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Aileen Cannon Makes Clarence Thomas’ Calvinball Newly Significant

Aileen Cannon’s order throwing out the stolen documents prosecution may make some Calvinball Justice Thomas engaged in more important in days ahead.

Cannon actually didn’t give Trump his preferred outcome: a ruling that Jack Smith would have had to be senate-confirmed and also that he was funded improperly. Aside from the timing, neither is this outcome one (I imagine) that Trump would prefer over a referral of Jack Smith for investigation or a dismissal on Selective Prosecution or spoilation or some other claim that would allow Trump to claim he was victimized.

Rather, she adopted a second part of Trump’s argument, that Merrick Garland didn’t have the legal authority to appoint a Special Counsel, of any sort, whether someone from outside the Department or someone (like David Weiss) who was already part of it. She punted on most of the question on whether a Special Counsel is a superior officer requiring Senate confirmation or an inferior one not requiring it.

Cannon’s argument lifts directly from Clarence Thomas’ concurrence, which she cites three times (though that is, in my opinion, by no means her most interesting citation). Thomas argues that the four statutes that Garland cited in his appointment of Jack Smith are insufficient to authorize the appointment of a Special Counsel.

We cannot ignore the importance that the Constitution places on who creates a federal office. To guard against tyranny, the Founders required that a federal office be “established by Law.” As James Madison cautioned, “[i]f there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Executive powers ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices.” 1 Annals of Cong. 581. If Congress has not reached a consensus that a particular office should exist, the Executive lacks the power to create and fill an office of his own accord.

It is difficult to see how the Special Counsel has an office “established by Law,” as required by the Constitution. When the Attorney General appointed the Special Counsel, he did not identify any statute that clearly creates such an office. See Dept. of Justice Order No. 5559–2022 (Nov. 18, 2022). Nor did he rely on a statute granting him the authority to appoint officers as he deems fit, as the heads of some other agencies have.3 See supra, at 5. Instead, the Attorney General relied upon several statutes of a general nature. See Order No. 5559–2022 (citing 28 U. S. C. §§509, 510, 515, 533).

None of the statutes cited by the Attorney General appears to create an office for the Special Counsel, and especially not with the clarity typical of past statutes used for that purpose. See, e.g., 43 Stat. 6 (“[T]he President is further authorized and directed to appoint . . . special counsel who shall have charge and control of the prosecution of such litigation”). Sections 509 and 510 are generic provisions concerning the functions of the Attorney General and his ability to delegate authority to “any other officer, employee, or agency.” Section 515 contemplates an “attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law,” thereby suggesting that such an attorney’s office must have already been created by some other law. (Emphasis added.) As for §533, it provides that “[t]he Attorney General may appoint officials . . . to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” (Emphasis added.) It is unclear whether an “official” is equivalent to an “officer” as used by the Constitution. See Lucia, 585 U. S., at 254–255 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (considering the meaning of “officer”). Regardless, this provision would be a curious place for Congress to hide the creation of an office for a Special Counsel. It is placed in a chapter concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (§§531–540d), not the separate chapters concerning U. S. Attorneys (§§541–550) or the now-lapsed Independent Counsel (§§591–599).4

To be sure, the Court gave passing reference to the cited statutes as supporting the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 694 (1974), but it provided no analysis of those provisions’ text. Perhaps there is an answer for why these statutes create an office for the Special Counsel. But, before this consequential prosecution proceeds, we should at least provide a fulsome explanation of why that is so.

4Regulations remain on the books that contemplate an “outside” Special Counsel, 28 CFR §600.1 (2023), but I doubt a regulation can create a federal office without underlying statutory authority to do so.

Cannon takes Thomas’ treatment of Nixon as a “passing reference” as invitation to make truly audacious analysis of it as dicta.

D. As dictum, Nixon’s statement is unpersuasive.

Having determined that the disputed passage from Nixon is dictum, the Court considers the appropriate weight to accord it. In this circuit, Supreme Court dictum which is “well thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated” is due near-precedential weight. Schwab, 451 F.3d at 1325–26 (collecting cases); Peterson, 124 F.3d at 1392 n.4. Additionally, courts are bound by Supreme Court dictum where it “is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.” Id. at 1326 (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)). The Nixon dictum is neither “thoroughly reasoned” nor “of recent vintage.” Id. at 1325–26. For these reasons, the Court concludes it is not entitled to considerable weight.

She then reviews the cited statutes one by one and deems them all insufficient to authorize a Special Counsel, with special focus on 28 USC 515 and (because Garland cited it for the first time) 533.

The Court now proceeds to evaluate the four statutes cited by the Special Counsel as purported authorization for his appointment—28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533. The Court concludes that none vests the Attorney General with authority to appoint a Special Counsel like Smith, who does not assist a United States Attorney but who replaces the role of United States Attorney within his jurisdiction.

[snip]

Section 515(b), read plainly, is a logistics-oriented statute that gives technical and procedural content to the position of already-“retained” “special attorneys” or “special assistants” within DOJ. It specifies that those attorneys—again already retained in the past sense—shall be “commissioned,” that is, designated, or entrusted/tasked, to assist in litigation (more on “commissioned” below). Section 515(b) then provides that those already-retained special attorneys or special assistants (if not foreign counsel) must take an oath; and then it directs the Attorney General to fix their annual salary. Nowhere in this sequence does Section 515(b) give the Attorney General independent power to appoint officers like Special Counsel Smith—or anyone else, for that matter.

Cannon twice notes her order applies only to the indictment before her (perhaps the only moment of judicial modesty in an otherwise hubristic opinion).

The instant Superseding Indictment—and the only indictment at issue in this Order—arises from the latter investigation.

[snip]

The effect of this Order is confined to this proceeding.

This is obvious — but it is also a way of saying that if the Eleventh backs this ruling, it would set up a circuit split with the DC rulings that she dismisses in cursory fashion.

Effectively, this represents one Leonard Leo darling, Cannon, dropping all her other means of stalling the prosecution for Trump, to act on seeming instructions from a more senior Leonard Leo darling.

A bunch of lawyers will dispute Cannon’s recitation of Thomas’ reading of the law. Indeed, Neal Katyal has already done so in an op-ed for the NYT.

Judge Cannon asserts that no law of Congress authorizes the special counsel. That is palpably false. The special counsel regulations were drafted under specific congressional laws authorizing them.

Since 1966, Congress has had a specific law, Section 515, giving the attorney general the power to commission attorneys “specially retained under authority of the Department of Justice” as “special assistant[s] to the attorney general or special attorney[s].” Another provision in that law said that a lawyer appointed by the attorney general under the law may “conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal,” that other U.S. attorneys are “authorized by law to conduct.”

Yet another part of that law, Section 533, says the attorney general can appoint officials “to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” These sections were specifically cited when Attorney General Merrick Garland appointed Mr. Smith as a special counsel. If Congress doesn’t like these laws, it can repeal them. But until then, the law is the law.

I drafted the special counsel regulations for the Justice Department to replace the Independent Counsel Act in 1999 when I worked at the department. Janet Reno, the attorney general at the time, and I then went to Capitol Hill to brief Congress on the proposed rules over a period of weeks. We met with House and Senate leaders, along with their legal staffs, as well as the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. We walked them extensively through each provision. Not one person raised a legal concern in those meetings. Indeed, Ken Starr, who was then serving as an independent counsel, told Congress that the special counsel regulations were exactly the way to go.

This legal dispute will be aired in the Eleventh in Jack Smith’s promised appeal.

Katyal’s more salient point is in describing where this leads if Trump’s Supreme Court gets to review Special Counsel appointments at some time after the November election will determine whether the rule applies to Trump or to a normal president.

Imagine a future president suspected of serious wrongdoing. Do we really want his appointee to be the one investigating the wrongdoing? The potential for a coverup, or at least the perception of one, is immense, which would do enormous damage to the fabric of our law.

That’s the kind of explanation, after all, why Cannon would drop all her other obstruction and pursue this angle: to ensure that a second Donald Trump administration could not be threatened with even the possibility of a Special Counsel.

But I’m interested in the way Thomas ended his concurrence, to an opinion about a prosecution involving official acts of a then-president. It is not dissimilar to the way John Roberts closed his majority opinion, by claiming this was all about separation of powers.

Whether the Special Counsel’s office was “established by Law” is not a trifling technicality. If Congress has not reached a consensus that a particular office should exist, the Executive lacks the power to unilaterally create and then fill that office. Given that the Special Counsel purports to wield the Executive Branch’s power to prosecute, the consequences are weighty. Our Constitution’s separation of powers, including its separation of the powers to create and fill offices, is “the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government” and the liberty that it secures for us all. Morrison, 487 U. S., at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There is no prosecution that can justify imperiling it.

In this case, there has been much discussion about ensuring that a President “is not above the law.” But, as the Court explains, the President’s immunity from prosecution for his official acts is the law. The Constitution provides for “an energetic executive,” because such an Executive is “essential to . . . the security of liberty.” Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Respecting the protections that the Constitution provides for the Office of the Presidency secures liberty. In that same vein, the Constitution also secures liberty by separating the powers to create and fill offices. And, there are serious questions whether the Attorney General has violated that structure by creating an office of the Special Counsel that has not been established by law. Those questions must be answered before this prosecution can proceed. We must respect the Constitution’s separation of powers in all its forms, else we risk rendering its protection of liberty a parchment guarantee.

Here, the Executive is sharply constrained, even in its prosecutorial function, by guardrails Congress has given it.

I’m not sure this is consistent with this language from Roberts’ opinion, which reads maximalist authority for presidents to conduct criminal investigations (and cites to Nixon, with its assertion of great deference on Article II issues).

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. As we have explained, the President’s power to remove “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed” may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts. Myers, 272 U. S., at 106, 176; see supra, at 8. The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. App. 186–187, Indictment ¶10(c). And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority. Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. [my emphasis]

That is, Roberts has to read presidential authority to intervene in DOJ’s prosecutorial functions in order to sanction Trump’s plan to demand DOJ’s participation in his fraud. But then Thomas argues that the president can only do so if Congress has given him authority.

Which is it?

Spirit of Revenge: John Roberts Says Joe Biden Can Demand an Investigation of Ginni Thomas

July 3, 2024/91 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, 2024 Presidential Election, Hunter Biden, January 6 Insurrection /by emptywheel

As I wrote in this post, John Roberts chose to cloak his radical opinion eliminating rule of law for Presidents by nodding to George Washington’s Farewell Address.

Our first President had such a perspective. In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the Nation that “a Government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of Liberty is indispensable.” 35 Writings of George Washington 226 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). A government “too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction,” he warned, could lead to the “frightful despotism” of “alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge.” Id., at 226–227. And the way to avoid that cycle, he explained, was to ensure that government powers remained “properly distributed and adjusted.” Id., at 226.

It is these enduring principles that guide our decision in this case.

As I showed, that was partly an attempt to spin the usurpation of Executive Branch prosecutorial authority between Administrations as, instead, protection of the separation of powers of co-equal branches.

But it was also an attempt to deploy Washington’s warnings against partisanship as if they counseled doing what Roberts was doing, rather than the opposite.

Roberts had the audacity, for example, to quote from a passage talking about how unbridled partisanship could lead to foreign influence, corruption, insurrection, and authoritarianism and suggest he was preventing that, rather than immunizing it.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and the duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. [my emphasis]

As I described in the initial release of Ball of Thread, the podcast I’m doing with LOLGOP, the Republicans on SCOTUS really believe Trump’s garbage claims that his prosecution was about revenge and despotism, rather than an effort to stave it off.

Trump has gotten people who claim to care about the country to view up as down, fascism as freedom.

Never mind that a court riddled with corruption scandals invoked the passage of the Farewell Address warning against it.

Between the shock of the overall holding and the obsession with Joe Biden’s poor debate, though, there has been little focus on an equally troubling part of Roberts’ opinion: one sanctioning the wholesale politicization of DOJ.

In the passage throwing out the charges involving Jeffrey Clark altogether, Roberts prohibits review of not just DOJ’s prosecutorial decisions (except, of course, when they involve a President’s predecessor, in which case DOJ has very constrained authority), but also of the President’s involvement in those decisions.

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. As we have explained, the President’s power to remove “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed” may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts. Myers, 272 U. S., at 106, 176; see supra, at 8. The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. App. 186–187, Indictment ¶10(c). And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority. Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. [my emphasis]

Here, Roberts turns the Take Care Clause on its head. Whereas conservative judge Karen Henderson viewed the Take Care Clause to require that the President obey the law, Roberts instead sees that as a source of permission for the President to demand investigations, even if they are proposed for an improper purpose.

In doing so, Roberts gives Joe Biden permission to demand an investigation of Ginni Thomas for the purpose of revenge against her spouse.

To be sure, in spite of Roberts’ expansive permission for President’s to politicize DOJ, there appear to be limits. Joe Biden cannot order the IRS to review whether Clarence Thomas has written off all the undeclared boondoggles Harlan Crow has given him.

One of the only laws specifically mention the President, it turns out, is 26 USC 7217, which prohibits certain people, including the President himself, from asking the IRS to take investigative action against a taxpayer.

(a)Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any applicable person to request, directly or indirectly, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.

(b)Reporting requirement
Any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service receiving any request prohibited by subsection (a) shall report the receipt of such request to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.

[snip]

(e)Applicable person
For purposes of this section, the term “applicable person” means—
(1)the President, the Vice President, any employee of the executive office of the President, and any employee of the executive office of the Vice President; and

This law could one day, in the not-too-distant future, come before the Justices. It could even do so in the specific context at issue here, Donald Trump’s pressure on Jeffrey Rosen on December 27, 2020.

That’s because, as laid out in Hunter Biden’s selective and vindictive prosecution claim, in the very same conversation where Trump demanded that DOJ make false claims about election fraud, he also pressured Rosen to investigate Hunter Biden “for real.”

On December 27, 2020, then Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue took handwritten notes of a call with President Trump and then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, showing that Mr. Trump had instructed Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue to “figure out what to do with H[unter] Biden” and indicating that Mr. Trump insisted “people will criticize the DOJ if he’s not investigated for real.”57

57 Dec. 27, 2020 Handwritten Notes of Richard Donoghue Released by H. Oversight Comm. at 4 (emphasis added), www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-richard-donoghue-s-handwrittennotes-on-trump-rosen-calls/cdc5a621-dfd1-440d-8dea-33a06ad753c8; see also Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue at 56 (Oct. 1, 2021), H. Oversight Comm., https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-TRANSCRIPT-CTRL0000034600/pdf/GPO-J6- TRANSCRIPT-CTRL0000034600.pdf.

Hunter Biden’s as-applied challenge to his gun charges are more likely to get to SCOTUS and do so more quickly.

But his prosecution, with the President privately and publicly intervening both as President and as candidate to replace his father raises fairly unprecedented questions about the due process rights of a person whom the President has demanded be investigated for the purpose of revenge.

Until such a case gets reviewed, however, John Roberts has invited Joe Biden to call up Merrick Garland and demand not just that DOJ open an investigation into Ginni Thomas, but to appoint a Special Counsel who could continue the investigation for the foreseeable future.

By refusing all review of improper pressure on the Attorney General, John Roberts has not eliminated the risk of revenge and despotism.

He has, rather, sanctioned it.

Open Thread: SCOTUS Decisions, Friday Edition

June 14, 2024/67 Comments/in Federal Courts /by Rayne

[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

SCOTUS will dump a second cluster of decisions this week at 10:00 a.m. this morning. As in the past, there’s no clue as to which cases have been decided, including Trump’s presidential immunity case.

Decisions released today to follow in an update and will appear at the bottom of this post.

~ ~ ~

Time-killing observation:

Clarence Thomas is a lying mothertrucker who lies

Oh, oops, he just kind of forgot to tell the American people his rich white daddy bought him some trips.

Details of the private jet flights between 2017 and 2021 were obtained as part of an investigation the committee has been conducting into reports of lavish undisclosed travel and perks provided to justices by Crow and other wealthy benefactors that have sparked calls for reform.

Crow released the information after the committee issued subpoenas in November for him and conservative activist Leonard Leo to provide information to the body. The subpoenas have never been enforced.

source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/13/supreme-court-clarence-thomas-travel/

Mothertrucker needs to step down but you know he thinks he’s entitled because he’s been bought and paid for.

~ ~ ~

Three decisions today, none of which are about presidential immunity.

First decision: U.S. Trustee v. Hammons

Justice Jackson wrote the 6-3 majority opinion concerning bankruptcy. Several dozen Chapter 11 bankruptcies were charged higher fees when their cases were moved to a different judicial district.

Second decision: Campos-Chavez v. Garland

Justice Alito wrote the 5-4 majority opinion with Jackson writing the dissent. The case was centered on immigration and the notification issued to Campos-Chavez related to subsequent removal order.

Third decision: Garland v. Cargill

Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion with Sotomayor writing the dissent. The case concerned bump-stocks on guns and their definition as “machinegun” which are regulated by ATF.

~ ~ ~

Suspense escalates about the presidential immunity case.

Watch this space for updates related to the decisions above or other developments related to the SCOTUS jurists.

Clarence Thomas’ Club Votes Against Democracy

December 22, 2023/115 Comments/in 2024 Presidential Election /by emptywheel

SCOTUS denied Jack Smith’s effort to get a SCOTUS review of Trump’s absolute immunity claim immediately.

SCOTUS will wait until after DC Circuit hears arguments on January 9, decides the issue, and then they’ll take it up at their leisure, when they’re not taking rich vacations with right wing donors.

This is the easiest of all decisions before SCOTUS, because by taking the case right away, they might make all their other decisions easier.

But instead, they’re stalling.

When John Eastman Acknowledged that Candidate Trump Spoke in His Personal Capacity

December 4, 2023/20 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, January 6 Insurrection /by emptywheel

In Sri Srinivasan’s opinion in Blassingame holding that presidents, when speaking as candidates, are not immune from civil suit, he pointed to a key moment in the 2020 transition period to illustrate the distinction he was making between when a president running for re-election speaks as an office-seeker, rather than an office-holder: When Trump intervened in the Texas v. Pennsylvania lawsuit.

As an example, consider a situation directly germane to the cases before us in which President Trump publicly volunteered that he was acting—and speaking—in an unofficial, private capacity. In the period after the 2020 election and before January 6, the Supreme Court considered an effort by Texas to challenge the administration of the election in several battleground states in which then-President-elect Biden had been declared the winner. Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22O155 (U.S. 2020). President Trump moved to intervene in the case. In doing so, he specifically explained to the Supreme Court (and captioned his filing accordingly) that he sought to “intervene in this matter in his personal capacity as a candidate for re-election to the office of President of the United States.” Motion of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to Intervene in his Personal Capacity as Candidate for ReElection, Proposed Bill of Complaint in Intervention, and Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene 14, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22O155 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2020) (Trump Mot. to Intervene). He relatedly elaborated that he wished “to intervene to protect his unique and substantial personal interests as a candidate for re-election to the Office of President.” Id. at 24.

President Trump, then, affirmatively communicated to the Supreme Court (and the public) that he was acting and speaking in that matter in his “personal capacity” as a candidate for reelection—indeed, he explained that his reason for wanting to participate in the case was a “substantial personal” one rather than an official one. That stands in sharp contrast with other cases in which he—like all Presidents—had filed briefs in the Supreme Court in his “official capacity as President of the United States.” See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at II, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965). But while President Trump’s effort to participate in Texas v. Pennsylvania was made in an expressly and self-consciously personal, unofficial capacity, the content of his speech in his submission undoubtedly involved a matter of significant public concern: his challenge to the election results in various pivotal states, whose “electors [would] determine the outcome of the election.” Trump Mot. to Intervene 27.

As that example illustrates, an immunity for all presidential speech on matters of public concern—without regard to the context in which the President speaks—would be grounded purely in “the identity of the actor who performed it” rather than “the nature of the function performed.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 695 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229). Such a result is “unsupported by precedent.” Id. And it is unsupported by the basic object of granting a President official-act immunity: assuring that the President is not “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.” Id. at 694 (emphasis added) (quoting Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32). That concern necessarily has no salience when the President acts—by his own admission—in an unofficial, private capacity.

b.

As President Trump’s intervention motion in Texas v. Pennsylvania highlights, whether the President speaks (or engages in conduct) on a matter of public concern bears no necessary correlation with whether he speaks (or engages in conduct) in his official or personal capacity. And because it is the latter question that governs the availability of presidential immunity—as a matter both of precedent and of the essential nature of an immunity for (and only for) official acts—we must reject President Trump’s proposed public-concern test as illsuited to the inquiry. [my emphasis; links added]

Remember that time, weeks before the actions alleged in these lawsuits, Srinivasan might have been nudging the six Republican appointees to the Supreme Court, where even Donald Trump admitted that sometimes when the president speaks, he speaks only in his personal capacity?

It was more than that, though, and in ways that might be significant to both the civil cases and Jack Smith’s case.

This was not just Donald Trump acknowledging that, at that moment in December 2020 when he asked the Supreme Court to make him the winner of the 2020 election, he was speaking in his personal capacity. It was John Eastman, Counsel of Record on that motion, who described Trump as such. Eastman filed that motion to intervene, representing Trump in his personal capacity, in a period when he was discussing with Clarence Thomas’ spouse about lawsuits to challenge the results of the election (though she told the January 6 Committee she had no involvement “at all” in Texas v. Pennsylvania). Even Republican members of Congress got into the act, starting with now-Speaker Mike Johnson and including Jim Jordan and Scott Perry.

When Ken Paxton asked the Supreme Court to throw out the votes of four swing states, a bunch of people who would go on to play key roles in the attack on Congress were party to an action in which Co-Conspirator 2 described that Defendant Trump spoke in his personal capacity.

In days ahead, we’ll learn more about how the DC Circuit civil decision being sent back to Amit Mehta will intersect with Tanya Chutkan’s criminal decision that former president Donald Trump is entitled to no immunity as former president. These two decisions may literally and figuratively pass each other in the halls of Prettyman Courthouse, as one decision heads back to the older District chambers and another heads up to the fancier Circuit chambers.

Srinivasan’s opinion is limited, inviting very specific fact-finding.

As I described, in a passage citing the Blassingame decision released just hours earlier, Chutkan very pointedly stopped short of that specificity. She declined to weigh in on whether a former president’s immunity from criminal prosecution would be different if he was acting “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” duties than if he was engaged in official acts, effectively inviting Srinivasan and his colleagues to do that.

Similarly, the court expresses no opinion on the additional constitutional questions attendant to Defendant’s assertion that former Presidents retain absolute criminal immunity for acts “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” responsibility. Immunity Motion at 21 (formatting modified). Even if the court were to accept that assertion, it could not grant Defendant immunity here without resolving several separate and disputed constitutional questions of first impression, including: whether the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” includes within its “outer perimeter” at least five different forms of indicted conduct;5 whether inquiring into the President’s purpose for undertaking each form of that allegedly criminal conduct is constitutionally permissible in an immunity analysis, and whether any Presidential conduct “intertwined” with otherwise constitutionally immune actions also receives criminal immunity. See id. at 21–45. Because it concludes that former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office, however, the court need not reach those additional constitutional issues, and it expresses no opinion on them.

5 As another court in this district observed in a decision regarding Defendant’s civil immunity, “[t]his is not an easy issue. It is one that implicates fundamental norms of separation of powers and calls on the court to assess the limits of a President’s functions. And, historical examples to serve as guideposts are few.” Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 74 (D.D.C. 2022); see id. at 81–84 (performing that constitutional analysis). The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed that district court’s decision with an extensive analysis of just one form of conduct—“speech on matters of public concern.” Blassingame v. Trump, Nos. 22-5069, 22-7030, 22-7031, slip op. at 23–42 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2023).

Chutkan’s decision might well be sufficient. There are plenty of things a president might do, claiming to do so in his official capacity, which would also break the law; DOJ raised five pretty familiar looking examples in their response to Trump’s bid for absolute immunity.

DOJ points to the possibility that a President might trade a pardon — a thing of value — as part of a quid pro quo to obtain false testimony or prevent true testimony.

[snip]

A President ordering the National Guard to murder his critics

A President ordering an FBI agent to plant evidence on his political enemy

A bribe paid in exchange for a family member getting a lucrative contract

A President selling nuclear secrets to America’s adversaries

It would be nice if first DC Circuit and then SCOTUS could put this matter to bed, so it stops holding up Trump cases.

But judges like to move cautiously, testing the easy cases before they test the harder ones. With the Srinivasan decision in hand, the DC Circuit might treat the criminal appeal differently than they otherwise might.

For example, they might note, as DOJ did in its response, that five of six Trump described co-conspirators are also private citizens: Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani, Eastman representing Trump in his personal role, Sidney Powell, whom Trump recent said would be conflicted from representing him personally), Ken Chesebro who also claimed to be representing Trump personally, and Boris Epshteyn, who nominally remained an employee of the campaign.

If invited to do further briefing in light of Srinivasan’s opinion, DOJ might note that after SCOTUS denied Texas v. Pennsylvania cert, Trump’s campaign lawyers gave up the fight, as the January 6 Committee Report describes, ceding the fight to Rudy and the other co-conspirators.

Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake elector plan. OnDecember 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a high-profile lawsuit filedby the State of Texas challenging the election results in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.42 After that decision, the Trump Campaign’s senior legal staffers said that they reduced their involvement in thefake elector effort, apparently because there was no longer a feasible scenario in which a court would determine that President Trump actually won any of the States he contested.43 Justin Clark, who oversaw the Trump Campaign’s general counsel’s office, said that he basically conveyed, “I’mout,” and encouraged his colleagues on the legal team to do the same.44 Findlay told the Select Committee that “we backed out of this thing,” and Morgan, his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for the electorsas “my way of taking that responsibility to zero.”45

Clark told the Select Committee that “it never sat right with me that there was no . . . contingency whereby these votes would count.”46 “I hadreal problems with the process,” Clark said, because “it morphed into something I didn’t agree with.”47 In his view, the fake electors were “not necessarily duly nominated electors” despite being presented as such.48 Hesaid he believed he warned his colleagues that “unless we have litigationpending like in these States, like I don’t think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn’t the right thing to do.”49

DOJ might also note that, as charged in the indictment, the suit played a specific role in the Georgia allegations, when Chris Carr refused Trump’s request that he join in Texas’ lawsuit, because none of Trump’s claims had merit.

And it’s not just Trump’s personal lawyer co-conspirators. The invocation of Texas v. Pennsylvania even weighs heavily on the role Jeffrey Clark, then serving as Acting Assistant Attorney General at DOJ and so in a far better position to claim to be acting in an official role, played in the alleged conspiracy.

That’s because Trump’s bid to replace Jeffrey Rosen with Clark was directly tied to an effort to get DOJ to file a similar lawsuit. Here’s how Jeffrey Rosen described it to the January 6 Committee.

Q Okay. And want to talk to you also about the December 27th call where | believe you conferenced in Mr. Donoghue. ~ And that involved the President as well. In Mr. Donoghue’s notes, he references John Eastman and Mark Martin and has a note that says: P trusts him.

What do you remember about that aspect of the conversation?

A So I think that day someone had sent over to us a draft Supreme Court brief modeled on the Texas v. Pennsylvania case that the Supreme Court had rejected. And I was I think Rich Donoghue and Steve Engel and I had a meeting that we were there for t0 address an oversight set of issues that had produced some controversy that Members of Congress who – I won’t get nto all that, other than that Mr. Meadows had asserted to me that the thing had – that he and AG Barr had resolved it. But now AG Barr was gone, and it wasn’t resolved, and he wanted to talk to me about getting it resolved.

But at that discussion Mr. Meadows raised with us: ~ Did you guys see the Supreme Courtbrief that was sent over?

And I think we said: Haven’t read it carefully, but it doesn’t look viable.

And he responded in some sense — and, again, I’m paraphrasing, because I don’t I’m repeating the substance rather than the words was: Well, Mark Martin and John Eastman, who are, you know, these great legal scholars, think it’s great idea.

And we said: Well, you know, we’ll get back to you. But preliminary take is it has problems, that it doesn’t look like a good idea to us. But we’ve only had it 2 hours or something like that, you know, whatever the timeframe was, which it was relatively brief.

Trump followed up twice, pushing DOJ to sue as the government.

What I remember better was that, on Wednesday, after the Kurt Olsen incident, I spoke to the President. I think that was just me, or Rich may have been in my office, but I don’t think it was on the speakerphone. Some of these were on speakerphone with me and Rich, and some, it was just me, but Rich could’ve been in my office.

And the way I remember it is, on Wednesday, I wound up telling the President, “This doesn’t work. ~ There’s multiple problems with it. And the Department of Justice is not going to be able todo it” And–

In the same exchange, there was discussion of whether a DOJ attorney, like Jeffrey Clark, could represent the president in his personal capacity.

Q Okay. So is it fair then to say that this was not partof the Department’s official businessatthe time?

A Yes

Q And, to your knowledge, can Jeff Clark as the assistant — Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, can he represent the President in a personal capacity while also maintaining his role at the Department of Justice?

A Let me just make sure I understand the question. You’re saying, can he outside of his DOJ role represent the President in a personal capacity? And I’m trying what I’m trying to distinguish is sometimes the President or others get sued in their individual capacity. But they have some form of governmental immunity or the like. And so the government can represent them as individuals. That’s not what you’re getting at. You’re talking about, can a – can someone who’s a government employee, You know, have like a side gig representing a private person?

But then, after Jeffrey Rosen refused to make DOJ Trump’s own personal law firm, Trump took steps to make Jeffrey Clark, who was willing to do that, Acting Attorney General.

This application may even have critical import to the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) and (k) to Trump’s actions. Weeks before Trump and Eastman allegedly conspired to obstruct the vote certification on January 6, Eastman described that Trump had “unique and substantial personal interests” in throwing out the votes of four states that voted for Joe Biden. That’s the kind of admission from co-conspirator 2 that would make any analysis of Trump’s corrupt purpose in obstructing the vote certification quite easy.

Srinivasan’s use of Trump’s motion to intervene was, at one level, a very convenient use of Trump’s own legal claims — made before a conservative Supreme Court that will eventually answer both of these questions — against him.

But it maps onto the criminal case, too, in ways that DC Circuit might choose to apply as a way to tiptoe their way into sanctioning the first prosecution of an ex-president for actions he took as an office-seeker, rather than an office-holder.

Update: Ben Wittes and Quinta Jurecic similarly discuss how these two rulings work in tandem.

Trump’s New Appellate Argument about His 100 Million Imaginary Friends

November 3, 2023/68 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, emptywheel, January 6 Insurrection /by emptywheel

Judge Tanya Chutkan issued her order denying Trump a stay of her gag order on October 29.

That was admittedly a Saturday. Nevertheless, it took Trump four days before he ran to the DC Circuit to cry about an emergency infringement on the First Amendment rights of him and his mob.

He took those four days even as he demanded that the DC Circuit — which had been expecting Trump’s initial brief on November 8 — rule on this motion by November 10.

The Court should stay the Gag Order pending appeal. In addition, President Trump respectfully requests that the Court enter a temporary administrative stay pending resolution of this motion and issue its ruling by November 10, 2023. If the Court denies this motion, President Trump requests that the Court extend its administrative stay for seven days to allow him to seek relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

During those four days that Trump didn’t file for a stay, John Lauro found time to file three different things (one, two, three) in Judge Chutkan’s docket. In those four days, Trump posted a slew of attacks on Joe Biden, the 2020 election, and his prosecution (though admittedly many of the recent posts targeted Arthur Engoron), many of them attacks that — he claims — this gag prevents him from making.

I’ll leave it to smarter people to explain the posture that leaves this case.

What I’m more interested in are the arguments that Trump makes that should not withstand prolonged scrutiny, at least not at the DC Circuit, arguments that are surely designed to trigger the interest of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas.

In his appeal, Trump argues — substantially for the first time — that his gag subjects him to viewpoint discrimination. There’s a very short section dedicated to the topic, citing an inapt precedent.

7. The Gag Order reflects forbidden viewpoint discrimination.

By forbidding speech that “target[s]” certain individuals, the Gag Order prohibits only (vaguely defined) negative speech about them. See infra, Part I.C. In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that prohibiting only negative or “disparaging” speech constitutes forbidden viewpoint discrimination. 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (plurality opinion). Such a prohibition “constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). To prohibit “disparaging” speech “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 249; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391- 92. The Gag Order violates these principles

Trump lards the rest of the discussion with claims that a gag tied to the crimes alleged against Trump amounts to censorship of right wing views.

Based this speculation, the district court entered a sweeping, viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a major Presidential candidate, based solely on an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.” The Gag Order violates the First Amendment rights of President Trump and over 100 million Americans who listen to him.

[snip]

President Trump’s viewpoint and modes of expression resonate powerfully with tens of millions of Americans. The prosecution’s request for a Gag Order bristles with hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint and his relentless criticism of the government—including of the prosecution itself. The Gag Order embodies this unconstitutional hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint. It should be immediately stayed.

[snip]

As a viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a Presidential candidate to an audience of over 100 million Americans, the Gag Order is virtually per se invalid.

There are nine appearances of the word “viewpoint” in the entire appendix. All appear in Trump’s filings bidding for a stay, not his underlying opposition to the gag. But all of those also appear as part of an argument about political speech — an important argument, but one largely divorced from the circumstance of this gag, not as a free-standing argument about the free speech of nutjob right wingers.

That argument is closely related to (and builds on) another argument that Trump belatedly raised: that gagging his speech harms the First Amendment rights of his 100 million followers.

4. The Gag Order violates the rights of tens of millions of Americans to receive President Trump’s speech.

The First Amendment’s “protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (citing many cases); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). A restriction on President Trump’s speech inflicts a reciprocal injury on the rights of over 100 million Americans who listen to him, irrespective of their political beliefs.

This right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message has its “fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,” especially for the Presidency. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 162. Ford emphasized that, if Congressman Ford were silenced, “reciprocally, his constituents will have no access to the views of their congressman on this issue of undoubted public importance.” 830 F.2d at 601. Likewise, Brown stated that “[t]he urgency of a campaign … may well require that a candidate, for the benefit of the electorate as well as himself, have absolute freedom to discuss his qualifications….” 218 F.3d at 430.

In Trump’s appeal, he doesn’t cite evidence supporting this number, but — as I already noted — the underlying motion relies on garbage double counting of bots on the Twitter platform Trump no longer uses. Given that this argument is based on fraudulent numbers, it amounts to a defense of the First Amendment rights to listen of Trump’s imaginary friends, including the Russian bots the now-deceased Yevgeniy Prigozhin deployed to fuck with US politics.

The problem with this argument is, as DOJ noted in its response to Trump’s bid for a gag, Trump misrepresented the record on that point.

11 The defendant did not invoke these interests in his response to the Government’s motion for an order under Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c). And while the defendant claims to have invoked these interests at the hearing, only to have been unfairly interrupted by the Court (ECF No. 110 at 17), his citations mischaracterize the record. For example, he asserts (id.) that the Court interrupted him in response to his statement, “And what the government is proposing here is an order not just directed against President Trump but against the American electorate that wants to hear from President Trump under these circumstances.” The Court did not, in fact, interject in response to that point. See ECF No. 103 at 44. Rather, it was only several sentences later, after defense counsel returned to his oft-repeated talking point that “[t]his is the first time we’ve had a sitting administration prosecute a political opponent” that the Court responded, “I’m going to interrupt you. . . . You have said that. You have said it repeatedly. I have heard it.” Id. Likewise, the defendant asserts (ECF No. 110 at 17) that, when counsel said, “The American people are entitled to understand that and understand the consequences of that,” the Court simply responded, “No.” The Court did no such thing. After defense counsel’s comment, the Court asked why the defendant “is entitled to suggest that an appropriate punishment would be death.” ECF No. 103 at 59-60. When defense counsel invoked the First Amendment in response, the Court said, “No. As part of that. But again, the First Amendment protections must yield to the administration of justice and the protection of witnesses.” Id.

In a footnote of Judge Chutkan’s order denying the stay, she agreed.

Defendant’s Motion argues that his speech restrictions are inconsistent with the “right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message.” Motion to Stay at 15. Defendant did not squarely raise that argument in his opposition brief to the government’s original motion; the closest he came to identifying any authority for it was an unrelated “see also” citation to United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 1987), a case that he now quotes to support his right-of-listeners argument. Compare ECF No. 60 at 5, with Motion to Stay at 16. But the court expressly addressed and distinguished that case. Order at 2–3. In any event, the argument does not alter the fundamental principle that First Amendment rights, whether those of the speaker or the listener, may be curtailed to preclude statements that pose sufficiently grave threats to the integrity of judicial proceedings.

Undeterred by that footnote, Trump argues that Chutkan’s failure to address something he didn’t raise is her reversible error, not a waiver on his part.

Though the issue was raised repeatedly, A159-60, A165, A178; A47, A62-63, the district court gave the First Amendment rights of President Trump’s audiences no meaningful consideration. The Gag Order does not mention them, see A1-3, and the district court declined to consider them when President Trump raised them, e.g., A47, A62-63. That is reversible error.

I’ve linked two of the spots in the record, above, where John Lauro imagines he raised this — A47, which he cites twice, was in the oral arguments, not the underlying brief. None was a substantive argument about his imaginary 100 million friends. Here’s the appendix if you want to see if you can find what other things he is citing to.

There are other problems with this appeal. Trump doesn’t address the part of Chutkan’s order that explicitly permits Trump to attack, “the current administration or the Department of Justice.” Trump does not engage, at all, with the evidence DOJ submitted of expected trial witnesses testifying under oath about how mobs started threatening them after Trump tweeted mean things. Notably, Trump’s citations to the government’s examples of threats that Trump made between August 2 and September 26 doesn’t cite to the footnotes in the government response that reference the threat — made the day after the linked threat, “if you come after me I’m coming after you” — to Judge Chutkan herself.

By the time the Gag Order was entered, the case had been pending for almost three months, and President Trump had often spoken about it. The prosecution provided seventeen examples of public statements by President Trump between August 2 and September 26, 2023, that it considered objectionable. A140-46; A190- 91. However, it did not produce any evidence that any prosecutor, witness, or court staffer experienced “threats” or “harassment” after President Trump’s speech. Likewise, it did not produce any evidence that any witness or prosecutor felt threatened or intimidated by President Trump’s speech—however subjectively—during three months of President Trump’s public commentary on the case. See A140-46; A190-91.

Lauro claims DOJ didn’t present any evidence that anyone, including court staffers but not the judge herself, felt intimidated by threats that followed on Trump’s incitement and simply ignores that footnote. But someone in Judge Chutkan’s chambers alerted the Marshals after that threat, and the FBI deemed it sufficiently dangerous to arrest Abigail Jo Shry for making it.

So there are other problems with this appeal, exhibiting the same obstinate refusal to address the record as it stands that Judge Chutkan described in her opinion refusing the stay.

But the key dynamic, in my opinion, is that Trump is trying to refashion his argument to trigger the known biases of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas. But he’s doing so — launching a bid to protect the First Amendment rights of his imaginary friends — after the fact.

This is not a frivolous argument. The legal arguments should bear the weight of the historic decision that ultimately will result.

But instead of making serious arguments, John Lauro has pitched the Supreme Court’s right wing justices an argument about Trump’s imaginary Twitter friends.

Update: A DC Circuit panel of 3 Democratic appointees (Obama, Obama, Biden) has stayed the gag and ordered and set an expedited briefing that is quick enough SCOTUS is unlikely to have any reason to intervene.

PER CURIAM ORDER [2025399] filed considering motion to stay case [2025149-2], ORDERED that the district court’s October 17, 2023, order be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. Further ordered that his case be expedited. setting briefing schedule: APPELLANT Brief due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPENDIX due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPELLEE Brief due on 11/14/2023, at 5:00 p.m., APPELLANT Reply Brief due 11/17/2023, at 12:00 p.m., scheduling oral argument on Monday, 11/20/2023. Before Judges: Millett, Pillard and Garcia. [23-3190] [Entered: 11/03/2023 05:06 PM]

Trump’s First Amendment Defense of Mobilizing His Violent Mob

October 23, 2023/62 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, 2024 Presidential Election, January 6 Insurrection /by emptywheel

There’s a move in Trump’s motion for a stay pending appeal of the gag order Judge Tanya Chutkan imposed that deserves more attention.

Trump appealed the gag last Tuesday and requested the stay on Thursday, about which Judge Chutkan ordered additional briefing that same day; we’ll see more briefing about this all week.

MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: Upon consideration of Defendant’s opposed 110 Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Request for Temporary Administrative Stay, and Memorandum in Support, it is hereby ORDERED that the court’s 105 Opinion and Order is administratively STAYED to permit the parties’ briefing and the court’s consideration of Defendant’s Motion. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the government shall file any opposition to Defendant’s Motion by October 25, 2023, and that Defendant shall file any Reply by October 28, 2023.

A substantial portion of the 33-page motion speaks for the First Amendment rights of his mob to hear, respond to, and amplify Trump’s speech. To defend this principle, Trump cites, among other things, the Missouri v. Biden that SCOTUS just agreed to review over the objections of Sam Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch.

Under the First Amendment, violating the rights of a speaker inflicts an equal and reciprocal constitutional injury on the listener. “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (emphasis added) (collecting many cases); see also, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment”); Missouri v. Biden, — F.4th –, No. 23- 30445, 2023 WL 6425697, at *11 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (holding that the “right to listen is ‘reciprocal’ to the … right to speak” and “constitutes an independent basis” for relief). Thus, injuring President Trump’s ability to speak injures the First Amendment rights of over 100 million Americans who listen to him, respond to him, and amplify his message.

The claim to have 100 million listeners is a bit like calling his NY penthouse 33,000 square feet, insofar as it relies on overlapping numbers, including the 87 million followers he has but does not tweet to on Xitter.

Trump necessarily dedicates a very long footnote to explaining how he has standing to appeal this gag on behalf of his mob.

3 President Trump unquestionably has third-party standing to defend the rights of his audiences in this context. The Supreme Court is “quite forgiving” of third-party standing requirements “[w]ithin the context of the First Amendment.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004). The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, for example, relieves the third-party plaintiff of the burden to show the usual “close relationship” and “hindrance” required by the third-party standing doctrine, id.; instead, Article III injury is all that is required. See id.; United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1586 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Litigants raising overbreadth challenges rarely satisfy either requirement [‘close relationship’ and ‘hindrance’], but the Court nevertheless allows third-party standing.”) (citing Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965)); N.J. Bankers Ass’n v. Att’y Gen., 49 F.4th 849, 860 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that “the requirement that an impediment exist to the third party asserting his . . . own rights” does not apply when the challenged government action “substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court”). Further, as the Supreme Court held in Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, it is particularly important to allow third-party standing to vindicate First Amendment interests because “freedoms of expression … are vulnerable to gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments” and must be protected by “the most rigorous procedural safeguards.” 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see also id. at 64 n.6 (upholding the third-party standing of book publishers to assert the rights of distributors because “[t]he distributor … is not likely to sustain sufficient economic injury to induce him to seek judicial vindication of his rights,” whereas the seller has a “greater . . . stake” in vindicating those rights). In addition, the doctrine of third-party standing applies “when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130. Here, the interference and restriction of President Trump’s First Amendment rights “would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights,” id.—i.e., the rights of his audiences to receive, respond to, and amplify his speech.

I think this footnote is suspect, legally and practically. I mean, the notion that Stephen Miller’s NGO for fascism couldn’t vindicate these rights is nonsense. But it is nevertheless telling.

Trump makes that argument even while complaining that Judge Chutkan had to rely on the potential actions of others — that very same mob riled up by the amplified false victimization of Trump — to justify the gag itself.

Unable to justify the Gag Order based on President Trump’s actions, the prosecution pivots to third parties, alleging that unnamed others, outside of President Trump’s control, acted improperly before this case began. Such concerns cannot justify the Gag Order. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that citizens of this country cannot be censored based on a fear of what others might do. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy . . . except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).

[snip]

In entering the Gag Order, the Court relied heavily on the anticipated reactions of unidentified, independent third parties to President Trump’s speech. The Court found that “when Defendant has publicly attacked individuals, including on matters related to this case, those individuals are consequently threatened and harassed.” Id. at 2. But the Court cited no evidence that President Trump’s statements—as distinct from the statements of millions of others—caused such alleged threats or harassment, let alone that the statements were directed to inciting imminent lawless action.

Remember, Trump has repeatedly denied that the indictment accuses him of mobilizing the mob against Congress. Even after DOJ disabused Trump of that fantasy, he is playing coy about the fact that the crime he is alleged to have committed significantly involves riling up a mob to use as a weapon.

Indeed, Trump admits this is the plan to get elected: to rile up the mob again, this time by using this prosecution as a trigger.

The prosecution filed the indictment in this matter on August 1, 2023. Doc. 1. As this case is pending, President Trump continues to campaign for President, and one of his core messages is that the prosecutions against him are part of an unconstitutional strategy to attack and silence the Biden Administration’s chief political rival. To advance this message, President Trump has made many public statements criticizing individuals he believes are wrongly prosecuting him, including President Biden, Attorney General Garland, and Special Prosecutor Jack Smith and his team. This viewpoint—that the prosecution is politically motivated—is one shared by countless Americans.

[snip]

President Trump’s speech in support of his re-election campaign—which is inextricably intertwined with this prosecution and his defense—lies “at the core of our electoral process of the First Amendment freedoms—an area . . . where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“[C]ore political speech” encompasses any “advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint.” “No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than” core political speech.).

Some of this is just cynicism: by claiming all this is political speech, Trump does base his appeal on the most expansive First Amendment precedent. The legal arguments here, some of them, anyway, are not frivolous.

But he’s not wrong about his campaign strategy. The key to Trump’s political success since he was sworn in was to polarize the electorate based off false claims that any investigation of Trump’s crimes is an attack on him and his mob.

And at one point, Trump’s argument admits that this is all an argument about democracy.

The Gag Order’s carve-outs exacerbate the vagueness problems by imposing new layers of confusion upon the Order. Doc. 105, at 3. The carve-outs seem to authorize “criticizing the government generally, including the current administration or the Department of Justice,” but that does not seem to include criticizing the most relevant figure of the Department of Justice, i.e., Jack Smith. Id. The carve-outs supposedly allow President Trump to state “that his prosecution is politically motivated,” but the Gag Order prevents him from “targeting” the specific actors involved in his prosecution, so it prevents him from giving any specific or detailed justification for this claim. Id. Where claiming that the prosecution is politically motivated ends, and “targeting” the prosecutors against President Trump begins, is anyone’s guess. The carve-outs apparently authorize “statements criticizing the platforms or policies of . . . former Vice President Pence,” id., but the “platforms or policies” of candidates like Pence (and Biden) are deeply intertwined with their views on election integrity, with specific reference to the 2020 election. When does criticism of Mike Pence’s “platforms or policies” become a statement “that target[s] . . . the substance of [his] testimony,” id., when questions about the integrity of the 2020 election are “central” to the 2024 Presidential campaign?

Joe Biden (comments about whom this gag does not restrict) is running on democracy. Mike Pence is running on defending the Constitution.

Trump is running on a promise that none of that matters: no election outcome — not that of 2020, not that of 2024 — should be respected, unless he wins.

And the way to ensure that happens, Trump knows, is to guard the right of his mob to amplify and respond to his false claims of victimization.

The Menendez Indictment: “how much is one kilo of gold worth” … “kilo of gold price”

September 22, 2023/113 Comments/in Financial Fraud, Foreign Influence /by emptywheel

The latest indictment of Robert Menendez almost seems like a personal challenge to Clarence Thomas, to see if there are bribes of a public official that Thomas and his cronies on the Supreme Court won’t find a way to deem constitutional.

After all, what if Thomas is getting gold bars on the side from his “friends,” as Menendez is alleged to have been?

The short version, though, is that after Menendez’ last corruption prosecution, Nadine Arslanian started dating then married Menendez. And he started doing favors for some of her friends, Wael Hanna and Fred Daibes, who had ties to Egypt, including sharing non-public information with Egyptian officials and helping Hanna secure the monopoly on halal certification for meat imported into Egypt.

The indictment alleges a lot of breath-taking stupidity on Menedez’ part, including twice searching for the price of gold after doing something incriminating.

On or about October 17, 2021, ROBERT MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ, a/k/a “Nadine Arslanian,” the defendants, returned from Egypt as described in paragraph 29.f, landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Upon their arrival, a driver for FRED DAIBES, the defendant (“DAIBES’s Driver”), picked up MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ from the airport and drove them to their home in New Jersey. The next day, MENENDEZ performed a web search for “how much is one kilo of gold worth.” As discussed herein, multiple gold bars provided by DAIBES were found during the court-authorized June 2022 search of MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ’s residence.

[snip]

d. On or about January 24, 2022, DAIBES’s Driver exchanged two brief calls with NADINE MENENDEZ. NADINE MENENDEZ then texted DAIBES, writing, “Thank you. Christmas in January.” DAIBES’s Driver’s fingerprints were later found on an envelope containing thousands of dollars of cash recovered from the residence of MENENDEZ and NADINE MENENDEZ in New Jersey. This envelope also bore DAIBES’s DNA and was marked with DAIBES’s return address. In or about the early afternoon of January 24, 2022— i.e., approximately two hours after NADINE MENENDEZ had texted DAIBES thanking him and writing “Christmas in January”—MENENDEZ called Official-4, in a call lasting for approximately 15 seconds. This was MENENDEZ’s first phone call to Official-4. On or about January 29, 2022—i.e., several days after NADINE MENENDEZ had texted DAIBES, thanking him and writing “Christmas in January”—MENENDEZ performed a Google search for “kilo of gold price.”

When the FBI searched Menendez’ home last year, they found over $100,000 in gold bars, as well as $480,000 in cash.

The gold bars and some of the envelopes had the fingerprints of their alleged co-defendants.

Some of these allegations will be harder to prove. Some will be easier to pin on Nadine, unless and until one of the spouses flips on the other.

But Menendez, who escaped justice the last time DOJ tried to prosecute him for his corruption in 2015, certainly seems to have pressed his luck.

Thomas, Alito and Christmas Cookies

July 14, 2023/220 Comments/in Federal Courts, Law, SCOTUS /by bmaz

You have heard about the private jet and yacht trips given to Clarence Thomas, the jet trips given to Samuel Alito, etc. The stories of this type of absolute impropriety are seemingly endless.

Senior Massachusetts District Judge Michael Ponsor has penned an op-ed in today’s New York Times: in which he discuses the acceptable limits of what federal judges can take as grift. It is quite good and not very long, I’d suggest a read of it.

What has gone wrong with the Supreme Court’s sense of smell?

I joined the federal bench in 1984, some years before any of the justices currently on the Supreme Court. Throughout my career, I have been bound and guided by a written code of conduct, backed by a committee of colleagues I can call on for advice. In fact, I checked with a member of that committee before writing this essay.
….
The recent descriptions of the behavior of some of our justices and particularly their attempts to defend their conduct have not just raised my eyebrows; they’ve raised the whole top of my head. Lavish, no-cost vacations? Hypertechnical arguments about how a free private airplane flight is a kind of facility? A justice’s spouse prominently involved in advocating on issues before the court without the justice’s recusal? Repeated omissions in mandatory financial disclosure statements brushed under the rug as inadvertent? A justice’s taxpayer-financed staff reportedly helping to promote her books? Private school tuition for a justice’s family member covered by a wealthy benefactor? Wow.

This is FAR beyond “the appearance of impropriety”, it is actual impropriety. Any judge and/or lawyer with even an ounce of ethics knows this, and it is patently obvious. It is wrong.

Let me give you an analogy that demonstrates how absurd Thomas and Alito really are.

Many, many years ago, a junior partner in our firm decided to be nice to the local county level judges we practiced in front of. So she got a bunch of boxes of Christmas cookies from a local custom cookie place and tried to deliver them to the pertinent judges for Christmas.They were just local superior court judges, not SCOTUS level. They turned them down, and there were a bunch of cookies suddenly in our kitchen and lounge.

There were a lot of attorneys, including me, both prosecution and defense, that used to drink at a local downtown dive bar after 5 pm. Judges, both federal and state, came in too. The lawyers always swapped rounds. But not the judges, they always paid for their own.

Nobody in the world would have carped about it if the judges would have eaten the cookies, nor had the judges gotten a free drink. They just did not. It was pretty admirable.

And now, when such things should be far more apparent, we have a Supreme Court that thinks they are entitled to the graft and grift. Do I think that makes them “corrupt” per se? I do not know that, we shall see how it all plays out further.

Update: SCOTUS Will Not Intervene [Yet] In Trump’s Stolen Documents Claim

October 13, 2022/88 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, Leak Investigations /by emptywheel

Update, 10/13: The Supreme Court just declined to intervene in Trump’s stolen document case. That means that the Special Master review will, unless something entirely unforeseen occurs, be limited to documents without classified markings.

I’m republishing because I think this post best explains the damage that might otherwise have been risked.

I laid out what SCOTUS might review later in this process here.

Given developments in the last two days, here’s how the various schedules pertaining to Trump’s stolen document case intersect (I’ve included the original 11th Circuit deadlines to show the effect of yesterday’s ruling to expedite the merits appeal):

October 5: Finalize a vendor

October 11: DOJ Reply to Trump Emergency Motion at SCOTUS

October 13: DOJ provides materials to Trump

By October 14: DOJ provides notice of completion that Trump has received all seized documents

On or before October 14, 2022: DOJ revised deadline to 11th Circuit

October 19: Original deadline for DOJ appeal to 11th Circuit

21 days after notice of completion (November 4): Trump provides designations to DOJ

November 8: Election Day

November 10, 2022: Trump revised deadline to 11th Circuit

10 days after receiving designations (November 14): Both sides provide disputes to Dearie

November 17, 2022: DOJ revised reply to 11th Circuit

30 days after DOJ appeal (November 18): Original Trump response to 11th Circuit

21 days after Trump reply (December 9): Original DOJ reply to 11th Circuit

December 16: Dearie provides recommendations to Cannon

January 3: New Congress sworn in

No deadline whatsoever: Cannon rules on Dearie’s recommendations

Seven days after Cannon’s no deadline whatsoever ruling: Trump submits Rule 41(g) motion

Fourteen days after Cannon’s no deadline whatsoever ruling: DOJ responds to Rule 41(g) motion

Seventeen days after Cannon’s no deadline whatsoever ruling: Trump reply on Rule 41(g)

As I understand it, one way the 11th Circuit appeal may be expedited is that the panel will be picked, secretly, from the start, giving it a chance to review filings as they come in. And they can schedule an oral argument, if necessary, for almost immediately after the reply brief comes in. It will be a new panel, so the odds are at least one other Trump appointee will get a chance to weigh in, in addition to the two who already ruled against Trump.

The SCOTUS appeal, remember, is for a limited issue: Whether to restore classified records to the matters before Special Master Raymond Dearie and, ultimately, before Judge Aileen Cannon.

Particularly given that even Clarence Thomas, in setting DOJ’s deadline a week out, isn’t treating Trump’s appeal as much of an emergency, I think the most likely scenario is that SCOTUS declines to consider Trump’s appeal. It’s the easiest thing to do, dictated by precedent if SCOTUS feels obliged to follow it, and made more likely by the fact that Cannon has altered the scope of her order. As the timeline above shows, if that were to happen, it might well happen before DOJ’s deadline for its appeal on the merits.

I think the most likely scenario is that the 11th Circuit sustains the opinion that three judges on the Circuit already came to: that Cannon abused her authority to even take the appeal. DOJ has more information about Cannon’s abuses they could choose to include in their brief, such as that Judge Cannon halted a national security investigation based in part on a document Trump made public six years ago. Though by the time Trump files his response, he will have been able to review all the documents seized from his beach resort (barring the classified documents, unless SCOTUS quickly reverses the Circuit). So who knows what kind of imagined injury he’ll invent after seeing all the documents? The Circuit may act quickly enough to rule before Dearie issues his report to Judge Cannon, which is the next most likely time for her to engage in more fuckery. Because of her past fuckery, it doesn’t even appear that Dearie will issue a report on the potentially privileged materials until then either.

In other words, the best scenario — and a not unlikely one — is that SCOTUS first declines to review Trump’s appeal, and then the 11th Circuit rules that Judge Cannon improperly intervened, all of which may well happen before anything else overt happens in Judge Cannon’s docket, though Trump would have the ability to and likely would introduce details learned from his review before the 11th.

But we don’t know.

As I keep saying, anyone who tells you they know how this is going to work out is selling you assurances that can no longer be offered with this 11th Circuit and with this Supreme Court.

One thing many commentators are claiming that bears correction, however, is the claim the only damage the Supreme Court review can do is delay: that even if SCOTUS permits Dearie and Cannon to review the documents with classification markings, it could do no more damage to the DOJ investigation. That is obviously false.

Assume for the moment that SCOTUS does take Trump’s appeal and does rule that Cannon can include classified documents in her review (to be sure, I think that unlikely). And assume for the moment that the 11th Circuit reverses itself and finds that Cannon acted properly by intervening in a national security investigation to protect Trump’s interest in a letter he himself made public six years ago. Assume, too, that the 11th Circuit leaves in place Cannon’s decision to treat this as a “hybrid” motion, yoking the Special Master process to a Rule 41(g) motion.

In that scenario, Dearie would issue his report, including regarding classified records, on December 16. He likely would uphold all DOJ’s assertions regarding classification, because he understands how classification at least used to work, before this case: that the current Executive gets unlimited say over what is classified (which is different than what is National Defense Information). Trump would then object to Dearie’s report (he is guaranteed to when and if Dearie ever makes one). Cannon would then review the report de novo, as she did with Dearie’s work plan. And she would write an opinion that either affirmed Trump on one or two minor documents, or said, effectively, that she agrees with Dearie’s classification designations, but that she believes Trump’s logic — that he declassified these documents by shipping them to Mar-a-Lago, and that’s why he refused to give them back — is reasonable.

There are other things Cannon could do to fuck up the prosecution, for example by deeming the 33 pages of correspondence with NARA included in the Category A documents seized from Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s personal possessions under rule 41(g) and returning them to him, thereby depriving DOJ of evidence that directly pertains to the crimes under investigation.

But the way in which Cannon could most fuck up any charges for 18 USC 793e (though not obstruction) would by by issuing an opinion that — even if she agreed all the documents were classified — nevertheless deemed Trump’s bullshit story, that he believed he had declassified these documents by packing them in a box and shipping them to his beach resort, reasonable.

Charging a former President under the Espionage Act presents unique challenges, but I think they could be overcome given what we know has transpired. We’re even likely to learn that Trump lied to the lawyers who knew better than to ship classified documents to his beach resort, and those lawyers will make compelling witnesses against Trump.

But if Cannon gets the opportunity to review Trump’s bullshit declassification story and deems it reasonable — even though she has virtually no relevant experience from which to judge that issue, even though she’s just one judge big-footing on a lawful warrant, even though such an opinion would likely be overturned on appeal — it might make charging Trump under the Espionage Act prohibitively difficult. That’s because that opinion from a judge that Trump’s bullshit story was reasonable would likely be enough to sway at least one juror, especially if the case were charged in Florida. And DOJ is not going to charge Trump — they’re definitely not going to charge Trump under the Espionage Act — unless they’re sure that the most credible people making these kinds of arguments are potentially implicated witnesses like Kash Patel. Yes, they might still charge obstruction (and they might only charge obstruction anyway), but if Republicans win back one or both houses, they will use an obstruction-only prosecution to claim it was a politicized prosecution.

So yes, Clarence Thomas could do harm by accepting Trump’s appeal and SCOTUS could do harm by ruling in favor of it. I don’t think that’s the most likely outcome (and such a move would likely to lead to further appeals). But there is a risk of harm beyond a simple delay.

Posts

Aileen Cannon Makes Clarence Thomas’ Calvinball Newly Significant

Spirit of Revenge: John Roberts Says Joe Biden Can Demand an Investigation of Ginni Thomas

Open Thread: SCOTUS Decisions, Friday Edition

Clarence Thomas’ Club Votes Against Democracy

When John Eastman Acknowledged that Candidate Trump Spoke in His Personal Capacity

Trump’s New Appellate Argument about His 100 Million Imaginary Friends

Trump’s First Amendment Defense of Mobilizing His Violent Mob

The Menendez Indictment: “how much is one kilo of gold worth” … “kilo of gold price”

Thomas, Alito and Christmas Cookies

Update: SCOTUS Will Not Intervene [Yet] In Trump’s Stolen Documents Claim

Interesting links

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