bank accounts, then abandon the countries. That is, if the elite were forced to invest and spend their tremendous wealth in their own countries, they might not be so quick to embrace policies that led to large scale instability.
But I guess you could say the same of the US. See also Kevin Phillips on the financialization of economies.
Anonymous says:
These are the numbers I have heard.
Currently the lower and uppper limits of the estimated eventual real cost of the war are 1 Trillion and 4 Trillion.
More conservative costs limits are 3 Trillion and 4 Trillion.
That is of course assuming that we don’t end up with a dirty (or not)nuclear bomb exploding somewhere.
Anonymous says:
Excuse me I was in a hurry I guess.
Correction:
More conservative cost limits are 2 Trillion to 4 Trillion.
[love that Polar bear picture.]
Anonymous says:
Thanks, Jodi–the $1 trillion came from a full year ago. Funny how costs can balloon over the course of a year?
Anonymous says:
There are only two situations that justify war. One is that the â€other guy†is crazy. And two, is that our leader is crazy. Period. The cause of war is insanity.
Anonymous says:
Hey emptywheel, sorry to pursue you, but I had a question from the back channels thread that I didn’t get to ask. (I work nights and keep a crazy schedule, so I’m lucky to get one question in before a thread dies, much less two.)
My sense of global strategy is so poor that I find that impossible to process. It blows a fuse in my brain.
Al-Qaeda: the group that primarily hates the House of Saud, the group that hates the USA primarily because we support the House of Saud (and incidentally because we support Likud and have troops on the peninsula). I mean, at one time Hitler and Stalin were allied, and not long after that Churchill and Stalin were allied, so I guess similarly weird things have happened. But if Al-Qaeda’s not a mortal enemy of the House of Saud then I have been seriously fooled (which, given that prominent Saudis are/were funding Al-Qaeda, I might have been).
If such an alliance were conceived to be more than temporary, and to extend beyond Al-Anbar+Baghdad, then I can’t yet imagine its outlines.
I’ll try to think it out here, but my question is what does â€open support of Al-Qaeda†mean, particularly as a grand strategic move.
Saudi can’t declare war on the West, which Al-Qaeda has done. Not even Iran/Hezbollah does Euro/American terrorism… right? Saudi has to sell their oil, mostly to Europe, on sea lanes that we still can annihilate if we choose.
The Saudis have extensive overseas investments, I gather, much of it in the USA. They have the power to ruin the dollar, although that would destroy the value of their American investments at the same time?
I’ve always assumed that the Saudis could not survive without strong American support — not against the Iranians nor against their own population. I guess I’m forced to imagine that they could actually tilt so far toward their Wahabbi population and so far against the USA that they could actually solidify their hold on their own kingdom so thoroughly that they would no longer be vulnerable from inside. Or from Al-Qaeda. Basically, if they govern as Bin Laden would wish, they no longer have to fear certain people; they’ve just swapped out their political base.
In that situation, they are de facto at war with the USA. Suppose they drop the dollar, pick up the Euro, and rely on the Europeans to prevent us from closing the sea lanes. The Saudis wouldn’t actually have fired a shot, but they would have completely strategically dumped us, and shut down our currency, and then would be daring us to turn a cold/economic war into a shooting war, which would be our only real strong point at that time. I suppose they could hope to constrain the US into not starting a shooting war. Our economy would already be in the dumps, and if we physically disrupted the global oil supply then Europe and Japan and China would be ruined too. I can’t actually imagine the geostrategic consequences of an American embargo of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, but given that the only provocation would be Saudi dumping us and our lousy dollar as a direct consequence of our stupid war, most of the world would probably think we’ve earned it and would be less than sympathetic. Just cause our economy has been exposed as trash is no valid reason to sabotage everyone else’s.
I don’t know if we could physically take control of Saudi oil fields, or if we could turn Iran into our ally overnight. If Saudi tilted toward Al-Qaeda, they would presumably have become very very hostile to Shiites, but maybe they could finesse that angle. If the Shiites and the Sunnis both decided to let us wither before they fought each other, and both Iran and Saudi shunned us, we’d be screwed. On the other hand, could the Iranians resist enlisting the American military apparatus on their side, for the first time since 1979 (and the first time ever on their own terms)?
I can only assume that an alliance with Iran/Iraq would entail asking them to continue trading in dollars. I don’t even know what our vital interests would be at that point other than propping up our economy and protecting Israel. There’s no situation in which we’re not allowed to buy oil, right, just a situation in which our currency is worthless and we can’t afford it?
What would Al-Qaeda do if it got everything it wanted in Saudi? Their goal is what, Wahabbi-style rule in all Sunni countries (the new caliphate), plus maybe repulsing the Jews and Shiites? The Saudis would have to get six or ten other rulers to join an unofficial Concert of Sunnis, operating within existing state boundaries. Pakistan would be interesting. Afghanistan would be interesting. Baghdad would be interesting.
Given Sunni ambitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, roping the Iranians into an alliance with us might not be impossible. Could depend on how Pakistan goes. USA+Iran+India+Israel+Kurds?
All this is not to mention that tilting towards Al-Qaeda doesn’t change the fact that Iran/Iraq is the new swing producer of oil. Of course, I don’t really understand the implications of that phrase anyway. The strategic consequences of being able to set the price of oil aren’t that clear to me.
As you can see, I’m performing well below the level of amateur. What is it that the Saudis are threatening? What does Saudi backing of Al-Qaeda mean, if it’s not a temporary move in Al-Anbar and vicinity?
Thanks very much, and apologies if thread-jumping is considered inappropriate.
Anonymous says:
texas dem
Saudi can’t declare war on the West, which Al-Qaeda has done. Not even Iran/Hezbollah does Euro/American terrorism… right? Saudi has to sell their oil, mostly to Europe, on sea lanes that we still can annihilate if we choose.
Correct, to a point. But in the initial stages, I suspect siding with AQ would be half-hidden, and it would occur in such a way as to dimish US efficacy. And to some degree, this would just involve a shift within the factions of the Saudi family to those who favor AQ (there have always been ties, although since 9/11 have remained at lower levels).
The Saudis have extensive overseas investments, I gather, much of it in the USA. They have the power to ruin the dollar, although that would destroy the value of their American investments at the same time?
I suspect they might work indirectly, rather than ruining their investments. But they could adopt the Euro pretty easily.
I’ve always assumed that the Saudis could not survive without strong American support — not against the Iranians nor against their own population. I guess I’m forced to imagine that they could actually tilt so far toward their Wahabbi population and so far against the USA that they could actually solidify their hold on their own kingdom so thoroughly that they would no longer be vulnerable from inside. Or from Al-Qaeda. Basically, if they govern as Bin Laden would wish, they no longer have to fear certain people; they’ve just swapped out their political base.
I think that’s kind of the idea. In a sense, they’re being forced in that direction anyway, because US support is probably beginning to cost the Saudis more than it is helping them. They can always pay troops to defend them. But I think the message they’re sending is that Iraq–and growing power of Iran–is an existential threat to them. And one of the first solutions for that threat is to collapse back into the one source of power some Saudis have, their ties to AQ.
I don’t know if we could physically take control of Saudi oil fields, or if we could turn Iran into our ally overnight.
According to Bob Baer, there is a contigency plan in place to do just that–take over the fields if need be. I imagine that plan is regularly updated. And no, I don’t think we could turn Iran into our ally, not now, not with these guys. We might be able to sow choas and prevent anyone else from getting the oil.
And remember, our military superiority relies on access to fuel. We use a huge percentage of the nations fuel on military purposes. How long could we hold out? And could the Saudis/the Iranians/the Venezuelans hold out longer? Loss of access to fuel is one critical factor in Nazi Germany/Imperial Japan’s loss in WWII.
E.W…Thanks for the discussion. It pains me that America is not having this discussion on a wide scale.
What ever happened to the old philosophical argument about socialism vs capitalism? It’s as if we cannot even bring it up.
I can remember as a child my father arguing the point about the problems with socialism. I remember him holding up countries like Denmark, and Sweden and how horrible the quality of life was for folks in those countries because of high taxes. I chuckle today when I think of it. Why don’t we have this discussion anymore?
A hypothetical: China expands its middle class; middle class in China votes to taper industrial payola; UN pressure adds world opinion to partisan influences upon Chinese as well as US lawmakers, to work on global warming amelioration instead of cronyist profiteering.
I would be interested in the Argentine views you once developed, ew. It is an extreme on the continent of S.America; but having delved into Iberian civil government history, as well as ethnology there, I see the rich-poor dualism in politics in Latin America as reflective of millenial patterns. Developing a middle class in Latin America may be fostered best by allowing illegal immigration in the US, though this seems a contrarian way to accomplish what would be best done approached directly: through leadership from the White House, rather than Bush’s dispersed corporate governance technique.
At the December 2006 American Geophysical Union meeting one paper described disappearance of the arcitic ice cap by 2046, with resultant hastening of climate change. The amicus brief authored by professor Hansen in the MA v EPA case in the Supreme Court in autumn 2006 is a precision 18-page primer on why it is important to accomplish changes in global warming policy immediately. I wonder what leadership is forthcoming from the new UN Secretary General BKM, with respect to climate change.
With the ascendancy of Nancy Pelosi to the speakership, her hometown paper the SF Chronicle, and its political reporters, have become must reading. Today the Chron reports that Bush and Pelosi can be expected to try to seek some accommodation on some issues, and mentions energy policy and by association global warming as possibilities.
Stranger things have happened. Ironically, global warming may have some real appeal for Bush as it is in almost every way easier than Iraq. I marvel at how it has seeped into the national consciousness since Gore’s film as an accepted problem for all but the most benighted. Easier in the sense that there are baby steps to be taken like subsidizing alternative fuels and maybe even more stringent mpg standards that will have much support. With Toyota eating Ford’s and GM’s lunches, maybe there will finally be a willingness to move on that front.
Re: Toyota, etc.
Um, this is where I bemoan my state’s politicos, who treat low cafe standards the same way Charlton Heston treats a gun.
John Lopresti
The Argentine crisis is just the most recent of a century plus history of exposure to bad trade policies. Argentina’s import substitution might have worked after WWII if 1) the US hadn’t made grain/beef imports from there impossible, and 2) the US hadn’t made it nearly-impossible for Argentina to collect the money England owed it. To say nothing of the earlier century British-invested elite.
But I think you could go a long way to improve LA economies if you imposed a kind of economic sovereignty which made it difficult for the elite of those countries to pull money out of the country into Swiss bank accounts, then abandon the countries. That is, if the elite were forced to invest and spend their tremendous wealth in their own countries, they might not be so quick to embrace policies that led to large scale instability.
But I guess you could say the same of the US. See also Kevin Phillips on the financialization of economies.
These are the numbers I have heard.
Currently the lower and uppper limits of the estimated eventual real cost of the war are 1 Trillion and 4 Trillion.
More conservative costs limits are 3 Trillion and 4 Trillion.
That is of course assuming that we don’t end up with a dirty (or not)nuclear bomb exploding somewhere.
Excuse me I was in a hurry I guess.
Correction:
More conservative cost limits are 2 Trillion to 4 Trillion.
[love that Polar bear picture.]
Thanks, Jodi–the $1 trillion came from a full year ago. Funny how costs can balloon over the course of a year?
There are only two situations that justify war. One is that the â€other guy†is crazy. And two, is that our leader is crazy. Period. The cause of war is insanity.
Hey emptywheel, sorry to pursue you, but I had a question from the back channels thread that I didn’t get to ask. (I work nights and keep a crazy schedule, so I’m lucky to get one question in before a thread dies, much less two.)
You said in answer to my underinformed comment that what the Saudis were threatening was â€open support of Al-Qaeda.â€
My sense of global strategy is so poor that I find that impossible to process. It blows a fuse in my brain.
Al-Qaeda: the group that primarily hates the House of Saud, the group that hates the USA primarily because we support the House of Saud (and incidentally because we support Likud and have troops on the peninsula). I mean, at one time Hitler and Stalin were allied, and not long after that Churchill and Stalin were allied, so I guess similarly weird things have happened. But if Al-Qaeda’s not a mortal enemy of the House of Saud then I have been seriously fooled (which, given that prominent Saudis are/were funding Al-Qaeda, I might have been).
If such an alliance were conceived to be more than temporary, and to extend beyond Al-Anbar+Baghdad, then I can’t yet imagine its outlines.
I’ll try to think it out here, but my question is what does â€open support of Al-Qaeda†mean, particularly as a grand strategic move.
Saudi can’t declare war on the West, which Al-Qaeda has done. Not even Iran/Hezbollah does Euro/American terrorism… right? Saudi has to sell their oil, mostly to Europe, on sea lanes that we still can annihilate if we choose.
The Saudis have extensive overseas investments, I gather, much of it in the USA. They have the power to ruin the dollar, although that would destroy the value of their American investments at the same time?
I’ve always assumed that the Saudis could not survive without strong American support — not against the Iranians nor against their own population. I guess I’m forced to imagine that they could actually tilt so far toward their Wahabbi population and so far against the USA that they could actually solidify their hold on their own kingdom so thoroughly that they would no longer be vulnerable from inside. Or from Al-Qaeda. Basically, if they govern as Bin Laden would wish, they no longer have to fear certain people; they’ve just swapped out their political base.
In that situation, they are de facto at war with the USA. Suppose they drop the dollar, pick up the Euro, and rely on the Europeans to prevent us from closing the sea lanes. The Saudis wouldn’t actually have fired a shot, but they would have completely strategically dumped us, and shut down our currency, and then would be daring us to turn a cold/economic war into a shooting war, which would be our only real strong point at that time. I suppose they could hope to constrain the US into not starting a shooting war. Our economy would already be in the dumps, and if we physically disrupted the global oil supply then Europe and Japan and China would be ruined too. I can’t actually imagine the geostrategic consequences of an American embargo of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, but given that the only provocation would be Saudi dumping us and our lousy dollar as a direct consequence of our stupid war, most of the world would probably think we’ve earned it and would be less than sympathetic. Just cause our economy has been exposed as trash is no valid reason to sabotage everyone else’s.
I don’t know if we could physically take control of Saudi oil fields, or if we could turn Iran into our ally overnight. If Saudi tilted toward Al-Qaeda, they would presumably have become very very hostile to Shiites, but maybe they could finesse that angle. If the Shiites and the Sunnis both decided to let us wither before they fought each other, and both Iran and Saudi shunned us, we’d be screwed. On the other hand, could the Iranians resist enlisting the American military apparatus on their side, for the first time since 1979 (and the first time ever on their own terms)?
I can only assume that an alliance with Iran/Iraq would entail asking them to continue trading in dollars. I don’t even know what our vital interests would be at that point other than propping up our economy and protecting Israel. There’s no situation in which we’re not allowed to buy oil, right, just a situation in which our currency is worthless and we can’t afford it?
What would Al-Qaeda do if it got everything it wanted in Saudi? Their goal is what, Wahabbi-style rule in all Sunni countries (the new caliphate), plus maybe repulsing the Jews and Shiites? The Saudis would have to get six or ten other rulers to join an unofficial Concert of Sunnis, operating within existing state boundaries. Pakistan would be interesting. Afghanistan would be interesting. Baghdad would be interesting.
Given Sunni ambitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, roping the Iranians into an alliance with us might not be impossible. Could depend on how Pakistan goes. USA+Iran+India+Israel+Kurds?
All this is not to mention that tilting towards Al-Qaeda doesn’t change the fact that Iran/Iraq is the new swing producer of oil. Of course, I don’t really understand the implications of that phrase anyway. The strategic consequences of being able to set the price of oil aren’t that clear to me.
As you can see, I’m performing well below the level of amateur. What is it that the Saudis are threatening? What does Saudi backing of Al-Qaeda mean, if it’s not a temporary move in Al-Anbar and vicinity?
Thanks very much, and apologies if thread-jumping is considered inappropriate.
texas dem
Correct, to a point. But in the initial stages, I suspect siding with AQ would be half-hidden, and it would occur in such a way as to dimish US efficacy. And to some degree, this would just involve a shift within the factions of the Saudi family to those who favor AQ (there have always been ties, although since 9/11 have remained at lower levels).
I suspect they might work indirectly, rather than ruining their investments. But they could adopt the Euro pretty easily.
I think that’s kind of the idea. In a sense, they’re being forced in that direction anyway, because US support is probably beginning to cost the Saudis more than it is helping them. They can always pay troops to defend them. But I think the message they’re sending is that Iraq–and growing power of Iran–is an existential threat to them. And one of the first solutions for that threat is to collapse back into the one source of power some Saudis have, their ties to AQ.
According to Bob Baer, there is a contigency plan in place to do just that–take over the fields if need be. I imagine that plan is regularly updated. And no, I don’t think we could turn Iran into our ally, not now, not with these guys. We might be able to sow choas and prevent anyone else from getting the oil.
And remember, our military superiority relies on access to fuel. We use a huge percentage of the nations fuel on military purposes. How long could we hold out? And could the Saudis/the Iranians/the Venezuelans hold out longer? Loss of access to fuel is one critical factor in Nazi Germany/Imperial Japan’s loss in WWII.