Posts

The May 2017 Report Tying Oleg Deripaska to Russian Intelligence

I’m working on a longer post about the sentencing submissions (McGonigal; SDNY) for Charles McGonigal’s SDNY case — the former head of counterintelligence for FBI’s New York Field Office. He will be sentenced in that case on Friday; he will be sentenced in his DC case in February.

The submission for McGonigal submitted by former Bill Barr flunkie Seth DuCharme argued that McGonigal’s crime, researching a rival oligarch for Oleg Deripaska after he retired in 2018, is no big deal because DOJ has sanctioned Deripaska’s rival, Vladimir Potanin, since that time.

[W]hen compared to other conduct for which the government has brought criminal charges, it bears repeating that here the crime was clearly malum prohibitum rather than malum in se—in other words, the defendant’s intent in agreeing to provide an SDN with information to be used for business competition purposes is far less serious than the criminal conduct in other IEEPA-related cases. [links added]

DuCharme asks for a probation sentence.

As you can imagine, SDNY has a lot to say about that in response. DuCharme, whom PACER does not show as having taken many, if any defendant, through sentencing since he left DOJ in 2021, really invited SDNY to throw a lot of damaging information at McGonigal.

One thing SDNY did was explain why McGonigal knew working for Deripaska was more damaging than that. One thing they note is that in January 2018, before he left the FBI, McGonigal reviewed a list of oligarchs, including Deripaska, under consideration for sanctions.

McGonigal knew full well that Deripaska was sanctioned. As SAC, McGonigal supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. (PSR ¶ 19).

[snip]

And in January 2018, McGonigal received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine. (PSR ¶ 19).

That detail was in the indictment.

As SAC, McGonigal supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, incl uding Deripaska . Among other things, in 2018, McGONIGAL , while acting as SAC, received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia ‘ s 2014 conflict with Ukraine .

But there’s a detail DOJ has since gotten declassified, one of those “other things” only alluded to in the indictment: before McGonigal started pursuing ties with Albania while still at FBI, he received a report “stating that Deripaska was associated with a Russian intelligence agency.”

Among other things, in May 2017, McGonigal received a then-classified email stating that Deripaska was associated with a Russian intelligence agency, and possibly involved in that agency’s coup attempt in another country. (PSR ¶ 19).

By context, the agency must be GRU and the attempted coup must be Montenegro, a country implicated in McGonigal’s other prosecution — one where Paul Manafort had an extensive history with Deripaska and one mentioned in Andrew Weissmann’s Team M report. See also this post Rayne wrote on related topics.

In other words, this strongly suggests that in the same month when Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller to investigate how GRU tampered in the 2016 election, McGonigal received a report tying Deripaska to the GRU.

Then he went on to agree to work for Deripaska anyway, hoping to make millions from a guy with a key role in the 2016 attack on American democracy.

And Bill Barr’s flunkie, Seth DuCharme — the guy who helped set up a way for Rudy Giuliani to share information from Russian-backed Ukrainians to be funneled to the Hunter Biden investigation — thinks that McGonigal should be sentenced to probation as a result.

Charles McGonigal’s Lonely Plea Deal

Former FBI Assistant Director Charles McGonigal pled guilty to one count of conspiring to violate sanctions today.

Tellingly, the Information doesn’t say with whom he conspired.

Remember, he was charged in January with former translator Sergey Shestakov. The acts to which he pled guilty — collecting business intelligence on Oleg Deripaska rival Vladimir Potanin, according to reports from the plea — he was alleged to have done with Shestakov and for Agent-1, understood to be Yevgeniy Fokin.

19 . In or about August 2021 , McGONIGAL, SHESTAKOV, and Agent-1 drafted and executed a contract (the “Contract”) . According to the Contract, a Cyprus corporation (the “Cyprus Corporation”) would pay a Corporation based in New Jersey (the “New Jersey Corporation”) $51 , 280 upon execution of the Contract and $41 , 790 per month for “business intelligence services, analysis, and research relevant to [the Russian Corporation], its business operations, and shareholders. ” Although the payments under the Contract in fact would be made to MCGONIGAL and SHESTAKOV at the behest of Deripaska , as negotiated by Agent-1 , none of those people was named in or was a si gnatory to the Contract . Pursuant to the Contract , on August 13, 2021 1 $51 , 280 was wired from a Russian bank (the “Russian Bank”) to the New Jersey Corporation, to be followed by monthly payments of $41, 790 between August 18 and November 18 , 2021.

20 . The New Jersey Corporation was owned by a friend of McGONIGAL (the ”Friend” ) . The Friend had arranged for McGONIGAL to participate in the business of the New Jersey Corporation while McGONIGAL was still serving as SAC with the FBI . The Friend provided McGONIGAL with a corporate email account and a cellphone under a false name, which McGONIGAL at times used, in order to conceal McGONIGAL’ s work for the New Jersey Corporation while still employed by the FBI. Wit h respect to the Contract, however, McGONIGAL told SHESTAKOV that he had not informed the Friend that he was using the New Jersey Corporation to receive payment on the Contract . SHESTAKOV subsequently forged the Friend’ s signature on the Contract without the Friend’ s knowledge or permission . When the Friend questioned McGONIGAL about why the Russian Bank was making payments to the New Jersey Corporation, McGONIGAL told the Friend, in substance and in part, that it was payment for “legitimate” work McGONIGAL was performing for “a rich Russian guy . ” The Friend acquiesced in the use of the New Jersey Corporation, and subsequently transferred funds obtained pursuant to the Contract at McGONIGAL’ s direction, including to McGONIGAL and SHESTAKOV.

21. From at least in or about August 2021 until in or about November 2021 and in return for the payments specified in the Contract, McGONIGAL sought to gather information about Oligarch-2 and the Russian Corporation . Among other things, McGONIGAL retained subcontractors to assist in this endeavor. With respect to one such subcontractor (“Subcontractor-ln) , McGONIGAL requested a “soup to nuts” investigation of Oligarch-2 and the Russian Corporation . McGONIGAL declined to t ell Subcontractor-1 the identity of his client, despite having an established relationship with Subcontractor- 1 in which McGONIGAL had identified his prior, lawful client.

Instead, his Information tersely describes that he and others worked for Deripaska.

From in or about August 2021 through in or about November 2021, McGONIGAL and others, acting at the behest of Oleg Deripaska, whom the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated as a Specially Designated National on or about April 6, 2018, sought to gather derogatory information about a rival of Deripaska, in violation of IEEPA.

From in or about August 2021 through in or about November 2021, McGONIGAL and others received and routed payments from Deripaska through two corporations, neither of which was registered in the name of McGONIGAL or Deripaska, in an effort to conceal that the payments originated from Deripaska.

Even the press release makes no mention of Shestakov. It only describes McGonigal’s conspiracy with Fokin.

In 2021, MCGONIGAL conspired to provide services to Deripaska, in violation of U.S. sanctions imposed on Deripaska in 2018.  Specifically, following his negotiations with an agent of Deripaska, MCGONIGAL agreed to and did investigate a rival Russian oligarch in return for concealed payments from Deripaska.  As part of their negotiations with Deripaska’s agent, MCGONIGAL and the agent attempted to conceal Deripaska’s involvement by, among other means, not directly naming Deripaska in electronic communications, using shell companies as counterparties in the contract that outlined the services to be performed, using a forged signature on that contract, and using the same shell companies to send and receive payment from Deripaska.

Nor is there any hint of cooperation, which you’d think a former FBI Agent might do if there were a co-conspirator still around to cooperate against. According to Innercity Press’ live tweet of the hearing, even though Seth DuCharme had recently suggested that both this and his DC case would be resolved in one agreement, this agreement doesn’t rule out consecutive sentences, meaning he could face more than the five years he’s facing in SDNY. Nor are tax charges off the table.

It’s not exactly the kind of sweet plea deal he must have imagined Bill Barr’s former fixer, Seth DuCharme might negotiate.

Seth DuCharme Really, Really Wants to Graymail Charles McGonigal’s Path to Freedom

I’m really not surprised that former Bill Barr flunky Seth DuCharme is trying to graymail the government in the SDNY case of his client, Charles McGonigal. That’s a legal strategy whereby you demand so many highly classified documents for trial that the government is faced with the prospect of dismissing a criminal case rather than going to trial.

As a reminder, former Special Assistant in Charge of Counterintelligence in FBI’s NY’s Field Office McGonigal was charged in two indictments: A DC indictment charging him for hiding some meetings with and payments from an Albanian associate while still at the FBI, and a SDNY indictment charging him and Sergey Shestakov with money laundering and conspiring to violate the sanctions imposed on Oleg Deripaska after McGonigal left theFBI.

Almost six months and maybe one or two sealed docket items in, there’s no public sign of a Classified Information Protection Act notice in the DC case (see this post for a background on CIPA).

Not so the SDNY case. That case has been headed for CIPA from the start.

But something funky is going on with the CIPA process, as if there’s a CIPA filter team backstopping the prosecution team.

SDNY must have planned this from the start, and it is driving McGonigal’s team nuts.

It started on February 8, when SDNY filed a CIPA letter, requesting a CIPA 2 conference.

Often, these letters review the entire CIPA process. The one Jay Bratt submitted in the Trump stolen documents case last week, for example, went through Section 1, Section 2, Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6 (broken down by sub-section), Section 7, Section 8, Section 9, and Section 10.

Not the SDNY one in the McGonigal case. It went through Section 2 — asking for a conference — and then stopped.

The Government expects to provide the Court with further information about whether there will be any need for CIPA practice in this case, and to answer any questions the Court may have, at the CIPA Section 2 conference.

In response, on March 1, McGonigal’s lawyers submitted their own CIPA letter, laying out Sections 1 through 8. Along the way, it described how important Section 4 is and informed Judge

Section 4, which is in many ways the heart of CIPA, governs the methods of disclosure of classified information by the government to the defendant, pursuant to its constitutional and statutory obligations. See 18 U.S.C. § App. III § 4. Section 4 is implicated when the head of the department with control over the matter, and after personal consideration of the matter, invokes the states-secrets privilege to withhold classified information from the defendant in the interests of national security. Doe v. C.I.A., No. 05 CIV. 7939 LTSFM, 2007 WL 30099, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007); see also United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008). The states-secrets privilege however is not absolute: it “must—under some circumstances—give way . . . to a criminal defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense.” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 141 (2d Cir. 2010). (internal quotations omitted).

Under Section 4, upon a “sufficient showing” by the government, the Court may authorize the government to “delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant . . . , to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.” 18 U.S.C. § App. III § 4. The government makes a sufficient showing that such alternatives are warranted through an ex parte submission to the Court. See id; see also United States v. Muhanad Mahmoud Al-Farekh, 956 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2020). Of critical importance to the fairness of the process, the Court may review, ex parte and in camera, the classified information at issue to determine whether and in what form the information must be disclosed to the defendant, and whether the government has truly satisfied its discovery obligations. See, e.g., United States v. Aref, No. 04 CR 402, 2006 WL 1877142, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006). To assist the Court in this analysis, the defense will provide the Court with its initial view of the scope of material that will be relevant and helpful in the preparation of the defense at the upcoming conference and will supplement that information as appropriate. [my emphasis]

This effectively flipped CIPA on its head, alerting Judge Jennifer Rearden they planned to tell the government what classified discovery should look like, not vice versa.

On March 3, Judge Rearden confirmed she would hold two separate CIPA conferences. The SDNY was held on March 6. On March 7, the day after SDNY’s CIPA conference and the day before McGonigal’s, SDNY wrote to note how McGonigal had flipped on its head.

Although much of McGonigal’s general discourse on CIPA is unobjectionable, the Government believes several points require correction or supplementation.

The whole thing is worth reading: for the description that the US Attorney’s Manual does not convey rights, for the observation that McGonigal had conflated the prosecution team and the Intelligence Community, for the challenge to McGonigal’s claim that the IC must have information about “a recently retired FBI intelligence official being corrupted by a Russian oligarch” (there’s even a long footnote distinguishing the Scooter Libby case, in both Circuit and victim, from this), and for McGonigal’s claim to do in an ex parte Section 2 hearing what normally comes later, in Section 5.

But notably SDNY’s response letter describes that while DOJ must comply with Brady, it doesn’t have to tell a defendant how it is doing so.

Second, although legal rules such as Brady and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 do obligate the Government to disclose particular information, they do not oblige the Government to explain to defendants how they have satisfied that obligation.

The next day, McGonigal had his CIPA hearing.

On May 8, SDNY filed a short letter informing Judge Rearden that they had declassified the material they had told her they would in their own CIPA 2 hearing and provided it to the defense.

At the March 6, 2023 ex parte conference held pursuant to Section 2 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) in the above-referenced case, the Government described to the Court certain materials that the Government was seeking to declassify. The Government writes to confirm that those materials have been declassified and produced to the defendants. At this time, the Government does not anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA and believes it has met its discovery obligations with respect to classified information.

In saying they didn’t anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4, they were undercutting the premise McGonigal’s team had made back on March 1.

Given the letter McGonigal submitted last Friday, June 23, such an approach seems to be driving McGonigal nuts. It describes that it is puzzling and concerning and hard to imagine that there isn’t more.

With respect to the way forward as it pertains to classified discovery, as we noted at our last court appearance, the government has indicated that it “does not anticipate making a filing pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA and believes it has met its discovery obligations with respect to classified information.” See ECF No. 44 at 1. In a subsequent series of conversations, the government informed us, in a general way, that it has satisfied its discovery obligations relating to classified information. The government’s position is perplexing. While it is not surprising that the government does not wish to account for its each and every step in satisfying its constitutional obligations, it is puzzling and concerning that the government would, at this stage, determine that no CIPA Section 4 presentation to the Court is appropriate, when we are a year away from trial and the government’s discovery obligations with respect to Rule 16, the Jencks Act, Brady and Giglio are ongoing. The indictment and the U.S. Attorney’s press release include accusations that foreseeably implicate classified information within each of the four categories of discoverable information. With respect to the category of impeachment material alone, it is hard to imagine a world in which there are no classified materials that touch on the credibility of the government’s trial witnesses (or alleged unindicted coconspirator hearsay declarants), and which would require treatment under Section 4 of CIPA.

It explains that both McGonigal and Seth DuCharme can be trusted with the government’s classified information — after all, McGonigal was only indicted for cozying up to the Russian oligarch he had hunted for years!

Not mishandling classified information.

And Seth DuCharme was, until recently, trusted with Bill Barr’s most sensitive secrets.

Further, it is hard to understand why the government is so reluctant to be more transparent in explaining its discovery practices to the defense in this case. While many national security cases involve defendants with no prior clearances or experience with the U.S. Intelligence Community, and may involve only recently-cleared defense counsel who may be new to navigating the burdens and responsibilities of handling classified information, here, those concerns do not apply. Mr. McGonigal was one of the most senior and experienced national security investigators in the FBI with significant direct professional experience in the areas germane to his requests for assurances about the thoroughness of the government’s discovery analysis. In addition, before moving to private practice, the undersigned counsel served as the Chief of the National Security Section, the Chief of the Criminal Division and the Acting United States Attorney in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York as well as the Senior Counselor to the Attorney General of the United States for National Security and Criminal matters, and has responsibly held TS/SCI clearances with respect to some of the United States government’s most sensitive programs. As the Department of Justice has concluded in re-instating defense counsel’s clearances for the purpose of this case, we are trustworthy. So, here, we have a defendant and defense counsel who are highly respectful and experienced with regard to the protocols for handling and compartmentalizing sensitive classified information, and simply request comfort that the government has indeed done everything it would normally do in a case such as this, with sufficient detail to assess the credibility of the government’s position.

Notably, Mr. McGonigal has not been accused of mishandling classified information in the cases brought against him, and he maintains respect for the national security interests of the United States, as of course do we. In addition, we are not asking the government to disclose to the defense any sensitive sources and methods by which discoverable information was collected—only to provide greater transparency to us, and to the Court, as to how it views its procedural obligations, so that we may consider the fairness and reasonableness of the government’s approach. Mr. McGonigal is personally familiar with this process from his time at the FBI, and it is reasonable for him to expect to be treated no worse than the other defendants who have come before him. To adequately represent Mr. McGonigal, it seems only fair that we be allowed to hold the United States government to the same standards that the defendant upheld as a national security and law enforcement professional, and to make a record of the government’s position.

DuCharme then invoked the Nejad case where, under his former boss’ tenure, a sanctions case blew up because DOJ failed to meet its discovery obligations.

Given DuCharme’s helpful offer to meet in a secure hearing or to submit a more highly classified brief, he’s clearly got something specific in mind.

In sum, if the government could explain, in an appropriate setting, how it determined that it had obviated the need for a CIPA Section 4 proceeding, we likely can avoid speculative motion practice, and the parties and this Court may be assured that we can continue to litigate this case fairly and with the level of confidence to which we are entitled.

[snip]

To the extent the Court would like more detailed briefing on these issues prior to the conference, the CISO has provided to cleared defense counsel access to facilities that would allow us to draft a supplemental submission at a higher classification level.

To be sure: I’m not sure which side is right here, and CIPA always sucks for defendants.

But both sides are dancing around something awfully interesting, as if the circumstances that led to McGonigal’s compromise are different — potentially even significantly worse — than anyone is letting on.

McGonigal’s team repeatedly invoked State Secrets. And DuCharme was the Barr flunky who ran interference so that Rudy Giuliani (whose close associate implicated McGonigal) could seek out dirt from known Russian agents without getting arrested. So the background here could indeed be quite interesting.

Thus far, at least, SDNY is refusing to play that game.

Timeline

January 12: Indictment

February 8: DOJ requests a CIPA 2 hearing

March 1: Seth DuCharme sends his own CIPA letter

March 3: Judge Rearden orders a CIPA 2 hearing

March 7: SDNY writes to refute some of DuCharme’s claims

May 8: SDNY writes to confirm it has declassified the materials described at March 6 CIPA hearing and does not believe it will need a CIPA 4 hearing

June 23: DuChare writes again saying it’s not possible for SDNY to have fulfilled its obligations

John Durham’s Disinformation Problem

The only person about whose ties to Christopher Steele John Durham showed no curiosity was Oleg Deripaska.

The only person whose ties to the creator of the dossier that led the FBI to adopt false claims against Trump aides that Durham didn’t pursue was the guy, on whose behalf, Trump’s campaign regularly sent out internal polling data starting in May 2016, the guy, on whose behalf, Trump’s campaign manager briefed Russian agent Konstantin Kilimnik on the campaign’s plan to win swing states. The 2021 Treasury filing that stated, as fact, that Kilimnik is a, “known Russian Intelligence Services agent implementing influence operations on their behalf,” also stated, as fact, that in 2016, “Kilimnik provided the Russian Intelligence Services with sensitive information on polling and campaign strategy,” the very same polling data and campaign strategy he obtained from Trump’s campaign manager on Oleg Deripaska’s behalf. As I’ve laid out, John Durham never mentioned Kilimnik in his report, not once, to say nothing of how Kilimnik obtained internal polling data and a campaign strategy briefing and delivered it to Russian spies.

Everyone else who had the least little tie to Christopher Steele, Durham pursued relentlessly. He charged Igor Danchenko, even though the FBI used Danchenko to, “fish information from Mr. Steele about what Mr. Steele was up to,” as the former British spook pursued a second dossier against Trump in 2017. He charged Danchenko even though Danchenko neither wrote the dossier nor shared it (or even knew it was being shared) with the FBI. Durham not only charged Steele’s primary source, but he caused Danchenko to be burned as an FBI informant, even though Danchenko’s subsource network had reportedly proven incredibly valuable to the FBI. Durham even helped to ensure that the FBI would not pay a significant lump sum payment to Danchenko for his assistance after Republicans in Congress led to his exposure.

Durham’s report aired, at length, details of the earlier counterintelligence investigation into Danchenko; he didn’t include the reasons Danchenko’s handler found the allegations unreliable (indeed, an undated referral in his report suggests Durham retaliated against Danchenko’s handler Kevin Helson for providing those details at trial). Once again, Durham failed his own standards of including exculpatory information. Durham also falsely claimed that Danchenko never told the FBI that his source network knew of his tie to Steele. In reality, as I’ll return to below, in his first interview with the FBI, Dancehnko described that two of them did.

Durham also conducted the investigation into Charles Dolan he believed Robert Mueller’s team should have done in 2017. Durham obtained Dolan’s email, his work email, his phone records, and his Facebook records. Durham still found no proof that Dolan was the source for any of the Russia-related reports in the dossier. After not getting the answers he wanted in Dolan’s first interview, Durham made him a subject and had him review an email Dolan sent, passing on information he had read in public sources, with a report in the dossier, which Dolan conceded might have come from his email. But Dolan still testified that Danchenko never asked Dolan for information about Trump’s connection to Russia.

It wasn’t just Danchenko and Dolan, though. A key part of Durham’s conspiracy theory against Michael Sussmann depended on the fact that — shortly after Sussmann got the Alfa Bank anomaly independent of the Hillary campaign — Sussmann asked Steele about the bank during a meeting where Marc Elias asked Sussmann to help vet Steele. Durham tried to introduce Steele’s subsequent report on Alfa Bank based on that meeting, even though all the evidence shows that if the Brit did provide the report to the FBI, he did so on his own, and it’s not even clear that he himself did provide that particular report directly to his FBI handler.

Durham compelled Fusion’s tech expert Laura Seago to testify because a meeting and four emails she exchanged with Rodney Joffe were the one link between Joffe and the dossier. Seago testified that the Alfa Bank allegations were not a big part of the work she did on Trump-related issues.

Durham had Deborah Fine testify because, as one of the Hillary Campaign’s Deputy General Counsels, she was the only person associated with the campaign — aside from Marc Elias — who regularly met with Fusion GPS. Durham made her testify even though she knew nothing about research relating to Alfa Bank and didn’t remember any conversations about Trump and Russia. Instead, Fine testified, her interaction with Fusion pertained to lawsuits filed against Trump, his company, and his family that Fusion helped to research.

Durham used every method at his disposal — including getting Judge Christopher Cooper to override the Hillary campaign’s claim of privilege over some Fusion emails — to unpack any possible relationship that subjects of his investigation had with Christopher Steele.

Except Oleg Deripaska.

In fact, Durham did the opposite: he obscured the import of Deripaska’s ties to Steele.

In his report, Durham asserted, as fact, something that had only been implied before: Oleg Deripaska paid Steele in spring 2016 to collect information on Paul Manafort.

When interviewed by the FBI in September 2017, Steele stated that his initial entree into U.S. election-related material dealt with Paul Manafort’s connections to Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs. In particular, Steele told the FBI that Manafort owed significant money to these oligarchs and several other Russians. 890 At this time, Steele was working for a different client, Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, often referred to as “Putin’s Oligarch” in media reporting, on a separate litigation-related issue. 891

In the same way that Paul Singer initiated the open source research into Trump done by Fusion GPS before the Democrats took it over, Oleg Deripaska — the person on whose behalf Russian intelligence obtained inside dirt, via Konstantin Kilimnik, from Trump’s campaign — initiated the HUMINT collection on Trump’s team, lasting at least until April 18, 2016, even after the Russian attack on Hillary Clinton had already started.

Oleg Deripaska started the dossier project and only later did the Democrats pick it up, unwitting to the fact that it was started by a guy who was busy playing a key role in Russia’s influence operation targeting Hillary’s campaign.

It’s bad enough that Durham didn’t pursue the tie between the dossier and Russia’s later efforts to obtain inside dirt from Trump’s campaign.

But when he described the evidence that Russia likely learned of Steele’s work for the DNC by July 2016, before Steele did virtually all but one of the substantive reports on Trump, Durham did so in a section almost 100 pages earlier than his description of Deripaska’s ties to Steele, and by adopting the moniker the DOJ IG Report used for Deripaska, “Oligarch 1,” he hid that the source of that knowledge was Deripaska himself.

As the record now reflects, at the time of the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI did not possess any intelligence showing that anyone associated with the Trump campaign was in contact with Russian intelligence officers at any point during the campaign. 251 Moreover, the now more complete record of facts relevant to the opening of Crossfire Hurricane is illuminating. Indeed, at the time Crossfire Hurricane was opened, the FBI (albeit not the Crossfire Hurricane investigators) was in possession of some of the Steele Reports. However, even if the Crossfire Hurricane investigators were in possession of the Steele Reports earlier, they would not have been aware of the fact that the Russians were cognizant of Steele’s election-related reporting. The SSCI Russia Report notes that”[s]ensitive reporting from June 2017 indicated that a [person affiliated] to Russian Oligarch 1 was [possibly aware] of Steele’s election investigation as of early July 20 l 6.” 252 Indeed, “an early June 2017 USIC report indicated that two persons affiliated with [Russian Intelligence Services] were aware of Steele’s election investigation in early July 2016.”253 Put more pointedly, Russian intelligence knew of Steele’s election investigation for the Clinton campaign by no later than early July 2016. Thus, as discussed in Section IV.D. l .a.3, Steele’s sources may have been compromised by the Russians at a time prior to the creation of the Steele Reports and throughout the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

Steele’s source network may have been compromised before the project started, Durham charged. But Durham hid the evidence that if it was compromised, it was compromised by the guy on whose behalf Trump’s campaign manager shared campaign information with Russian intelligence.

In fact, the DOJ IG Report, finished in December 2019 and from which Durham adopted that moniker, Oligarch 1, strongly suggests that Deripaska himself and his “known Russian Intelligence Services agent implementing influence operations on their behalf” sidekick, Konstantin Kilimnik, were the source of any disinformation in the dossier.

Durham did not pursue that evidence, at all, in his report. As I said, he never once mentioned Kilimnik.

He ignored Deripaska’s likely role in disinformation in 2016, even though he focused repeatedly on disinformation in his report. He complained, for example, that the FBI didn’t unpack any potential disinformation in the dossier before using it in the Carter Page FISA applications.

The failure to identify the primary sub-source early in the investigation’s pursuit of FISA authority prevented the FBI from properly examining the possibility that some or much of the non-open source information contained in Steele’s reporting was Russian disinformation (that wittingly or unwittingly was passed along to Steele), or that the reporting was otherwise not credible.

He suggested Danchenko’s unresolved counterintelligence investigation — and not Oleg Deripaska — was the source of potential disinformation.

Our review found no indication that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators ever attempted to resolve the prior Danchenko espionage matter before opening him as a paid CHS. Moreover, our investigation found no indication that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators disclosed the existence of Danchenko’s unresolved counterintelligence investigation to the Department attorneys who were responsible for drafting the FISA renewal applications targeting Carter Page. As a result, the FISC was never advised of information that very well may have affected the FISC’s view of Steele’s primary sub-source’s (and Steele’s) reliability and trustworthiness. Equally important is the fact that in not resolving Danchenko’s status vis-a-vis the Russian intelligence services, it appears the FBI never gave appropriate consideration to the possibility that the intelligence Danchenko was providing to Steele -which, again, according to Danchenko himself, made up a significant majority of the information in the Steele Dossier reports – was, in whole or in part, Russian disinformation.

He falsely used one answer Danchenko gave in his first meeting with the FBI to suggest that might be a source of disinformation.

Danchenko’s uncharged false statements to the FBI reflecting the fact that he never informed friends, associates, and/or sources that he worked for Orbis or Steele and that “you [the FBI] are the first people he’s told.” In fact, the evidence revealed that Danchenko on multiple occasions communicated and emailed with, among others, Dolan regarding his work for Steele and Orbis, thus potentially opening the door to the receipt and dissemination of Russian disinformation;

The claim was grossly dishonest, because at the same meeting, Danchenko described that Olga Galkina knew he worked in business intelligence, and also revealed how he asked Orbis for help setting up another of his sources with language instruction in the UK. Danchenko told the FBI enough, from his first interview, that gave them reason to think his sources might know for whom he reported. But Durham accused Danchenko of lying about it anyway, because he needed to blame Danchenko, and not Deripaska, for any disinformation in the dossier.

Durham even complained that Peter Strzok had not considered whether the original Australian report about George Papadopoulos could be disinformation. Maybe it’s the Australians’ fault, Durham suggests, not Deripaska’s!

Durham looked for disinformation in every source but the one place where — even by early in his investigation — the FBI already suspected it, in the guy who kicked off the dossier project in 2016, before the Democrats even got to it.

Durham’s treatment of Deripaska’s suspected role in disinformation in 2016 is all the more astounding given how quickly Durham dismissed the possibility that the foundation of his own investigation was disinformation.

Durham built his entire project on a source that the intelligence community warned him might be a fabrication, the Russian intelligence report claiming that Hillary had a plan to hold Trump accountable for his ties to Russia. Durham dismissed that warning in two short paragraphs.

As was declassified and made public previously, the purported Clinton Plan intelligence was derived from insight that “U.S. intelligence agencies obtained into Russian intelligence analysis.” 394 Given the origins of the Clinton Plan intelligence as the product of a foreign adversary, the Office was cognizant of the statement that DNI Ratcliffe made to Senate Judiciary Chairman Lindsey Graham in a September 29, 2020 letter: “The [intelligence community] does not know the accuracy of this allegation or the extent to which the Russian intelligence analysis may reflect exaggeration or fabrication.” 395

Recognizing this uncertainty, the Office nevertheless endeavored to investigate the bases for, and credibility of, this intelligence in order to assess its accuracy and its potential implications for the broader matters within our purview.

Remember: Durham made this report the cornerstone of his investigation starting around February 2020, three months after the DOJ IG Report, in December 2019, publicly gave reason to believe that Deripaska had been feeding the dossier with disinformation starting at least by July 2016, the month of this purported Russian intelligence report. Durham made this report the cornerstone of his investigation in spite of his confirmation that Deripaska initiated the dossier project in March 2016 and continued it until weeks before the Democrats took it over.

And Durham made this report the cornerstone of his investigation by fabricating a claim that even the Russians didn’t make about Hillary: that she wanted to promote a false narrative about Trump, rather than demonstrate all the true and damning Russian ties Trump had that Fusion had already fed to Franklin Foer by early July 2016.

Hillary Clinton had no incentive to pay a lot of money for false information — and nor did anyone need to fabricate Trump’s ties to Russia. Paying for false information predictably could — and did, and hasn’t stopped doing in the interim seven years — backfire stupendously. Plus, as I have shown, paying for false information demonstrably led to complacency about the possibility that the material stolen in the earlier hack would be used later in the campaign.

Hillary Clinton had no incentive to pay for disinformation! And Durham utterly fabricated the claim that she did!

But Oleg Deripaska would have an incentive to pay for disinformation.

Not only did that false information in the dossier send the FBI looking at Carter Page as Paul Manafort’s liaison with Russia instead of Konstantin Kilimnik — who then waltzed into a cigar bar in New York to hear how Trump planned to win Pennsylvania. Not only did the false information in the dossier lead the FBI to spend valuable time vetting the dossier rather than pursuing the hundreds of real ties Trump had to Russia.

But the false information in the dossier — and the way that Trump, in the wake of a January 2017 Manafort meeting with another Deripaska associate, attacked the dossier as a way to discredit the larger Russian investigation —  undermined the investigation and ultimately did untold damage to the FBI.

The false information in the dossier has been one of the most singular sources of partisan antagonism in the United States ever since. It has ripped the country apart. One right wing influencer even blamed the dossier for the January 6 attack on the Capitol.

Hillary Clinton had no incentive to pay for that. But Oleg Deripaska did.

And rather than laying out Deripaska’s likely role in the disinformation in the dossier, the known disinformation behind claims about Trump, Durham simply invented a claim that after such time as Deripaska had kicked off the dossier project and the Democrats picked it up, after such time as Deripaska knew that Democrats were funding the dossier, Hillary decided to make up false claims about Trump.

Rather than honestly laying out the public evidence that Deripaska was playing a ruthless double game — using Steele to make Manafort legally and financially less secure while using Manafort’s insecurity to win his cooperation with the influence operation — Durham did the one thing that could continue the wild success of Deripaska’s disinformation project: Blame Hillary for the disinformation, rather than Deripaska himself.

I don’t know whether Durham wittingly decided he was going to play Oleg Deripaska’s flunkie from inside the federal government (to say nothing of Alfa Bank, with whose investigation Durham shared a script). But everything he did with his investigation, every misrepresentation he makes in his report, all the human carnage Durham has done since, simply continues the disinformation project Deripaska kicked off seven years ago.

And that’s why his singular lack of curiosity about Deripaska’s ties to Steele is so telling.

Charles McGonigal and the Unclassified Oligarch Info

There’s a mildly interesting discovery dispute in the SDNY case of Charles McGonigal, the former FBI Special Agent in Charge indicted last month for sanctions violations connected to Oleg Deripaska.

His co-defendant, former Russian diplomat and approved translator Sergey Shestakov, wants to amend the protective order governing discovery in this case. As I said, this is only mildly of interest. Such challenges are not unusual, and his attorney, former Andrew Cuomo attorney, Rita Glavin, has agreed to be bound by the existing protective order while the dispute is settled, so the dispute is not holding things up (anymore).

The dispute pertains to two issues about which Glavin wants reciprocity with the government. One is whether witnesses must be bound by the discovery order.

The paragraph states: “The defense shall provide a copy of this Order to prospective witnesses and persons retained by counsel to whom the defense has disclosed Disclosure Material. All such persons shall be subject to the terms of this Order. Defense counsel shall maintain a record of what information has been disclosed to which such persons.”

[snip]

Shestakov’s counsel has claimed that the integrity of the proceedings requires that the Government, like the defense, maintain records about the persons to whom discovery materials are provided, and provide copies of the protective order to all such persons. But the Government is aware of no legal authority—nor any good cause under Rule 16(d)—supporting that request. And because the Government has long possessed much of this information, and appropriately used it for a variety of lawful purposes, such a log would be impractical at this stage.

The government’s point — that it has already interviewed so many people a log of those interviews would be meaningless (as well as its earlier point that the government is subject to grand jury secrecy rules but the witnesses before it are not) — is a perfectly reasonable point. Just as one example, McGonigal’s former mistress, Allison Guerriero, has already discussed issues that would be covered by the protective order with the press; SDNY has no way to oblige her to keep those details secret.

SDNY doesn’t say it, but it also likely wants to avoid keeping a list of all the witnesses it spoke with that might otherwise be discoverable by Shestakov; usually the government only has to provide details about witnesses who will testify.

The other dispute pertains to how discovery material must be treated — language that is, on its face, meant to prevent defendants from tweeting about confidential discovery information.

That sentence provides: “The defense shall not post any Disclosure Material on any Internet site or network site, including any social media site such as Facebook or Twitter, to which persons other than the parties hereto have access, and shall not disclose any Disclosure Material to the media or the public other than when such material becomes part of the public record in connection with court filings and court proceedings or as otherwise set forth herein.”

The government’s response is not as direct to this point. To Shestakov’s complaint that the government might leak (a complaint Glavin made repeatedly during the Cuomo case), the government responded only that he doesn’t have authority to complain in public.

More to the point, to the extent Shestakov has explained his objections to the challenged terms in the proposed order, those objections are not valid. In objecting to paragraph 3, for instance, counsel has told us that she will not agree to unilateral restrictions because she believes there is a risk that the Government will leak discovery material publicly. Courts have squarely rejected that argument. A defendant has no right to use discovery materials to influence public opinion about, or media coverage of, his case; as a result, the desire to publicly respond to perceived wrongs by the Government is no basis to oppose or modify a protective order. See, e.g., Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 540; United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 743 (E.D. Va. 2002). If Shestakov takes issue with public statements made by the Government, the remedy is supplied by Local Criminal Rule 23.1—which binds the Government and the defense alike—and there is no need to modify the proposed protective order.

Still, SDNY’s response that the Local Rules on extrajudicial statements would cover this does address why reciprocity here is sort of meaningless: SDNY is not going to comment outside of court proceedings unless they make a press statement at one of the milestones of a case, like the indictment, trial verdict, or sentencing. It violates not just local rules, but also DOJ rules.

That said, SDNY (or DOJ generally) might have cause to issue press releases on topics covered by the discovery in the case in other matters, such as the milestone of someone else charged in matters pertaining to Oleg Deripaska, or even new charges pertaining to him. That may be one unspoken reason why SDNY is balking at Shestakov’s complaint, though the main one is the likely the way in which the language might prohibit information sharing within the US government.

The government provides three reasons for the protective order in this case: two are to protect the identities of witnesses and the privacy interests of those whose materials are included in the discovery, which are, again, quite routine.

SDNY also cites the need to protect unclassified information about sanctions on oligarchs, Russia’s influence efforts, and documents relating to efforts to surveil them.

First, the materials include, among other things, information pertaining to the imposition of sanctions on Russian oligarchs, information from various sources about potential Russian influence in the United States, and documents relating to law enforcement’s surveillance efforts. None of the materials that will be subject to this protective order are classified—the Government has determined that they can appropriately be produced to the defendants in order to comply with the Government’s discovery obligations—but there would still be law enforcement consequences to their public disclosure.

This is the kind of stuff that SDNY — or other parts of the government — might have cause to include in other press releases, unrelated to this case.

It’s all unclassified, SDNY says.

It’s not surprising that SDNY would build a FARA and sanctions case around unclassified information. On its face, the indictment relies on emails between Shestakov and McGonigal, Evgeny Fokin, the NYPD, and the law firm involved in trying to reverse sanctions, Kobre & Kim, records pertaining to the payments alleged to have been laundered from a bank in Cyprus through a New Jersey company, as well as records pertaining to subcontractors McGonigal employed (in a repeat of Christopher Steele) to investigate a Deripaska rival.

But the indictment is tailored to avoid other, more interesting and potentially classified discovery. The indictment doesn’t charge Fokin, for example, which would implicate any communications he had directly with Deripaska and others.

FARA and sanctions violations provide crimes that are readily chargeable when other crimes — which may or may not be implicated here — would impose onerous discovery requirements on the government. The fact that SDNY maintains all the discovery in this case is unclassified is important background to questions about what more the government knows about McGonigal’s actions: by design, they’re not going to tell as part of this prosecution.

All that’s important background for the other reason I’m intrigued by an entirely unexceptional protective order dispute. As SDNY’s letter describes, between January 24 and February 6, SDNY and McGonigal’s legal team, which includes former Bill Barr aide Seth DuCharme, resolved their own “modifications” to the protective order.

The defendants were each arrested on January 21, 2023, and were presented before Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave on January 23, 2023. The next day, the Government proposed a standard protective order, based on those routinely used in this District, to counsel for both defendants. Over the ensuing days, the Government repeatedly discussed the proposed protective order with McGonigal’s counsel, and agreed to make certain modifications based on those discussions. The Government and McGonigal’s counsel reached agreement on a protective order with the terms contained in Exhibit A, and on February 6, 2023, McGonigal’s counsel returned a signed copy of the order.

Two days after the government and McGonigal’s team resolved their own protective order issues (which also happens to be two days after Shestakov’s legal team filed their notice of appearance, so before substantive discussions would have begun between SDNY and Glavin), SDNY triggered the CIPA process. Among other things, the CIPA process will give SDNY a chance to argue that other classified discovery can be withheld from the defendants if it is not relevant and helpful to their defense.

Some such classified material McGonigal would know about personally. As the indictment itself notes, while still at the FBI, McGonigal had access to information on investigations of Russian oligarchs.

As SAC, McGONIGAL served as the Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) of the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI’s New York Field Office. As SAC, McGONIGAL supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. Among other things, in 2018, McGONIGAL, while acting as SAC, received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia’s 2014 conflict with Ukraine.

This list is no longer classified. But other materials McGonigal had access to while still at FBI undoubtedly are, including materials pertaining to the investigation of Deripaska’s role in the 2016 election interference operation.

And it’s not just these issues that McGonigal might know exist and might want to demand. According to Mattathias Schwartz, the investigation into McGonigal didn’t stem from the tip that his disgruntled mistress, Guerriero, gave to the head of NY’s FBI in 2019. Starting in 2018, the Brits were aware that McGonigal had suspect meetings with an unidentified Russian in London.

In 2018, Charles McGonigal, the FBI’s former New York spy chief, traveled to London where he met with a Russian contact who was under surveillance by British authorities, two US intelligence sources told Insider.

The British were alarmed enough by the meeting to alert the FBI’s legal attaché, who was stationed at the US Embassy. The FBI then used the surreptitious meeting as part of their basis to open an investigation into McGonigal, one of the two sources said.

Whenever the Brits picked this up (and subsequent meetings that Schwartz notes were referenced in the indictment), they would have happened before or during the time that DuCharme played a key role at DOJ, first as Barr’s counsel and then as PADAG. As I keep noting, DuCharme was centrally involved in Barr’s extensive efforts to prevent Rudy Giuliani — a close friend of McGonigal’s ex-mistress — from being prosecuted for his own dalliances with Russian agents. It is inconceivable that a senior FBI agent was under suspicion for suspect meetings with Deripaska or his associates and the matter wouldn’t arise to Barr and Jeffrey Rosen’s level. And DuCharme was personally involved in exceptional interference in investigations of Russia agents.

Even just based on his own knowledge of sensitive information pertaining to Russian investigations, McGonigal had the means to make this prosecution difficult, by demanding classified information he accessed while still at FBI, perhaps to argue that he had reason to believe that Deripaska was really just a nice guy who didn’t deserved to be sanctioned.

But DuCharme’s knowledge of such information would surely be even fresher than McGonigal’s. Indeed, given the reported tip from the Brits in 2018, DuCharme is likely to have firsthand knowledge pertaining to issues relating to McGonigal that might not otherwise be included among discovery (for example, of discussions among Russians about McGonigal that McGonigal himself would not be privy to). DuCharme likely knows what DOJ knew about McGonigal’s ties to Deripaska at least through the time he moved back to EDNY in July 2020, and at EDNY DuCharme would have presided over other sensitive Russian investigations, including the one into Andrii Derkach.

DOJ has not, at least not yet, triggered CIPA in the DC case. But it likely doesn’t have as much sensitive information about — and as much sensitivity surrounding — information on the Albanians involved in that case.

Given their shared knowledge of matters relating to Deripaska, McGonigal and DuCharme may make the prosecution plenty difficult as it is in SDNY.

Earlier posts

[From Rayne] The Other Albanian Stuff

A Close Rudy Giuliani Associate Alerted FBI’s Assistant Director to Charles McGonigal’s Alleged Albanian Graft

No, Charles McGonigal Likely Isn’t Responsible for that Part of the Russian Investigation You Hate

Former FBI SAC Charles McGonigal Indicted for Crimes Spanning from 2017 to 2021

The Other Albanian Stuff

[NB: check the byline, thanks. This post contains some speculative content. /~Rayne]

Albania is a tiny country. Its population is a little smaller than that of Kansas, all living in a land mass the size of Massachusetts or Hawaii. The U.S. has six counties which are larger in area, and six which are larger in population.

It seems rather odd that two different stories related to Rudy Giuliani happened to involve Albania given its relative size.

While Giuliani was politicking an exiled Iranian dissident/terrorist group each year, often in Albania where the exiles waited regime change, an FBI special agent was schmoozing Albanians about oil drilling rights among other things.

What are the chances these two story arcs are wholly unrelated?

Items in the following timeline related to Charles McGonigal including some related to Russia are in italics; Albanian-specific items are noted in boldface.

– – –

2014-2019 — Giuliani met with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK) at least once each year; he never registered under FARA, appearing at MEK-related events in Poland, Albania, Paris and Washington (NBC News, Oct 2019)

– – –

April 2017 — Approximate time relationship between then-Special Agent Charles McGonigal and Allison Guerriero began (earliest date of requested documents from Nov. 2021 subpoena)

Spring 2017 — Giuliani and ally Michael Mukasey met with Iranian dissident group MEK.

01-JUL-2017 — John Bolton met with MEK members in Paris, advocating Trump admin push for regime change in Iran.

17-JUL-2017 — John Bolton tweeted, “Withdrawing from the Iran #NuclearDeal should be a top @realDonaldTrump administration priority.”

05-SEP-2017 — Date given in the DC District indictment for second count against McGonigal, for false statements under 18 USC 1001(a)(2), related to filing of an FD-772b for travel beginning two days later.

07-SEP-2017 — McGonigal met with Person A and negotiated terms of compensation; he traveled by air with Person A to Albania, met Person B and other foreign nationals.

09-SEP-2017 — McGonigal met with Person B and Albania‘s Prime Minister, during which McGonigal lobbied against Albania awarding oil field drilling licenses to Russian front companies. Person A and Person B both had financial interests in Albania‘s award decision.

September 2017 — While in Albania, Person A introduced McGonigal to an Albanian businessperson/politician who asked McGonigal to launch an investigation into an alleged plot to kill the Albanian businessperson/politician.

10-SEP-2017 — McGonigal traveled with Person A and others, from Albania to Kosovo. He met a Kosovar politician. McGonigal then returned to the US with Person A, traveling together.

September 2017 — McGonigal continued a relationship with Albania‘s prime minister after returning from Albania.

Fall 2017 — McGonigal received cash from Person A at Person A’s residence in separate payments of $80,000 and $65,000. McGonigal told Person A the money would be paid back.

05-OCT-2017 — Allison Guerriero saw “a bag full of cash” in FBI’s SA Charles McGonigal’s Park Slope apartment.

16-OCT-2017 — Date given for third count against McGonigal, for false statements under 18 USC 1001(a)(2), related to filing of an FD-772b.

15-NOV-2017Date given for fourth count against McGonigal, for false statements under 18 USC 1001(a)(2). McGonigal submitted a false FD-772 in advance of “official” travel to Austria. He did not disclose Person A was traveling with him; he did not indicate travel expenses would be covered by another party; he did not indicate he would be traveling to Albania as well as Austria; he did not disclose any other expected foreign contacts.

17-NOV-2017 — McGonigal flew to Austria.

18-NOV-2017 — With Person A acting as an interpreter, McGonigal along with a DOJ prosecutor (?!) interviewed the Albanian businessperson/politician McGonigal met in September. McGonigal did not submit paperwork for authorization of interpreter services or their payment, nor was an official FBI record filed of the interview.

18-NOV-2017 — McGonigal and Person A traveled from Austria to Albania after the interview, meeting again with the Albanian businessperson/politician. No DOJ prosecutor was present. The Albanian businessperson/politician discussed business opportunities with McGonigal and Person A.

21-NOV-2017 — McGonigal flew from Albania to Austria and then the US. Neither McGonigal nor the FBI paid for his lodging during his stay in Albania.

24-NOV-2017 — McGonigal received information from Person B about a US citizen registered to lobby on behalf of a Albanian political party in opposition to the Albanian PM’s party.

25-NOV-2017 — McGonigal informed the DOJ prosecutor involved in the November 18 interview of a potential new criminal investigation involving the US citizen who was a lobbyist for an Albanian opposition party.

December 2017 — Washington DC: McGonigal dined with Person A and Albanian government officials. New York City: McGonigal dined with Person A and Albania‘s PM.

– – –

04-JAN-2018 — McGonigal received information from Person A about the Albanian opposition party’s US citizen-lobbyist. He forwarded the information to another FBI NY special agent on 05-JAN-2018.

22-JAN-2018 — Date given for fifth count against McGonigal, for false statements under 18 USC 1001(a)(2). McGonigal filed a false FD-772b about the November trip to Austria. He did not report his trip to Albania; he did not report his meeting with Person B or Albania‘s PM; he did not report he had disclosed his FBI employment to foreign nationals on non-FBI business.

21-FEB-2018 — Through 24-FEB, McGonigal traveled with Person A to Albania without reporting the trip on FD-772 or FD-772b forms.

26-FEB-2018 — FBI-NY opened a criminal investigation into the Albanian opposition party’s US citizen-lobbyist at McGonigal’s request. FBI-NY later identified Person A as a confidential human source for the investigation; Person A provided information during the investigation. At a later date, Person B helped facilitate a meeting between FBI-NY and witnesses in Europe, including paying for witness travel expenses. McGonigal did not report his relationship with Person A, nor did he report contacts with Person B on form FD-981 as required.

04-MAR-2018 — McGonigal shared a meal with Person A, Albania‘s PM, a former FBI special agent who then worked at an international professional services firm and others in Washington DC.

20-MAR-2018 — Giuliani met with MEK leader Rajavi at MEK event in Tirana, Albania.

22-MAR-2018 — Trump announced by tweet that John Bolton would become National Security Adviser.

06-APR-2018 — Treasury Dept. identifies Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska as a Specially Designated National (SDN) subject to sanctions.

09-APR-2018 — John Bolton began as National Security Adviser.

26-APR-2018 — Through May 2, McGonigal traveled with Person A to Europe including Albania; he did not report the travel on FD-772 or FD-772b forms.

27-APR-2018 — McGonigal met with Person C (a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Person D (a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in Germany. C and D asked to meet with the US Ambassador to the United Nations or another high-level US govt. official to request US support for a political purpose affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina.

08-MAY-2018 — McGonigal asked FBI’s liaison to UN for assistance arranging a meeting requested by Person C and Person D.

08-MAY-2018 — Trump unilaterally exited the P5+1 JCPOA agreement with Iran.

09-MAY-2018 — US to reimpose sanctions on Iran — 180-day countdown to implementation began.

Spring-Summer 2018 — Deripaska’s connection, former translator for Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergey Shestakov, asks McGonigal to help Agent-1 obtain an internship for Agent-1’s daughter in counterterror/intel/international relations. McGonigal agreed.

10-JUN-2018 — Date given for sixth count against McGonigal, for false statements under 18 USC 1001(a)(2). Until May 2019, McGonigal created and submitted a false OGE-278 report which failed to include $225,000 in payments from Person A. An eighth count was charged under 18 USC 1519 for falsification of a record or document.

25-JUN-2018 — McGonigal proposed to Person A that Person A and Company A contract with Person D and Person D’s pharma company, by which Company A would be paid $500,000 by Person D and their pharma company (located in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in exchange for arranging a meeting between Person D’s pharmaco and a US delegation rep to the UN.

28/30-JUN-2018 — German, French and Belgian police broke up an assassination/terror plot to set off an explosive device at an MEK gathering in Paris. Iranian intelligence (MOIS) was believed to be behind the plot; Giuliani had been in attendance at the event. Four Iranians were eventually arrested including Assadollah Assadi, an Iranian intelligence officer assigned to Vienna under diplomatic cover.

01-JUL-2018 — McGonigal sent electronic message to Person A confirming he resent proposed contract, asking Person A to protect his name.

03-JUL-2018 — Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani traveled to Switzerland and Austria to attempt to salvage the JCPOA.

18-JUL-2018 — Person A proposed the contract to Person D as described on 25-JUN.

26-JUL-2018 — McGonigal provided to FBI’s UN liaison dates proposed for a meeting requested by Persons C and D.

06-AUG-2018 — First series of sanctions reengaged and next 180-day countdown began.

13-AUG-2018 — During a meeting, McGonigal provided information to a senior official for US delegation to UN about the meeting request by Persons C and D. McGonigal didn’t disclose Person A’s financial interest or McGonigal’s financial relationship with Person A.

22-AUG-2018 — Giuliani lobbied Romania on behalf of Freeh Group; Freeh’s client was not specified. Giuliani’s letter was in opposition to U.S. State Dept. policy on Romanian anticorruption efforts.[1]

September 2018 — Charles McGonigal left FBI and began working as Senior VP at Brookfield Properties, a subsidiary of Brookfield Asset Management which is owned in part by Qatar. Brookfield signed a 99-year lease on Jared Kushner’s 666 5th Avenue building in August 2018.

04-NOV-2018 — Second series of sanctions reengaged including purchasing fossil fuels from Iranian oil companies.

Late 2018 — McGonigal broke up with Guerriero. “A few months later” she ratted on McGonigal to William Sweeney, FBI-NY office.

– – –

2019 — Shestakov and McGonigal introduced Agent-1 to an international law firm so that Agent-1 could work to have Deripaska delisted as an SDN, lifting sanctions. Throughout the year, McGonigal traveled to meet Deripaska in London and Vienna at Deripaska’s residences. The law firm was to pay McGonigal $25,000 out of $175,000 it received for its services to Agent-1.

XX-FEB-2019 — Trump discussed replacements for DNI.

06-MAY-2019 — Date given for first count against McGonigal, for concealment of material facts under 18 USC 1001(a)(1) for filing false forms FD-772, FD-772b, FD-981, and OGE-278 which did not include information about his travel, compensation for travel-related expenses, relationships with foreign nationals, and the $225,000 received from Person A. The OGE-278 filed after his retirement was submitted this date for which a seventh count was charged under 18 USC 1001(a)(2). A ninth count was charged under 18 USC 1519 for falsification of a record or document.

20-JUN-2019 — In retaliation for downing a U.S. drone, Trump approved strikes on Iran which were abruptly aborted.

11-JUL-2019 — Giuliani spoke to MEK in Albania and met with its leader Maryam Rajavi.

28-JUL-2019 — Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats’ departure and John Ratcliffe nominated as replacement announced by Trump via Twitter. (Ratcliffe later removed himself from consideration.)

08-AUG-2019 — Primary Deputy Director DNI Sue Gordon resigned effective 15-AUG-2019, without additional prior notice, as ordered. Resignation letter without handwritten note.

15-AUG-2019 — Coats’ last day as DNI.

30-AUG-2019 — Trump tweeted a high-resolution satellite image of Iran’s failed Safir SLV launch while claiming the U.S. was not involved. The image may have been classified and ‘insta-declassified’ by Trump.

09-SEP-2019 — Trump asked for Bolton’s resignation and tweeted about it the next morning.

10-SEP-2019 — Bolton tells Fox’s Brian Kilmeade by text that he quit.

11-SEP-2019 — Bloomberg reported Bolton pushed back Monday-Tuesday at Trump over Iran sanctions; Bolton wanted maximum pressure while Trump wanted to encourage a meeting with Iran’s Rouhani later in September.

20-SEP-2019 — Mukasey registers as representative for MEK, claiming no compensation for this work; Giuliani remains unregistered.

27-DEC-2019 — K1 military base in/near Kirkuk, Iraq attacked by Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran. The group denied responsibility. A US contractor was killed and US soldiers wounded.

29-DEC-2019 — Trump ordered retaliatory airstrikes in western Iraq and eastern Syria targeting Kataib Hezbollah’s locations.

30-DEC-2019 — While golfing, Trump told Sen. Lindsey Graham about a plan to assassinate Iran’s Gen. Soleimani.

31-DEC-2019 — US Embassy-Baghdad stormed by Kataib Hezbollah. Sen. Graham tweets about meeting with Trump regarding the embassy.

31-DEC-2019 — Trump threatens Iran by tweet.

– – –

02-JAN-2020 — Trump authorizes assassination of Iran’s General Soleimani by missile strike.

March 2020 — Law firm and McGonigal’s work on behalf of Agent-1 ended.

– – –

Spring 2021 — Agent-1 negotiated with Shestakov and McGonigal to work directly for Deripaska on sanctioned matters, bypassing the law firm.

August 2021 — McGonigal, Shestakov, and Agent-1 drafted a contract for business intelligence services paid to an intermediary corporation owned by McGonigal’s “friend” who then paid McGonigal.

November 2021DOJ investigation of McGonigal underway; Guerriero received a subpoena.

– – –

Early Jan 2022 — McGonigal left employment at Brookfield.

Mid-July 2022 — Albania suffered a serious cyberattack for which it blamed Iranian groups.

07-SEP-2022 — Albania severed diplomatic ties with Iran over the cyberattacks; it had considered invoking Article 5 as a member of NATO.

– – –

I couldn’t help think of the relationship between Albania and Iran during the last week of January when an Iranian military industrial facility located in Isfahan province was attacked by drones which appeared to be under Israeli control.

The possibility crossed my mind that all of this effort with McGonigal working for Russians and Albanian opposition, and Giuliani and Bolton propping up MEK against Iran was intended to squeeze Albania between larger geopolitical players, possibly spreading destabilization to other neighboring countries. Montenegro, for one, has been under various forms of pressure for years by Russia because of its accession to NATO against which Russia pushed back.

Nor could I help but think of crude oil and gas market price fluctuations[2], and the threat to the EU due to Russia’s war on Ukraine and subsequent sanctions on Russia.

 

Where Albania fits into that picture along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with Romania, is the Southern Gas Corridor running from Azerbaijan through Turkey and finally through Albania, with a leg to the north from Turkey through Bulgaria and Romania to Ukraine.

Have Giuliani and McGonigal been used to increase instability in Albania in order to disrupt gas distribution to NATO member states in EU?

Have both of these corrupt hacks been used to increase instability in Albania to put pressure on a couple of the smallest NATO members, including Albania’s neighbor Montenegro which also plays a role in gas pipelines to EU states?

_________

[1] This item added because it seems like such an odd item. Tirana, Albania is a four-hour flight from Bucharest, Romania, though.

[2] This is a guesstimated amount Putin/Russian oil companies lost after Obama eased sanctions on Iranian oil during P5+1 JCPOA negotiations until the eventual implementation of the JCPOA. It does not include the amount lost after implementation.

8614.21 BBL/D/1K x 7 days x 73 weeks x -$45/BBL =

(8614.21 x 1000) x (511 days) x -$45/BBL =

-$198,083,758,950 lost

Based on average daily production 1992-2022 (see: https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/crude-oil-production) and at one-half the difference between WTI’s highest price in June 2014 and its price in January 2016.

A Close Rudy Giuliani Associate Alerted FBI’s Assistant Director to Charles McGonigal’s Alleged Albanian Graft

I know of two journalists who had reported on parts of the charges against former FBI Special Agent in Charge Charles McGonigal before he was indicted: In December 2021, Scott Stedman (with an assist from Wendy Siegelman) reported on the relationship between McGonigal, Oleg Deripaska, Sergey Shestakov, and Yevgenyi Fokin that was disclosed in a November 29, 2021 FARA filing.

And in September 2022, Mattathias Schwartz reported on a subpoena that (this was made more clear later) had been served ten months earlier, in November 2021. In the story, Schwartz claimed the documents he had in hand showed that McGonigal was under investigation for his Deripaska ties, which he only substantiated with a link to the FARA filing. The story itself pertained entirely to the Albanian side of the investigation, based off that subpoena, part of which he published.

Schwartz published that story a month after he won a lot of attention for getting Paul Manafort to confirm on the record the cover story someone had fed a NYT team including Maggie Haberman and Ken Vogel in February 2019: that Manafort had shared (just) campaign data with Konstantin Kilimnik. When first published in 2019, that cover story successfully distracted attention from outlines of a more substantive exchange pitched by Deripaska associate Kilimnik at an August 2, 2016 cigar bar meeting (and, indeed, from Deripaska’s involvement generally).

Manafort’s calendar showed that before he went to that meeting on August 2, 2016, he met with Trump and Rudy Giuliani. And while Manafort was serving his abbreviated prison term, Rudy reportedly consulted with him about his efforts to dig up dirt helpful to Trump.

In the wake of McGonigal’s indictments, Schwartz wrote a story about the person that he all but confirms was the one who received the subpoena: Allison Guerriero, who had a year-plus long affair with McGonigal that started sometime before October 2017 and lasted until late 2018, past the time McGonigal retired from the FBI in September 2018. According to the story, their relationship covered the most important period of the corruption described in the two indictments against McGonigal (meetings with Albania in the the DC indictment start in August 2017 and end in August 2018; favors for a Deripaska agent described in the SDNY indictment start in spring 2018; the favors continued through 2021, at which point the investigation into Deripaska had become overt).

In fact, Schwartz suggests that Guerriero may have tipped off FBI’s Assistant Director William Sweeney to McGonigal’s corruption in a drunken act of revenge after the affair ended.

In late 2018, McGonigal and Guerriero broke up. She remembers receiving an anonymous and hostile note in the mail. Soon after, McGonigal told her he was still married and had no plans to divorce his wife. “I was shocked,” she said. “I was very much in love with him, and I was so hurt.” She started drinking heavily to cope. A few months later, Guerriero, after a bout of drinking, dashed off an angry email to William Sweeney, who was in charge of the FBI’s New York City bureau, and who, she recalls, had first introduced her to McGonigal. She remembers telling Sweeney in the email that he should look into their extramarital affair, and also McGonigal’s dealings in Albania. McGonigal had already befriended Albania’s prime minister and traveled to the country extensively, dealings that would appear later in one of his indictments. Guerriero told Insider that she had deleted the email.

As Schwartz describes it, Guerriero told Sweeney he should look at not just McGonigal’s ties to Albania but also their affair, which is a nutty thing to say to an FBI official.

It’s a weird claim, because elsewhere, the story implies that Guerriero believed McGonigal’s stories about why he had bags of cash lying around, including a bag of cash that (Schwartz convincingly argues) is likely the one McGonigal is accused of receiving in a parked car on October 5, 2017.

That day in October wasn’t the only time that Guerriero remembers McGonigal carrying large amounts of cash. After he brushed her curiosity aside, she tempered her suspicions. She told herself it was probably “buy money” for a sting operation, or a payoff for one of McGonigal’s informants.

The story never describes that Guerriero learned of McGonigal’s ties to Albania, much less how or when she learned about them. And yet one takeaway from the story is that she might be the source of the entire investigation into her former boyfriend.

If she did send that email, it’s virtually certain an Assistant Director of the FBI would not delete it.

Schwartz describes Guerriero as,

a former substitute kindergarten teacher who volunteered for law-enforcement causes and was working as a contractor for a security company while living at home with her father.

The Facebook page for the charity for which she works shows the kind of NY law enforcement people she networks with.

Which partly explains the really remarkable detail about Guerriero. She’s close enough with Rudy Giuliani — who was himself being cultivated by Russian assets during the same period that McGonigal was — that the by-then discredited mayor put her up in his guest room after she suffered a burn injury in 2021.

Guerriero’s troubles worsened in early 2021, when she was badly burned during a fire at her father’s house. She asked friends for help through a GoFundMe. Former Mayor Rudy Giuliani of New York City, whom she knew from law-enforcement circles, let her stay in a guest bedroom. Since then, Guerriero has been a frequent on-air caller for Giuliani’s radio shows. She maintains that the 2020 election was marred by widespread voter fraud, a belief pushed by Giuliani that has been repeatedly debunked. “Whatever Giuliani says about the 2020 election is what I believe,” she said.

What a small world, that the woman who may have triggered the investigation into McGonigal was staying with Rudy as the investigation developed? Presumably, for example, some of Guerriero’s communications with Rudy would have been found on his phones after they were seized in April 2021 (though the investigation into McGonigal was already very advanced by the time the FBI actually started getting any communications from Rudy’s phones in November 2021, and emails with Guerriero would be out of scope of any known or suspected warrant targeting Rudy).

Schwartz doesn’t pursue the fact that McGonigal has such close ties to Rudy, though the connection would be even more interesting if McGonigal’s role in the Trump Russian investigation were as central as Schwartz presented it (he’s not alone in overstating McGonigal’s known role).

But there are two additional reasons the detail is particularly interesting.

First, as noted, Schwartz published part of the subpoena that, this second story clarifies, Guerriero received in November 2021.

Regardless, by November 2021, the FBI was looking into McGonigal. Two agents showed up at Guerriero’s door, she says, showed her a picture of McGonigal with the Albanian prime minister, and interviewed her about their interactions. She also received a grand-jury subpoena requesting all of her communications with McGonigal as well as information about any “payments or gifts” he may have given her.

It tracks the DC indictment closely (and was sent by the LA-based team investigating it). Four bullets ask for information about the Albanians that are the central focus of the indictment. Bullet f references McGonigal’s ties to Kosovo, which show up in ¶28 of the indictment. Bullet h and i ask for information on the Bosnians who appear in ¶¶45, 46 and 48 of the indictment; bullet j asks for information about the alleged access peddling to the UN described in ¶¶50-52 of the indictment.

But the subpoena — bullet g — asks about another country, Montenegro, where much of Deripaska and Manafort’s long history began and where Deripaska was still allegedly interfering as late as 2016. If Montenegro shows up in the indictment at all, it’s only as one of the other locations in Europe to which McGonigal was traveling with his Albanian contact (for example, a spring 2018 trip described in ¶44). That may simply reflect Montenegro’s relative import in McGonigal’s paid travel, the quality of evidence, or maybe DOJ didn’t want to include it for some other reason. But if Montenegro were a key part of McGonigal’s Balkans travels — on which, ¶22 of the indictment makes clear, he worked to persuade Albania not to sign oil contracts with Russian front companies — it would put him in a country where Deripaska likely still has a rich network of sources.

In any case, the only other thing that doesn’t map directly from the subpoena to the indictment are any payments or gifts McGonigal gave to Guerriero. The DC indictment never explained why, “no later than August 2017,” McGonigal allegedly asked his Albanian contact if he could provide him money, but Schwartz’ story reveals that the indicted former SAC was giving Guerriero gifts of cash and taking her to high-end restaurants during their affair, which started at least by October 2017 (her subpoena asked for records going back to April 2017). The indictment never mentions her, but the affair with her may explain part of McGonigal’s urgent need for cash in September 2017, something that would make McGonigal ripe to compromise by anyone who learned of it.

As I noted earlier, there’s one more remarkable player in this little network that includes Rudy Giuliani: Seth DuCharme, who spent much of the last year of the Trump Administration implementing Bill Barr’s bureaucratic efforts to ensure that Rudy Giuliani would not be prosecuted for his efforts to obtain benefit for Trump — including, but not limited to, dirt on Hunter Biden — from people that included several suspected Russian agents. DuCharme, who works at Rudy’s former firm, Bracewell, is part of the team representing McGonigal.

And to the extent that Guerriero is one of the witnesses from whom DOJ learned the specifics about how much cash McGonigal received in bags in parked cars (though, again, Schwartz’ story is inconsistent about whether she knew none of that or whether she knew enough to tip off William Sweeney) it would be part of DuCharme’s job to discredit Rudy’s former houseguest as a witness. He would do so, presumably, by pointing to all the things Guerriero told Schwartz she regrets, including harassment of McGonigal’s family that was serious enough to merit restraining orders in two states.

By her own account, Guerriero contacted one of McGonigal’s children despite being prohibited from doing so by a court order, an incident that led to her spending the night in a New Jersey jail. The court order stemmed from a 2019 police report, obtained by Insider, that McGonigal’s wife, Pamela, filed with the Montgomery County Police Department in Maryland. The report states that McGonigal and Guerriero “had a relationship” and that Guerriero had repeatedly harassed her with unwelcome emails and phone calls — including 20 calls in one day — despite her asking Guerriero to stop.

Guerriero confirmed that her contact with the McGonigal family led to a separate restraining order issued in New Jersey. “I am ashamed and embarrassed and sorry for my actions during the time that I was drinking,” she said.

In Schwartz’ story, Guerriero doesn’t say she regrets that email to Sweeney, which could well have sparked this entire investigation. She regrets the harassment of McGonigal’s family, which might come out if she were called as a witness.

All of which may provide insight into why the DC case against McGongial is charged as it is. Among the overt acts of which McGonigal is accused in DC are:

  • Networking with representatives of the government of Albania in late 2017 and early 2018 during the period when he used information from them to launch an investigation against the US citizen lobbyist for their rival.
  • Proposing that his prime Albanian contact be paid $500,000 (which may have been meant as repayment of money the Albanian gave McGonigal in 2017) to set up a high level UN meeting for some Bosnians.

Both of these overt acts could be charged under FARA and the Albanian tie, at least, could well have been charged under 18 USC 951. But McGonigal would likely offer the same kind of defense that Tom Barrack did in his EDNY trial: when McGonigal counseled the Albanian Prime Minister not to sign oil contracts with Russian on September 9, 2017, he could easily argue, he did so because he was genuinely opposed to Russian influence and not because he was seeking a benefit for his key Albanian contact.

Instead, DOJ charged him with inadequate disclosure to the FBI on forms FD-772b and OGE-278, with each inadequate disclosure charged as a false statement under either 18 USC 1001 or 1519 (though I don’t understand why McGonigal would not immediately challenge the three of the charges tied to filings submitted more than five years ago, especially if FBI had notice of all this in 2018). The 1001 charges would normally only get a few months sentence, though with a sentencing enhancement for abusing his official position, and by treating each inadequate disclosure as a separate crime, potential exposure could easily add up to years, or, with a plea deal, it could be pitched as “process crimes” meriting just months of prison time.

Charging it that way not only gives DC USAO more flexibility in plea discussions.

It would also make it a “paper case,” something that depends largely on documentation rather than the credibility of a witness like McGonigal’s primary Albanian contact (who seems to have told FBI that the cash payments were loans, not payments) or Guerriero. For each false form McGonigal submitted, DOJ will only have to show where he traveled, how his travel was paid, and that he didn’t properly disclose it. It would rely on travel records and bank statements and not the testimony of a witness who harassed McGonigal’s family out of jealousy.

I don’t want to make too much of Schwartz’ revelation that a key witness against McGonigal was staying in Rudy’s guest room as the investigation developed. Drunken jealousy is all the motive you need to explain her actions (though not, perhaps, inconsistencies about how much of the Albanian graft she knew about).

But once you throw Rudy and Montenegro into the mix, the trajectory on which McGonigal traveled, from arguing against Russian oil contracts in September 2017 to thinking he could manage ties to Deripaska in spring of 2018, gets a lot more interesting.

No, Charles McGonigal Likely Isn’t Responsible for that Part of the Russian Investigation You Hate

Everyone — whether from a left, right, or frothy perspective — has seized on the arrest of former FBI Special Agent in Charge Charles McGonigal to assume he was responsible for something they don’t like about the Russian investigation: the leaks (attributed to but not exclusively from SDNY) about the Clinton Foundation investigation; the problems on the Carter Page applications and vetting of the Steele dossier; the tanking of the Alfa Bank allegations; some later sabotage of the Mueller investigation.

There’s no reason to believe he was primarily responsible for most of that, and good reason to believe he was not. But he was in a place where he could have tampered in other really serious cases. So I want to lay out what his timeline is, with some comment on how it intersects with key investigations.

Here’s an excerpt from the bio sent out with the October 4, 2016 announcement of his promotion to SAC in NY Field Office.

FBI Director James B. Comey has named Charles McGonigal as the special agent in charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office. Mr. McGonigal most recently served as the section chief of the Cyber-Counterintelligence Coordination Section at FBI Headquarters.

[snip]

In 2014, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of the Baltimore Field Office’s cyber, counterintelligence, counterespionage, and counterproliferation programs.

[snip]

McGonigal will assume this new role at the end of October.

This 2016 promotion would have put him in New York too late to be a key 2016 leaker; the damage to Hillary had already been done by the time he would have arrived in New York.

He should have had a role in the Alfa Bank investigation, which included both a cyber and a counterintelligence component, though the latter was in Chicago. But his name did not show up (in unredacted form, anyway) in the Michael Sussmann files. Plus, we know what bolloxed that investigation: two cyber agents, Nate Batty and Scott Hellman, who decided the anomaly was nothing even before they had looked at all the data, then kept telling the counterintelligence investigators that too.

McGonigal was in the loop on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. He had a hand in forwarding the tip from the Australians to DC headquarters. And he was in the vicinity of the Carter Page investigation after it got moved back to New York in January 2017 (in which context he shows up in communications with Jennifer Boone). But at least per the Horowitz Report, he wasn’t a key player.

Because McGonigal was tangential to the above matters — including the successful effort, aided by Sussmann and Rodney Joffe — to kill the early NYT story on the Alfa Bank allegations, he’s probably not the most important player in the October 2016 NYT story every Democrat hates (though his expertise could have made him a source for several of the journalists involved).

He likely was involved in coordination in the early parts of the investigation into the DNC hack (which was investigated in Pittsburgh and San Francisco), including a decision not to open an investigation on Roger Stone, and there were steps not taken in those early days that probably should have been. Perhaps McGonigal is to blame for the fact that, when Jeannie Rhee asked for a briefing on the investigation into the hack-and-leak in 2017, nothing had been done. Ultimately, it did get done though. He was no longer in a position to interfere with the investigation during the key part of it in 2018 (though he likely knew important details about it).

One thing that’s absolutely certain, though: He was in a position to sabotage investigations into Oleg Deripaska, and with him, Paul Manafort. And he would have greatly facilitated Deripaska’s campaign to undermine the Russian investigation with disinformation, which continued beyond 2018. Just as one measure of timing, Deripaska’s column in the Daily Caller was at the beginning of the time when Shestkov was reaching out to McGonigal.

The materials on the SDNY indictment pertaining to Deripaska make it clear that he had accessed sanctions packages pertaining to Deripaska before he left the FBI in 2018.

As SAC, McGonigal supervised and participated in investigations of Russian oligarchs, including Deripaska. Among other things, in 2018, McGONIGAL, while acting as SAC, received and reviewed a then-classified list of Russian oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin who would be considered for sanctions to be imposed as a result of Russia’s 2014 conflict with Ukraine.

He appears to have leaked that information with the daughter of Agent 1 (believed to be Yevgenyi Fokin).

An NYPD Sergeant assigned to brief Agent-1’s daughter subsequently reported the event to the NYPD and FBI, because, among other reasons, Agent-1’s daughter claimed to have an unusually close relationship to “an FBI agent” who had given her access to confidential FBI files, and it was unusual for a college student to receive such special treatment from the NYPD and FBI.

It seems likely, then, Manafort got visibility onto what the FBI knew about him. And he got it around the same time Konstantin Kilimnik was included in a conspiracy indictment with Paul Manafort in June 2018. He almost certainly got it before the Mueller investigation was over, which hypothetically could have influenced or facilitated Manafort’s effort to thwart DOJ’s investigation.

I have reason to suspect that people associated with McGonigal, if not he himself, have seeded disinformation about Deripaska-related investigations.

McGonigal’s tie to Deripaska and the trajectory of his career would have put him in a position to tamper in other investigations. As noted above, he moved from Baltimore (overseeing matters involving the NSA during years when the materials that would be leaked as part of the Shadow Brokers operation were stolen), to a cyber/CI role in DC, to NYC. The overt acts described in his two indictments (SDNY, DC) only start in 2017, which would suggest he may not have sold out until then.

Except there’s a problem with that: The first overt act in the DC indictment is him asking for money. So it’s not clear when he got started.

August 2017: McGonigal first asks Albanian for money.

September 7, 2017: McGonigal travels to Albania.

October 5, 2017: McGonigal receives $80,000 in a parked car from the Albanian.

November 18, 2017: McGonigal conducts an interview in Vienna with the Albanian acting as translator; the FBI has no record of the interview. Then McGonigal flies to Albania and discusses business with the same witness.

November 25, 2017: McGonigal predicates an investigation into the lobbyist for a rival Albanian politician.

February 28, 2018: McGonigal formally opens investigation into rival Albanian relying on witnesses whose expenses were paid by his source.

March 4, 2018: McGonigal dines with Prime Minister of Albania.

April 27, 2018: McGonigal pitched by two people in Germany to get involved in Bosnian affairs, facilitates an introduction to US Ambassador to UN.

June to August 2018: McGonigal sets up arrangement whereby Bosnian-tied pharma company would pay Albanian $500K to broker UN ties.

Spring-Summer 2018: At Sergey Shestakov’s request, McGonigal sets up Deripaska’s agent’s daughter with an NYPD internship.

September 2018: McGonigal retires from the FBI.

There are a number of key investigations, including some in which Deripaska had tangential interest, on which McGonigal would have had complete visibility. Their compromise would present a grave threat to the country.

They’re not the ones left, right, and frothers are most concerned about though.

Given how DOJ has charged these two indictments (and given the charges they have yet to file), I suspect they will try to get McGonigal to plead to one side and cooperate in the other — in part to unpack everything he did before and after he left the FBI. But even if they do, they’re not going to tell us what he was up to.

Former FBI SAC Charles McGonigal Indicted for Crimes Spanning from 2017 to 2021

When I said on Saturday that, “I wouldn’t be surprised if there were a few stray indictments [relating to Oleg Deripaska] we haven’t seen yet,” I wasn’t specifically thinking of former Special Agent in Charge of FBI’s New York Counterintelligence Office, Charles McGonigal, who was arrested that same day in SDNY for conspiring to hide that he was working for Deripaska.

Though I had noted Scott Stedman’s report, which itself piggybacked on a Wendy Siegelman catch of a FARA filing from McGonigal’s alleged co-conspirator, Sergey Shestakov, which laid out the relationship.

In fact, DOJ seems to be treating this case — and a DC indictment given less prominence in DOJ’s releases today — as a public integrity prosecution first, and only after that the kind of national security case that the other Deripaska cases have been. That is, this is about how Deripaska and his associates used McGonigal’s alleged corruption to harm national security, and not the way McGonigal made a corrupt decision to work with Deripaska.

DC US Attorney Matthew Graves even suggested that’s the trajectory by which McGonigal came to be working for one of the Russians he should have been hunting. “Covering up your contacts with foreign nationals and hiding your personal financial relationships is a gateway to corruption.”

The DC charges pertain to $225,000 in payments McGonigal took from a former Albanian security official while he was still at the FBI. After taking the payments, McGonigal initiated an investigation into someone lobbying for competing Albanian interests.

According to the nine-count indictment, unsealed today, from August 2017, and continuing through and beyond his retirement from the FBI in September 2018, McGonigal concealed from the FBI the nature of his relationship with a former foreign security officer and businessperson who had ongoing business interests in foreign countries and before foreign governments.  Specifically, McGonigal requested and received at least $225,000 in cash from the individual and traveled abroad with the individual and met with foreign nationals.  The individual later served as an FBI source in a criminal investigation involving foreign political lobbying over which McGonigal had official supervisory responsibility.  McGonigal is accused of engaging in other conduct in his official capacity as an FBI Special Agent in Charge that he believed would benefit the businessperson financially.

Effectively, a top CI official was on the take from someone who then used that influence to take out a rival.

The charges in DC include a bunch of false statements and obstruction counts (though the obstruction could amount to twenty years in prison).

The NY charges accuse McGonigal and Shestakov of working with someone else in an attempt to get Oleg Deripaska’s sanctions lifted.

Even before McGonigal left the FBI, he was doing favors for someone listed as Deripaska’s agent (I’ll come back to him, but I believe his identity, too, is public). Then starting in 2018, McGonigal and Shestakov started working with a law firm, which earlier reporting identified as Kobre & Kim, in an attempt to help Deripaska get his sanctions lifted. Then after K&K stopped pursuing that effort in 2020, McGonigal and Shestakov continued to work for Deripaska, laundering the funds through a Friend (who may be the Albanian, in which case that may be where they discovered the tie to him).

Because of the money laundering in the SDNY indictment, it may in practice include a stiffer sentence than the DC one.

As I said above, on paper (based, in part, on the prosecutors assigned) this is being treated as a public integrity problem that led to a huge counterintelligence one. There’s not even any mention of the KleptoCapture initiative started in response to the Russian war.

But like the Deripaska investigations, I expect this one will continue for a while.

Update: I want to talk a bit about what I mean that these are Public Integrity indictments with a CI twist.

The DC prosecution team consists of two DC USAO attorneys, with the assistance of a senior NSD executive.

The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Elizabeth Aloi and Michael Friedman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, with assistance from Acting Deputy Chief Evan Turgeon of the DOJ’s National Security Division Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, and the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs.

In addition to a bunch of January 6 cases in the last two years, Aloi is on the Navarro team and the case against two guys who pretended to be DHS agents to get close to some FBI agents. Most if not all of her January 6 cases included cooperation agreements. Michael Friedman’s January 6 cases included two involving threats, and two involving movement right wingers, including Zeeker Bozell, the scion of the family.

The DC team seems like one you’d use to try to get McGonigal to cooperate to unwind whatever other fuckery he did at the FBI.

The SDNY prosecution team consists of three public integrity prosecutors and an NSD one.

The case is being prosecuted by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Hagan Scotten, Rebecca T. Dell, and Derek Wikstrom are in charge of the prosecution with assistance from Trial Attorney Scott A. Claffee of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

All the SDNY prosecutors have been involved with very large multi-defendant conspiracies. Hagan Scotten was involved in the Rudy Giuliani and Parnas Fruman investigation. Derek Wikstrom was on the Build the Wall (Steve Bannon) team.

Scott Claffee has been involved in some of the highest profile Chinese counterintelligence prosecutions. But he’s also involved in at least one of the other Deripaska-related cases, the one involving dual use sourcing.

But by far the most interesting lawyer involved in this case is McGonigal’s defense attorney: Seth DuCharme, a top Billy Barr aide who was at the center of numerous Barr efforts to protect Trump associates.

Including Rudy.

Especially Rudy.

Finally, a word about timing.

The SDNY indictment came first. That indictment is dated January 12.

That press release hails the Border Patrol, and given that the arrest happened at JFK, that may be why SDNY went first.

DC got its indictment on January 18. That same day there was a sealed document placed in the SDNY docket, perhaps related to the other case

Update: Here’s his bio from when he was promoted to the NY position.

Charles McGonigal Named Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office

FBI Director James B. Comey has named Charles McGonigal as the special agent in charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office. Mr. McGonigal most recently served as the section chief of the Cyber-Counterintelligence Coordination Section at FBI Headquarters.

Mr. McGonigal entered on duty with the FBI in 1996. He was first assigned to the New York Field Office, where he worked Russian foreign counterintelligence and organized crime matters. During his tenure in New York, Mr. McGonigal worked on the TWA Flight 800 investigation, was assigned to the task force investigating Wen Ho Lee, investigated the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and investigated the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Mr. McGonigal was assigned to an investigative response squad, which focused on pending international terrorist threats in the New York City area.

Mr. McGonigal was assigned to the Cleveland Division where he investigated white-collar and violent crime matters. In 2002, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to a supervisory special agent in the Counter-Espionage Section at FBI Headquarters, where he handled several high-profile espionage investigations. In April 2004, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to chief of the Asia-Near East Counterintelligence Unit.

In 2006, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to field supervisor of a counter-espionage squad at the Washington Field Office. In this capacity, Mr. McGonigal was in charge of many high-profile espionage, economic espionage and media leak investigations resulting in criminal prosecution. In 2014, Mr. McGonigal was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of the Baltimore Field Office’s cyber, counterintelligence, counterespionage, and counterproliferation programs. Mr. McGonigal earned a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in 1990 and completed a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. McGonigal will assume this new role at the end of October.

For those trying to assess whether he was a part of the Russian investigation, he largely missed it. I think he would have been in the loop after he moved to NY, but he didn’t show up in the Sussmann trial.

Fronting for OVD: A Third Deripaska-Focused Indictment from Late September

DOJ rolled out two sanctions-related indictments targeting Russia yesterday. One, charged in Connecticut, accuses some Latvians and a Ukranian of attempting to purchase and re-export a jig grinder to “individuals in Russia.”

The indictment alleges that, beginning in 2018, Eriks Mamonovs, 33, and Vadims Ananics, 46, both citizens of Latvia who operated CNC Weld, a Latvia-based corporation, conspired with Stanislav Romanyuk, 37, a citizen of Ukraine and resident of Estonia who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OU, and others, including Janis Uzbalis, 46, of Latvia, and individuals in Russia and a Russia-based company, to violate U.S. export laws and regulations and smuggle a jig grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut to Russia. A jig grinder is a high-precision grinding machine system that does not require a license to export to European Union countries, but does require a license for export and reexport to Russia because of its potential application in nuclear proliferation and defense programs. [my emphasis]

The Latvians accused were arrested Tuesday; Ukranian Stanislav Romanyuk was arrested in Estonia on June 13. The actual indictment — described as a superseding indictment — was obtained on July 7, but is not yet publicly docketed.

The other indictment, which was charged in Brooklyn, charges five Russians — one of whom was arrested in Germany, the other in Italy, both on Monday — along with a Spaniard and a Venezuelan, for sanctions violations and money laundering.

Payment for NDA GmbH’s illicit activities was often consummated in U.S. dollars routed through U.S. financial institutions and correspondent bank accounts.  To facilitate these transactions, Orekhov and his coconspirators used fictitious companies, falsified “Know Your Customer” documentation and bank accounts in high-risk jurisdictions, causing U.S. banks to process tens of millions of dollars in violation of U.S. sanctions and other criminal laws.  In one conversation with Soto, Orekhov bragged that “there were no worries…this is the shittiest bank in the Emirates…they pay to everything.”  The scheme also utilized bulk cash drops with couriers in Russia and Latin America, as well as cryptocurrency transfers worth millions of dollars, to effectuate these transactions and launder the proceeds.

It, too, focuses on the military aspect of the scheme — and even claims to have found components obtained through this network on the battlefield in Ukraine.

As alleged, Orekov has served as the part owner, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of Nord-Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH (NDA GmbH), a privately held industrial equipment and commodity trading company located in Hamburg, Germany.  The other owner of NDA GmbH is Artem Uss, the son of the governor of Russia’s Krasnoyarsk Krai region.  Kuzurgasheva served as the Chief Executive Officer of one of the scheme’s shell companies and worked for NDA GmbH under Orekhov.  Using NDA GmbH as a front company, Orekhov and Kuzurgasheva sourced and purchased sensitive military and dual-use technologies from U.S. manufacturers, including advanced semiconductors and microprocessors used in fighter aircraft, missile systems, smart munitions, radar, satellites and other space-based military applications.  These items were shipped to Russian end users, including sanctioned companies controlled by Telegin and Tulyakov, such as Radioavtomatika, Radioexport and Abtronics, that serviced Russia’s defense sector.  Some of the same electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine.

But there’s a significant component of the Brooklyn indictment that focuses on Oleg Deripaska and Rusal. The lead defendant, Yury Orekhov, is described as a former procurement manager for what the indictment makes clear is Deripaska and Rusal. [Note, the indictment variably transliterates his name Orekov and Orekhov; I’ll use the latter.]

OREKHOV previously worked as a procurement manager for a publicly-traded Russian aluminum company (the “Aluminum Company”) controlled by a Russian billionaire and industrialist (the “Oligarch”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury.

The identify of Rusal (and therefore Derispaska) is confirmed in a paragraph that describes the period of Rusal’s sanctions (which Reuters noted here).

On August 3, 2021, USS sent OREKHOV a draft communication to the Aluminum Company regarding business dealings with NDA GmbH. The letter began, “During the sanctions period, the Company [NDA GmbH] began to supply fuel oil for [the Aluminum Company in Guinea].” Notably, the Aluminum Company was included in the SDN List from on or about April 6, 2018 through on or about January 27, 2019.

For example, Orekhov and Artem Uss are accused of laundering money to purchase oil from Venezuela’s sanctioned PDVSA for the use of Rusal. The indictment cites communications from Orekhov to a trader Juanfe Serrano, referencing the sanctions against Deripaska.

Indeed, as reflected in numerous documents from the Aluminum Company and NDA GmbPI, the defendants YURY OREKOV and ARTEM USS repeatedly purchased oil from PDVSA, causing U.S. financial institutions to process U.S. dollar-denominated payments, and supplied it to the Aluminum Company. For example, in a March 2020 draft letter addressed to a Deputy of the State Duma (one of the chambers of Russian parliament), who was an associate of the Oligarch, NDA GmbH proposed alternate sources of supply for “[Aluminum Company] procurement,” including using a “small, aggressive trader” that “conducts high-risk transactions in the Caribbean region, including with the Venezuelan state-owned company PDVSA, which is under sanctions, [and] has excess profits due to a 40% discount on the selling price of oil.” On or about December 4, 2021, in a series of electronic communications between OREKHOV and the defendant JUAN FERNANDO SERRANO PONCE, OREKHOV wrote, “this is our mother company pasting a link to the Aluminum Company’s website and a link to the Oligarch’s Wikipedia page. OREKHOV stated, “He [the Oligarch] is under sanctions as well. That’s why we [are] acting from this company [NDA GmbH]. As fronting.” SERRANO responded, “My partner also haha … he is very close to the government. He is one of the influence people in Venezuela. Super close to the Vice President.” SERRANO pasted a link showing search results for a Venezuelan lawyer and businessman who was currently wanted by U.S. authorities for bribery and money laundering, an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury. Later, in a series of communications between OREKHOV and SERRANO in or about March 2022, OREKHOV sought a “term contract with [PDVSA]” for “1 million [barrels of oil] per month,” and clarified that, “with [the Aluminum Company] it’s an annual contract, every month, every month … this is stable for sure.” [my emphasis]

As described, the smuggling involved spans Germany, Venezuela, Dubai, Malaysia, Panama, China, and Australia, among other countries. Seven US companies are identified. In addition, there’s an Individual 1 tied to a “California-based consulting and logistics company” who met with Orekhov in Europe in 2019.

The entire indictment — and the timeline laid out in the conspiracy part — almost feels like two indictments: one that spans 2018 through January 2020 (when Bill Barr was trying to shut down inconvenient investigations) and a second one that restarted after Russia’s Ukraine invasion.

In two different paragraphs pages apart, the indictment describes a conversation that Uss and Orekhov had on March 30 of this year, after the expanded invasion of Ukraine started. While much of the context seems left out, it seems that Orekhov was getting cold feet on Russia.

28. On March 30, 2022, the defendant YURY OREKHOV asked the defendant ARTEM USS, “Have you decided to leave Russia?” USS joked in response, “[Y]ou want to be an international fugitive? It’s too much.” OREKHOV replied, “[A]nd you? Would you like to? 1 can arrange, very easy.”

[snip]

37. In a March 30, 2022 message exchange between the defendants YURY OREKHOV and ARTEM USS regarding NDA GmbH’s business with the Aluminum Company, USS wrote to OREKHOV, “[I]f you’re serious … I will meet with [the Oligarch’s initials] when 1 return to Moscow . . . and I will convey to him personally your desire to pay off all debt… if you don’t want to work with Russia now and it’s really toxic, then don’t work. I will follow this closely.”

That’s the kind of person who might be willing to make a deal.

As I said above, this is the third indictment of Deripaska-linked figures obtained in late September. The timeline looks like this:

September 21: Deripaska property manager Graham Bonham-Carter indicted in SDNY

September 26: Orekhov et al indicted in EDNY

September 28: Superseding indictment obtained against Olga Shriki, Deripaska, and others

September 29: Deripaska’s US-based associate Shriki arrested

October 11: Bonham-Carter arrested in the UK

October 17: Yury Orekhov and Artem Uss arrested in Germany and Italy, respectively

In less than a month, then, DOJ has charged Deripaska, both a US and UK based manager, and someone involved in illicit procurement for Deripaska and the Russian government, with arrests of those three key associates.

The announcements for all three describe the involvement in National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section — the spying section (the Connecticut announcement lists an NSD trial attorney, but it’s unclear whether he is specifically in the CECS section). The Orekhov indictment even describes that a CECS prosecutor will play a part in the prosecution. That implies DOJ’s interest goes beyond just sanctions violations.

It’s fairly impressive work and no doubt unbelievably complicated coordination, given all the other countries involved. But it feels like there might be a few more things in the work. As noted, while the indictment charging Deripaska personally moves for forfeiture of Deripaska’s three US-based properties, Shriki is not described as the primary person running those properties.