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[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

FISC Rules that [Redacted] Is Not Subject to FISA 702 for One of Its Services

Last week ODNI declassified two FISA Court opinions pertaining to Section 702. The first was a 2022 FISA Court opinion (which dates to sometime after April 2022 orders were signed) written by Presiding Judge Rudolph Contreras. The second is a 2023 per curiam opinion (David Sentelle, Robert Miller, and Stephen Higginson) affirming the original Contreras one.

While the exact details of the appeal are heavily redacted, it’s clear that the opinion pertains to the definition of Electronic Communications Service Provider under the law. As a reminder, under 702, the government can given a US-based ESCP a “directive” ordering not just content, but also technical assistance. In general, such directives apply to both data in motion (so telecoms) and data at rest (so cloud providers).

One thing the opinions make clear is that the service provider provided at least two categories of service. The service provider seemed to only challenge one of those two categories of service and willingly accept directives for another. The FISCR opinion lays out that the definition of ECSP must be applied on a service to service basis.

A reexamination of subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) confirms that it is the service being rendered-and nothing else about the provider-that is the crux of each definition. For “provider of electronic communication service,” and “provider of remote computing service,” only the specified communication service is statutorily defined. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (b )( 4 )(B) (relying on the definition of “electronic communication service” at 18 U .S.C. § 2510(15) to delineate providers of such); 50U.S.C.§1881(b)(4)(C) (relying on the definition of “remote computing service” at 18 U.S.C. § 2711 to delineate providers of such). Although the term “telecommunications carrier” is itself statutorily defined, that definition similarly relies on the definition of “telecommunications services,” except for one exclusion. See 47 U.S.C. § 153( 51) (‘” [T]elecommunications carrier’ means any provider of telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of telecommunications services . … “); 47 U .S.C. § 153(53) ( defining “telecommunications service”).

[snip]

What matters is the service that is being provided at a particular time (or as to a particular piece of electronic communication at a particular time), rather than … the service provider itself.” (internal quotations omitted)).

The issue, for the second service, seems to pertain to whether the service provider had access to the comms in question — whether in motion or at rest; such a dispute may be a question of encrypted communications to which the provider did not have access.

Contreras’ opinion treats each type of ECSP, data in motion and then data at rest, to determine that for the service in question (but not for others the service provider offers) it is not a an ECSP under Section 702.

Notably, a key part of the first part of Contreras’ analysis (on data in motion) relies on two opinions about cell phones.

see also Garcia v. City of Laredo, 702 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2012) (a cell phone “does not provide an electronic communication service just because the device enables use of electronic communication services” ( emphasis in original); Loughnane v. Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, No. 19 C 86, 2021 WL 1057278 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2021) (“a smartphone … does not provide the end-user the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications;” it “merely enables the end-user to employ a wire or electronic communication service . . . which in turn provides [that] ability”) (emphasis in original). 15

And a later passages also pertains to personal devices.

Nonetheless, most courts have found that personal devices used to access web-based email services or similar communication platforms are not facilities through which an ECS is provided. 18

Under the second part of his analysis, Contreras focused on whether the service provider had access to communications (again, a discussion that might be consistent with encryption). In that section, there’s this curious discussion of the June 2021 Van Buren decision that limited the application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which pivoted on authority to access.

Van Buren interpreted a statutory provision that describes the elements of a crime. It is natural for “access” in that context to be confined to (wrongfully) entering a computer system or parts thereof. It would not sensibly extend to the opportunity or ability to enter a system, without actually doing so, just as it would not make sense for a passerby to be liable for trespass because he walked by an open door without going in. But it strikes the Court that, in other, even computer-related contexts, “access” could be used as a noun (as it is in Section 701(b)(4)(D)) to refer to the ability or opportunity to enter: “Frank has access to the database but be has not logged into it yet.”

FISCR likewise invoked the definition of access under Van Buren.

Context reinforces this understanding. See, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1657- 58 (2021) (“When interpreting statutes, courts take note of terms that carry ‘technical meaning[s]. “‘). In Van Buren, the Supreme Court observed that ‘” [ a ]ccess’ is one such term, long can-ying a ‘well established’ meaning in the ‘ computational sense’- a meaning that matters when interpreting a statute about computers.” Id. at 1657 ( citation omitted).

Close to the end of the FISCR opinion, it seems to definitively define ECSP based on this access principle.

If an entity does not provide a communication service through which it has “access to wire or electronic communications either as such communications are transmitted or as such communications are stored;’ 50 U.S.C. § 188l(b)(4)(D), it is not an ECSP as defined by subparagraph (D), [half paragraph]

Then, FISCR notes that 702 is up for reauthorization this year, so if the government doesn’t like this principle, it can go ask Congress to change it.

Some company successfully argued that if they don’t have access to your data, they can’t be compelled to provide US spooks assistance to get to it.

Between the Annual Release of FISA Statistics and the Release of the FISA 702 Opinion, FBI Rolled Up Turla

I’m curious about the timing of the release of the FISC 702 opinion, dated April 21, 2022, approving Section 702 certificates that would last until April 21, 2023. I laid out a Modest Proposal in response to that opinion here.

In the past, the government has often released the prior year’s FISC opinion around the same time as it releases all the FISA transparency reports, which it released this year on April 28, 2023. But ODNI didn’t release the opinion itself until May 19, eight days after the FBI released a FISA-related audit that covers many of the same violative queries laid out in the FISC opinion and three weeks after the other transparency filings. The delayed release resulted in the release of significantly overlapping bad news twice, a week apart, at a time when the spooks already face an uphill climb to get 702 reauthorized before the end of the year.

One possible explanation for the delayed release is that there was a one-month delay in reapproval of new 702 certificates, meaning that ODNI held back the opinion until such time as a new opinion had replaced the old one.

But as I read, especially, a separate opinion released along with the 702 one, I couldn’t help but note that between the date when ODNI would customarily release the prior FISC authorization and the date it did, FBI rolled up the Turla malware.

May 4, 2023: Search warrant affidavit

May 8, 2023: Planned operation

May 9, 2023: DOJ Press releaseNSA press releaseJoint Cybersecurity Advisory

When I wrote my post on the operation, I laid out how, starting in 2016, the FBI had learned how Turla worked via voluntary monitoring of US-based victims from whose servers the malware was launching attacks in other countries.

A key part of the affidavit’s narrative describes that monitoring process. The FBI discovered that Turla compromised computers at US Victim A in San Jose, which let the FBI monitor how the malware worked. Using US Victim A, Turla compromised US Victim B in Syracuse, which in turn let the FBI monitor what happened from there. Using both US Victims A and B, Turla compromised US Victim D in Columbia, SC, which in turn let the FBI monitor traffic. Using Victim B, Turla compromised US Victim C, in Boardman, OR, which in turn let the FBI monitor traffic.

Over seven years, then, the FBI has been monitoring communications traffic from a growing number of US victim companies that Turla used as nodes. The affidavit emphasizes that these sites were used to attack overseas targets — like the presumed German and French targets mentioned in the affidavit. Aside from the journalist working for a US outlet (who could be stationed overseas), the affidavit doesn’t mention any US collection targets. Nor does it explain whence Turla targets US collection targets.

But there were two or three companies that refused to allow the FBI to engage in consensual monitoring of their victimized servers: Victim-E, Victim-F, and Victim-G, all of which were discovered in 2021 or 2022 (Victim-F went defunct and destroyed its computers).

According to the FBI search warrant, then, it launched a global operation to roll up the Turla Snake’s many nodes around the world without the benefit of at least two US-based nodes from which it could discover other victims. That didn’t make sense to me.

The other FISA opinion released with the 702 one sought authorization to conduct physical surveillance of two locations in the US used by an agent of a foreign power; the government uses physical surveillance to obtain data in rest on a server. DOJ first submitted the application in early 2021. FISC appointed former cybersecurity prosecutor and current tech attorney Marc Zwillinger and retired EDNY Magistrate James Orenstein as amici and conducted several rounds of briefing and a hearing. Orenstein would have still been a Magistrate in EDNY when the grand jury behind this operation was seated there in 2018; he retired in 2020.

The heavily redacted opinion itself is pretty short — just 6 pages. It explains that “the Court has little difficulty finding probable cause to believe that the intended targets … are agents of a foreign power.” It had a harder time with two other issues, though: proving that the premises to be searched “is or is about to be owned, used, possessed by … that foreign power.” Suggestions from Zwillinger and Orenstein provided limits to the order such that FISC presiding Judge Rudolph Contreras could meet that standard.

The government also noted that the data in the targeted location “might not be owned or used by” the agents of the foreign power in question. Contreras imposed a 60-day deadline for the government to destroy everything that was not.

With those limitations, Contreras approved the FISC order on September 27, 2021.

Both of these issues are common ones in cybersecurity surveillance. Hackers hijack others’ servers, and from that sanctuary, victimize others. And then hackers transport data that are the fruits of theft, not communications about such a crime, via these nodes. So one way or another, the opinion sounds like it could pertain to cybersecurity surveillance. The timing is what makes me wonder whether the order was withheld until the end of the Turla operation.

Zwillinger and Orenstein were appointed as amici in 2022 as well.

Note, there’s a technique that got authorized in the 702 opinion, first proposed in March 2021, which involved two different amici, Georgetown Professor Laura Donohue, who asked for the assistance of Dr. Wayne Chung, the Chief Technology Officer of BlueVoyant, a cybersecurity company. That discussion is even more heavily redacted. But the issues debated appear to include:

  • Whether the thing obtained using 702 was included in the definition of intelligence permitted for collection
  • Whether the assistance required in the US came from an Electronic Communications Service Provider (Victim A from the Turla operation was located in San Jose, and the Victim G that refused to cooperate was described as a cloud service provider located in Gaithersberg)
  • Whether the assistance from the ECSP is covered by 702
  • Whether the intended use of the information fit the definition of querying
  • Whether NSA should have used another provision of FISA
  • Whether all the targets were overseas
  • What kind of minimization procedures the kind of information that would be obtained required

The 702 application is even more obscure than the physical search one. But if the latter pertains to Turla, it’s not inconceivable that the former does too.

More on the Government’s January 6 Google GeoFence

In October, I wrote a piece on a reasonably framed challenge to the Google GeoFence used to investigate January 6, in the trespassing case of David Rhine. In recent days, Wired picked up my story, but didn’t situate the GeoFence in the context of prior rulings overturning their use, including the EDVA ruling in March on which this challenge most directly relies. Nor did it show how this information worked with other evidence against Rhine (including two tips), that led to his arrest. That led to a lot of alarmism that, if the January 6 GeoFence is upheld, it’ll set some kind of precedent.

Yesterday, the government submitted its response to the challenge, which better explains how the GeoFence was used and why it is highly unlikely the conditions present with this GeoFence will be replicated in the future. That description is here.

As described this was a three step process:

  • Provide an anonymized list of the phones using Google Location Services that were present in the Capitol between 2 and 6:30PM on January 6 (whether in Google records preserved on the evening of January 6, the morning of January 7, or still on January 13). In addition, provide anonymized lists of phones using Google Location Services present in the Capitol between 12:00 and 12:15 and/or 9:00 and 9:15 PM on January 6.
  • Eliminate devices believed to be legally present in the Capitol (because they were in the earlier and/or later lists, so there before and/or after the riot), and identify those that evinced likely criminal behavior, either because the location data showed at least one hit entirely within the margin of error, or because there device showed presence in the Capitol (but not entirely within the margin of error) but also showed evidence of account deletion.

First, the government compared the 2:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. data with the noon and 9:00 p.m. “control” lists, and then struck the control-list devices from the main list. Def. Ex. A at 27. That process eliminated over 200 unique devices. Def. Ex. B. at 7. Second, the government eliminated all devices except those that had at least one location data point within the Capitol building with a margin-of-error radius entirely within the geofence. Def. Ex. B. at 7. This process reduced the pool to approximately 1,500 unique devices. Id. Third, the government added back 37 devices that, despite not having a margin-of-error radius entirely within the geofence, still hit on the geofence between 2:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. and, in addition, had another indicator of criminal activity: the account’s Location History data was deleted at some point between January 6 and January 13.

  • For the resulting ~1,500 devices, DOJ obtained a second warrant for Google to obtain the account identifier.

As the government explains this Google GeoFence differs from ones that have been overturned in several ways. Most importantly, in addition to the claim that the use of Location Services is voluntary (as distinct from location services associated with using cell phones), which was rejected in other GeoFences, here, the government also argues that, even on a normal day, anyone entering the Capitol would have no reasonable expectation of privacy, but all the more so here, where it was closed to the public.

So whereas the government argued that with Google and Facebook, users had no Reasonable Expectation of Privacy regarding information voluntarily shared with the tech company, they appear to have pursued individualized warrants with cell companies because sharing that information (under Carpenter) does involve REP. For all three, though, I think the government would argue there was no REP for people who entered the Capitol without authorization.

The government is also relying on the short timespan — 4.5 hours — to justify its GeoFence.

Relatedly, in contrast to other GeoFences that encompassed public spaces and in some cases, private residences, here, most people captured by the Google GeoFence would be people who committed a crime by being in the Capitol, or who were witnesses, victims, or first responders.

The defendant’s reliance (ECF No. 43 at 16) on the magistrate judge’s decision in Matter of Search of Information Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 2020 WL 5491763 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2020), is misplaced for essentially the same reason: there, the geofence covered “a congested urban area encompassing individuals’ residences, businesses, and healthcare providers,” so that “the vast majority of cellular telephones likely to be identified in [that] geofence will have nothing whatsoever to do with the offenses under investigation.” Id. at *5 (footnote omitted); see also id. at *5 n.7 (stating that “[t]he government’s inclusion of a large apartment complex in one of its geofences raise[d] additional concerns … that it may obtain location information as to an individual who may be in the privacy of their own residence”). Again, the geofence here was limited to the U.S. Capitol during a time period when members of the public were not allowed to be in the area.

In the past, I’ve noted that the others captured by the GeoFence would be victims (employees of Congress, whether Members, staff, or service staff) or First Responders. The most serious privacy exposure here might be journalists, particularly those carrying burner phones or similar.

I asked Igor Bobic, as a test of whether a credentialed journalist would be included in those deemed legally present(recall that Bobic took the iconic footage of Doug Jensen chasing Officer Eugene Goodman up the steps). He told me he was inside the Capitol for both the control periods, at noon and at 9PM. That makes sense: those present to report on the vote certification would have had cause to show up before it started and to stay — often until the wee hours of the morning — to witness its completion.

In other words, journalists who were covering events outside, but followed rioters in (and there were substantial teams from multiple media outlets as well as a number of documentary teams), would be those whose privacy was most affected.

I said in my last post that this is a well-argued motion to suppress. But the government’s response explains why Rhine is not the best situated defendant to bring this challenge. Generally, the FBI has used this GeoFence in three ways: To confirm already identified defendants were present in the Capitol or entered the Capitol, to help identify a suspect in surveillance footage, or (more recently) as leads sent out to the field to run down.

As I suspected, Rhine is in the second category: DOJ opened the investigation and advanced it based off several tips and even had confirmed Rhine’s presence via a particularized warrant to Verizon. Only later did it use the GeoFence to identify where in the existing surveillance footage to look for images of Rhine (who obscured his face with a mask).

In June 2021, the FBI’s principal investigator spent approximately 10 hours reviewing videos from the U.S. Capitol Building, attempting to locate the defendant and his activities during the January 6 riot. Def. Ex. O. During this initial review, the investigator already had access to the geofence data, which the FBI investigators received in March 2021. Gov’t Ex. 1. Despite having access to the geofence data, the investigator’s initial efforts were not successful. Def. Ex. O. After receiving additional training about the FBI’s video system, the investigator was able to locate the defendant in the Capitol Police footage. Def. Exs. O, P. The FBI then traced the defendant through U.S. Capitol based on his clothing and appearance. Def. Ex. O at 1-4 (trace of the defendant through the U.S. Capitol); Def. Ex. M at 15-22.

[snip]

[T]he November 2021 Affidavit described, in addition to the results of the geofence warrant, a constellation of evidence supporting probable cause. First, it described information reported by two separate tipsters who had learned that the defendant had entered the Capitol building during the riot on January 6. Def. Ex. M at 12. The first tipster also reported that, when confronted, the defendant did not deny entering the Capitol building and claimed that the Capitol police moved the barriers to let him into the building. Def. Ex. M. at 12. Second, the affidavit stated that, according to Verizon records, the defendant’s cell phone had connected, during the riot, to a cell site whose service area included the U.S. Capitol building’s interior. Def. Ex. M. at 12-13. Third, the affidavit reported that, in March 2021, investigators interviewed the first tipster. Def. Ex. M at 13. The tipster explained that, though he had not personally seen the Facebook post in which the defendant’s wife referred to the defendant entering the Capitol on January 6, he had seen a screenshot of the post, which a friend had sent to him. Id. The tipster also stated that he believed the defendant’s wife had deleted the Facebook post shortly after posting it. Id. And the affidavit included a screenshot of text messages that the tipster exchanged with the defendant and his wife after learning of the defendant’s participation in the riot. Id. In the exchange, the defendant did not deny entering the Capitol; in fact, he implied the opposite, stating that he saw no violence, and that Capitol police removed barriers and let people in. Def. Ex. M. at 14 (Aff. ¶ 42). Fourth, the affidavit reported that, in September 2021, the tipster identified the defendant in a still photograph obtained from the Capitol Police closed-circuit surveillance system: Def. Ex. M at 15. Fifth, the affidavit explained that investigators placed the same individual depicted in the photograph above at various locations inside the U.S. Capitol Building during the January 6 riot. Def. Ex. M. at 15-23. The affidavit included 10 supporting screenshots, complete with descriptions of the events depicted in the photographs. See Def. Ex. M at 16-23. Finally, the affidavit reported that, according to a Capitol Police officer who arrested the defendant inside the Capitol, the defendant was found in possession of two knives and pepper spray, which were seized. Ex. M, at 19. Even without the geofence evidence, the affidavit contained ample evidence of probable cause.

There are other arrest affidavits that, at least as described, start with the identification in the Google GeoFence (here’s one example). Some even suggest that leads based off GeoFence hits were sent to field offices to chase down. While there are no arrests based entirely on the GeoFence, defendants arrested after an investigation that started from a GeoFence lead would seem to be better situated to challenge the GeoFence.

In any case, the unique conditions at the Capitol on January 6, based on the fact that any unauthorized person who entered the Capitol was likely breaking the law, are unlikely to be replicated anytime in the future.

So whether or not this is sustained (and the warrants based on it would be sustained on good faith grounds), it’s unlikely to be a precedent for other GeoFences.

1,500 Investigative Subjects: A Competent Google GeoFence Motion to Suppress for January 6

For some time, I’ve been waiting for a January 6 defendant to (competently) challenge the use of a Google GeoFence as one means to identify them as a participant in January 6. (There have been incompetent efforts from John Pierce, and Matthew Bledsoe unsuccessfully challenged the GeoFence of people who livestreamed on Facebook.)

The motion to suppress from David Rhine may be that challenge. Rhine was charged only with trespassing (though he was reportedly stopped, searched, and found to be carrying two knives and pepper spray, but ultimately released).

As described in his arrest affidavit, Rhine was first identified via two relatively weak tips and a Verizon warrant. But somewhere along the way, the FBI used the general GeoFence warrant they obtained on everyone in the Capitol that day. Probably using that (which shows where people went inside the Capitol), the FBI found him on a bunch of surveillance video, with his face partly obscured with a hat and hoodie.

The motion to suppress, written by Tacoma Federal Public Defender Rebecca Fish, attempts to build off a ruling in the case of Okello Chatrie (and integrates materials from his case) to get the GeoFence used to identify Rhine and everything that stemmed from it thrown out.

The three-step GeoFence Warrant and the returns specific to Rhine are sealed in the docket.

But the MTS provides a bunch of the details of how the FBI used a series of warrants to GeoFence the crime scene.

First, as Step 1, it got a list of devices at the Capitol during the breach, either as recorded in current records, or as recorded just after the attack. At this stage, FBI got just identifiers used for this purpose, not subscriber numbers.

The geofence warrant requested and authorized here collected an alarming breadth of personal data. In Step 1, the warrant directed Google to use its location data to “identify those devices that it calculated were or could have been (based on the associated margin of error for the estimated latitude/longitude point) within the TARGET LOCATION” during a four-and-a-half hour period, from 2:00 p.m. until 6:30 p.m. Ex. A at 6. The target location—the geofence—included the Capitol Building and the area immediately surrounding it, id. at 5, which covers approximately 4 acres of land, id. at 13. Indeed, the warrant acknowledges that “[t]o identify this data, Google runs a computation against all stored Location History coordinates for all Google account holders to determine which records match the parameters specified by the warrant.” Ex. A at 26 (emphasis added). Though not spelled out with clarity in the warrant itself, the warrant ordered that the list provided in step 1 not include subscriber information, but that such information may be ordered at a later step. See id. at 6; see also id. at 25 (“This process will initially collect a limited data set that includes only anonymous account identifiers, dates, times, and locations.”).

This yielded 5,723 unique devices (note, the MTS points to Google filings from the Chatrie case to argue that only a third of Google’s users turn on this location service).

Google ultimately identified 5,653 unique Device IDs that “were or could have been” within the geofence, responsive to the first step of the warrant. Ex. B (step 2 warrant and application) at 6. However, Google additionally searched location history data that Google preserved the evening of January 6. When searching this data, as opposed to the current data for active users at the time of the search, Google produced a list of 5,716 devices that were or could have been within the geofence during the relevant time period. Id. Google additionally searched location history data that Google preserved on January 7. When searching this data, Google produced a list of 5,721 devices that were or could have been within the geofence during the relevant time period. Id. The three lists combined yielded a total of 5,723 unique devices that Google estimated were or could have been in the geofence during the four-and-a-half hour period requested. Id. at 7.

In Step 2, the FBI asked Google to identify devices that had been present at the Capitol before or after the attack — an attempt to find those who were there legally. That weeded the list of potentially suspect devices to 5,518.

In this case, the second step of the geofence warrant was also done in bulk, given the lack of specificity as to the people sought. In the initial warrant, the Court ordered Google to make additional lists to eliminate some people who were presumptively within the geofence and committed no crimes. First, the warrant ordered Google to make a list of devices within the geofence from 12:00 p.m. to 12:15 p.m. on January 6. And second, the warrant ordered Google to make a list of devices within the geofence from 9:00 p.m. to 9:15 p.m. Ex. A at 6.

[snip]

Google provided these lists to the government in addition to the lists detailed above. Google identified 176 devices that were or could have been within the geofence between 12:00 p.m. and 12:15 p.m., and 159 devices that were or could have been within the geofence between 9:00 p.m. and 9:15 p.m. Ex. B at 6. The government ultimately subtracted these devices from those that they deemed suspect. Id. at 7. However, this still left 5,518 unique devices under the government’s suspicion. See id. The original warrant contemplated the removal of devices that were present at the window before and after the primary geofence time because the government asserted that the early and late windows were times when no suspects were in the Capitol Building, but legislators and staff were lawfully present. Ex. A at 27. However, the original warrant also indicated that “The government [would] review these lists in order to identify information, if any, that is not evidence of crime (for example, information pertaining to devices moving through the Target Location(s) in a manner inconsistent with the facts of the underlying case).” Ex. A at 6.

Aside from comparing the primary list with the lists for the early and late windows, the government appeared to do no culling of the device list based on movement. Rather, the government used other criteria to decide which devices to target for a request for subscriber information. 3.

The government then asked for the subscriber information of anyone who showed up at least once inside the Capitol (as the MTS notes, Google’s confidence levels on this identification is 68%). That identified 1,498 devices.

In step 3, as relevant to this case,4 the government sought subscriber information—meaning the phone number, google account, or other identifying information associated with the device—for two different categories of people. First, the government sought subscriber information for any device for which there was a single data point that had a display ratio entirely within the geofence. Ex. B at 7. In other words, the government sought identifying information for any device for which Google was 68 percent confident the device was somewhere within the geofence at a single moment during the four-and-a-half hour geofence period. Again, the government equated presence to criminality. The government sought and the warrant ordered Google to provide identifying information on 1,498 devices (and likely people) based on this theory. See id.

It also asked for subscriber information from anyone who had deleted location history in the week after the attack, which yielded another 37 devices.

Second, the government sought identifying subscriber information for any device where location history appeared to have been deleted between January 6 or 7 and January 13, and had at least one data point where even part of the display radius was within the geofence. See Ex. B at 7–8. The government agent asserted that such devices likely had evidence of criminality because: “Based on my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that criminals will delete their Google accounts and/or their Google location data after they commit criminal acts to protect themselves from law enforcement.” Id. at 8.

[snip]

The theory that potentially changed privacy settings or a deleted account as indicative of criminality led the government to request identifying information for 37 additional devices (and likely people). Ex. B at 8.

The MTS notes that at a later time, the FBI expanded the scope of the GeoFence for which they were seeking subscriber information, but that’s not applicable to Rhine.

4 Discovery indicates that the government later sought substantially more data from geofences in areas next to, but wholly outside of, the Capitol Building. However, Mr. Rhine addresses here the warrants and searches most relevant to his case.

The GeoFence was one of a number of things used to get the warrant to search Rhine’s house and digital devices.

I’ll hold off on assessing the legal merit of this MTS (though I do plan to share it with a bunch of Fourth Amendment lawyers).

For now, what is the best summary I know of how the known Google GeoFence reveals how the FBI used it: first obtaining non-subscriber identifiers for everyone in the Capitol, removing those who were by logic legally present before the attack, and then obtaining subscriber information that was used for further investigation.

And that GeoFence yielded 1,500 potential investigative subjects, which may be only be a third of Google users present (though would also by definition include a lot of people — victims and first responders — who were legally present). Which would suggest 4,500 people were inside the Google GeoFence that day, and (using the larger numbers) 15,000 were in the vicinity.

As I keep saying, the legal application here is very different in the Chatrie case, because everyone inside the Capitol was generally trespassing, a victim, a journalist, or a first responder.

To make things more interesting, Rudolph Contreras, who is the FISA Court presiding judge, is the judge in this case. He undoubtedly knows of similar legal challenges that are not public from his time on FISC.

Which may make this legal challenge of potentially significant import.

Did Kash Patel Already Confess to Illegally Disseminating Carter Page FISA Information?

I’m pretty proud of how closely my two posts (first, second) predicted what the likely and known contents of the Trump affidavit would be. I pretty accurately described the structure, the contents, and many of the known details of what we’ve seen of the application so far.

That’s especially true of the statutory section. I not only predicted that — “Particularly given the novel legal issues implicating a search of the former President” — there would be a substantial statutory background section, but that, “If there’s a version of this statutory language, it may be among the things DOJ would acquiesce to releasing.”

Which they did.

And, to a significant extent, I predicted what would be in that statutory section. Here is that section of my post, with the paragraphs of the Trump affidavit where that language appears in bold and linked.

Everything I expected to be in there, was in there. The details I didn’t anticipate, though, are pretty noteworthy.

That’s particularly true of the section describing special designations. These designations all stem from what the FBI found in the 15 boxes Trump returned in January.

From May 16-18, 2022, FBI agents conducted a preliminary review of the FIFTEEN BOXES provided to NARA and identified documents with classification markings in fourteen of the FIFTEEN BOXES. A preliminary triage of the documents with classification markings revealed the following approximate numbers: 184 unique documents bearing classification markings, including 67 documents marked as CONFIDENTIAL, 92 documents marked as SECRET, and 25 documents marked as TOP SECRET. Further, the FBI agents observed markings reflecting the following compartments/dissemination controls: HCS, FISA, ORCON, NOFORN, and SI. Based on my training and experience, I know that documents classified at these levels typically contain NDI. Several of the documents also contained what appears to be FPOTUS ‘s handwritten notes.

If the FBI found a document of a particular type in May, it included that designation in this statutory section.

The Atomic Energy Act was not included, which means (as some knowledgable people predicted in advance), if Trump had nuke documents, they’re not about our nukes, they’re about someone else’s. Trump’s affidavit also includes a description of HCS and SI, Human and Signals Intelligence, designations which have appropriately sobered the response of at least some Republicans, because they mean Trump could get someone killed.

The mention of ORCON — Originator Controlled material — would mostly matter if the FBI found that one of NSA documents that Mike Ellis was sharing with unauthorized people and places during the period Trump was packing up were among the things in the boxes. Those documents were both described as relating to (a or some), “controlled, compartmented NSA program,” in the Inspector General Report on Ellis and the designation ORCON would matter more if documents were retained after the Originator made a sustained effort to get them back, as NSA did in this case.

It’s the mention of FISA, though, that I should have anticipated, and which could present heightened legal problems for Trump — and Kash Patel, and others.

14. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or “FISA,” is a dissemination control designed to protect intelligence information derived from the collection of information authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or “FISC.”

That’s because both Kash and John Solomon have been attempting to create an alibi for information that may include the final Carter Page application. And, as that preliminary review determined, there was at least one FISA document in the boxes returned in January.

On top of any violations of the Espionage Act, if Trump took a copy of that with him after he was fired, it might constitute unlawful dissemination under FISA.

Between them, Kash and Solomon — whom Trump made his representatives to NARA on June 19 — have described that materials relating to the Russian investigation were among those NARA found in the returned boxes and that they might include a Carter Page FISA warrant (which I assume must mean the application).

There’s the May 5 column in which Kash claimed that everything that had been returned in the 15 boxes had been declassified.

“Trump declassified whole sets of materials in anticipation of leaving government that he thought the American public should have the right to read themselves,” Patel told Breitbart News in a phone interview.

“The White House counsel failed to generate the paperwork to change the classification markings, but that doesn’t mean the information wasn’t declassified,” Patel said. “I was there with President Trump when he said ‘We are declassifying this information.’”

In that column, Kash exhibited knowledge that the materials included documents from “Russiagate” [sic] and Impeachment 1.0.

“It’s information that Trump felt spoke to matters regarding everything from Russiagate to the Ukraine impeachment fiasco to major national security matters of great public importance — anything the president felt the American people had a right to know is in there and more.”

That’s the column cited in the Trump affidavit — though there’s at least one sentence of that paragraph that remains redacted.

I am aware of an article published in Breitbart on May 5, 2022, available at https://www.breitbart.com/politicsi2022i05/05/documents-mar-a-lago-marked-classified-wereah-eadv-declassifi.ed-kash-patel-savs/, which states that Kash Patel, who is described as a former top FPOTUS administration official, characterized as ”misleading” reports in other news organizations that NARA had found classified materials among records that FPOTUS provided to NARA from Mar-a-Lago. Patel alleged that such reports were misleading because FPOTUS had declassified the materials at issue. [redacted]

Kash has issued a statement complaining, even though he had no complaint when information about Michael Isikoff was unsealed in the Carter Page FISA application for a similar published statement.

More interesting still, on July 20, John Solomon (who did a podcast on January 14, 2021 bragging of detailed knowledge of what Russian investigation materials would be released in the coming days) described having newly obtained a January 20, 2021 Mark Meadows memo to DOJ instructing them to declassify documents from the Russian investigation.

Even though the Meadows memo cites from Trump’s own January 19, 2021 order stating that the declassification, “does not extend to materials that must be protected from disclosure pursuant to orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,” Solomon described that the declassified information did include both transcripts of “intercepts made by the FBI of Trump aides,” (which may have included the intercepts of Mike Flynn obtained by targeting Sergey Kislyak which, because the intercepts took place in the US, may have been conducted under FISA) and “a declassified copy of the final FISA warrant approved by an intelligence court.”

The declassified documents included transcripts of intercepts made by the FBI of Trump aides, a declassified copy of the final FISA warrant approved by an intelligence court, and the tasking orders and debriefings of the two main confidential human sources, Christopher Steele and Stefan Halper, the bureau used to investigate whether Trump had colluded with Russia to steal the 2016 election.

In the end, multiple investigations found there was no such collusion and that the FBI violated rules and misled the FISA court in an effort to keep the probe going.

The documents that Trump declassified never saw the light of day, even though they were lawfully declassified by Trump and the DOJ was instructed by the president though Meadows to expeditiously release them after redacting private information as necessary. [my emphasis]

Curiously, the PDF of the Mark Meadows memo Solomon linked (my link) — which includes a staple mark and other oddities for an original document preserved by NARA — shows a September 27, 2021 creation date, with a modification date just days after Trump designated Solomon as his representative at NARA. (h/t @z3dster for the observation)

Back to Solomon’s implication that the documents in question — documents that Kash had suggested were among those boxed and sent back to NARA — included the final Carter Page warrant.

If the former President’s stash included an unredacted copy of the final FISA application targeting Carter Page, it could mean additional trouble for him and anyone else involved.

Even a Kislyak intercept would, because it would impact Mike Flynn’s privacy.

Similarly, even if, after three years of effort led largely by Kash Patel, an Inspector General hadn’t deemed the Carter Page FISA applications problematic, Trump took the Carter Page warrant application home after he left office, it would be an egregious violation of FISA’s minimization procedures, which strictly limit how such material can be disseminated. A disgruntled former government’s employee’s desire to spread propaganda about his tenure is not among the approved dissemination purposes.

But Carter Page, almost uniquely of any American surveilled under FISA, has special protections against such things happening.

That’s because in the wake of the IG Report on Carter Page, and in the wake of Bill Barr’s DOJ withdrawing its claim of probable cause for the last two Page warrants, James Boasberg required the government to ensure that materials for which there might not have been probable cause were no longer disseminated. In issuing that order, Boasberg cited 50 USC 1809(a)(2), the part of FISA that makes it a crime, punishable by a five year sentence, to disseminate improperly collected material from a targeted person. As a result, in June 2020, Boasberg issued an order sequestering the material collected from the Carter Page FISA except for five designated purposes.

Indulging the former President’s tantrum is not one of those five purposes.

And Trump and Kash, especially, have reason to know about this sequester. That’s because in October 2020 — at a time when Kash was still babysitting John Ratcliffe at DNI — DOJ violated the sequester by sharing information on Page with the Jeffrey Jensen and John Durham inquiries. As far as we know, that violation of the sequester order didn’t result in surveillance records on Carter Page being stored in a poorly secured storage closet in a resort hotel, but it still involved a hearing before the FISC and a public scolding.

If there’s an unredacted copy of the Page application, it would mean sections like this and this would be unsealed. There’s even a description of the emails that Page sent to the campaign bragging about his access to top Russian officials that, because of how it came to be in the application, would be subject to Boasberg’s sequestration order. There might even be contacts that Page had with Steve Bannon, whose privacy would also be implicated. Disseminating any of that stuff in unredacted form is, by itself, a crime, one the FISC has warned Trump and Kash’s bosses about repeatedly.

In his January 2021 podcast, Solomon claimed that the material Trump wanted to release would prove he was spied on. To show that from materials relating to Carter Page would require sharing information specifically covered by the sequestration order. Shipping that from the White House to Mar-a-Lago would be a crime. Sharing it from there would definitely be a crime. And any authorization would have to involve the FISA Court. No President — not Trump and not Biden — can lawfully ignore that order.

Since at least May, both Kash and Solomon seem frantic to help Trump develop a cover story. And their frantic efforts seem to explicitly include materials pertaining to Carter Page.

And that’s why the confirmation that Trump had FISA materials in his stolen boxes could present additional headaches for the former President and his flunkies.

Baloney and Blackjack! A John Pierce Client Complains of Paying Too Much for What Had Been Free

It’s time to check in with John Pierce’s accumulation of January 6 clients.

The other day, the attorney who got fired by Kyle Rittenhouse apparently swapped family members to expand his docket. Pierce withdrew from the case of Jonah Westbury, who is charged, by himself, with trespassing. At virtually the same time, Pierce was making his first appearance in the case of Isaac and Robert Westbury and Aaron James, replacing lawyers for all three. Isaac Westbury and Aaron James are charged with civil disorder and assault, and all three are charged with trespassing. When Rudolph Contreras was sorting all this out a status hearing, Pierce explained, “ I think we’re up to 21, your honor!!!,” like a kid who has gotten his first 21 in blackjack. (h/t MK for the observation) Though unless not all his clients are noticed on the docket, he’s at 20 as of November 1.

Here are those 20, along with the clients who dropped him along the way:

Christopher Worrell: Christopher Worrell is a Proud Boy from Florida arrested on March 12. Worrell traveled to DC for the December MAGA protest, where he engaged in confrontational behavior targeting a journalist. He and his girlfriend traveled to DC for January 6 in vans full of Proud Boys paid for by someone else. He was filmed spraying pepper spray at cops during a key confrontation before the police line broke down and the initial assault surged past. Worrell was originally charged for obstruction and trespassing, but later indicted for assault and civil disorder and trespassing (dropping the obstruction charge). He was deemed a danger, in part, because of a 2009 arrest for impersonating a cop involving “intimidating conduct towards a total stranger in service of taking the law into his own hands.” Pierce first attempted to file a notice of appearance on March 18. Robert Jenkins (along with John Kelly, from Pierce’s firm) is co-counsel on the case. Since Pierce joined the team, he has indulged Worrell’s claims that he should not be punished for assaulting a cop, but neither that indulgence nor a focus on Worrell’s non-Hodgkins lymphoma nor an appeal succeeded at winning his client release from pre-trial detention. While Pierce was hospitalized with COVID, Pierce submitted some filings attempting to get Worrell out of jail because he’s not getting medical care; the most recent filing not only thrice misstated what jail Worrell is in, but also admitted he has refused treatment at least five times. On September 24, Alex Stavrou replaced Pierce, and almost immediately found success that Pierce had lacked in getting Judge Royce Lamberth to believe that Worrell is not getting adequate medical treatment in the DC jail.

1. William Pepe: William Pepe is a Proud Boy charged in a conspiracy with Dominic Pezzola and Matthew Greene for breaching the initial lines of defense and, ultimately, the first broken window of the Capitol. Pepe was originally arrested on January 11, though is out on bail. Pierce joined Robert Jenkins on William Pepe’s defense team on March 25. By April, Pierce was planning on filing some non-frivolous motions (to sever his case from Pezzola, to move it out of DC, and to dismiss the obstruction count), but not much has happened since.

2. Paul Rae: Rae is another of Pierce’s Proud Boy defendants and his initial complaint suggested Rae could have been (and could still be) added to the conspiracy indictments against the Proud Boys already charged. He was indicted along with Arthur Jackman for obstruction and trespassing; both tailed Joe Biggs on January 6, entering the building from the East side after the initial breach. Pierce filed to join Robert Jenkins in defending Rae on March 30.

3. Stephanie Baez: On June 9, Pierce filed his appearance for Stephanie Baez. Pierce’s interest in Baez’ case makes a lot of sense. Baez, who was arrested on trespassing charges on June 4, seems to have treated the January 6 insurrection as an opportunity to shop for her own Proud Boy boyfriend. Plus, she’s attractive, unrepentant, and willing to claim there was no violence on January 6. Baez was formally charged with trespassing on August 4.

Victoria White: White was detained briefly on January 6 then released, and then arrested on April 8 on civil disorder and trespassing charges. At one point on January 6, she was filmed trying to dissuade other rioters from breaking windows, but then she was filmed close to and then in the Tunnel cheering on some of the worst assault. Pierce filed his notice of appearance in White’s case on June 10. On September 3, while Pierce was in the hospital with COVID, White told Judge Faruqui she didn’t want Pierce to represent her anymore.

Ryan Samsel: After consulting with Joe Biggs, Ryan Samsel kicked off the riot by approaching the first barriers and — with several other defendants — knocking over a female cop, giving her a concussion. He was arrested on January 30 and is still being held on his original complaint charging him with assault and civil disorder. He’s obviously a key piece to the investigation and for some time it appeared the government might have been trying to persuade him that the way to minimize his significant exposure (he has an extensive criminal record) would be to cooperate against people like Biggs. But then he was brutally assaulted in jail. Detainees have claimed a guard did it, and given that Samsel injured a cop, that wouldn’t be unheard of. But Samsel seemed to say in a recent hearing that the FBI had concluded it was another detainee. In any case, the assault set off a feeding frenzy among trial attorneys seeking to get a piece of what they imagine will be a huge lawsuit against BOP (as it should be if a guard really did assault him). Samsel is now focused on getting medical care for eye and arm injuries arising from the assault. And if a guard did do this, then it would be a key part of any story Pierce wanted to tell. After that feeding frenzy passed, Pierce filed an appearance on June 14, with Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui releasing his prior counsel on June 25. Samsel is a perfect defendant for Pierce, though (like Rittenhouse), the man badly needs a serious defense attorney. On July 27, Samsel informed Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui that he would be retaining new counsel.

4. James McGrew: McGrew was arrested on May 28 for assault, civil disorder, obstruction, and trespassing, largely for some fighting with cops inside the Rotunda. His arrest documents show no ties to militias, though his arrest affidavit did reference a 2012 booking photo, he has some drug-related crimes, and he violated probation in the period before he was arrested. Pierce filed his appearance to represent McGrew on June 16, and he’s currently trying to get McGrew bailed by arguing he wasn’t assaulting cops, he was looking for his mother. Update: Chief Judge Howell denied the effort to reopen detention fairly resoundingly.

Alan Hostetter: John Pierce filed as Hostetter’s attorney on June 24, not long after Hostetter was indicted with five other Three Percenters in a conspiracy indictment paralleling those charging the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys. Hostetter was also active in Southern California’s anti-mask activist community, a key network of January 6 participants. Hostetter and his defendants spoke more explicitly about bringing arms to the riot, and his co-defendant Russell Taylor spoke at the January 5 rally. On August 3, even before Pierce’s bout with COVID halted his relentless acquisition of new Jan 6 clients, Hostetter replaced Pierce, and Hostetter has since gotten permission to represent himself.

5, 6, 7. On June 30, Pierce filed to represent David Lesperance, and James and Casey Cusick. As I laid out here, the FBI arrested the Cusicks, a father and son that run a church, largely via information obtained from Lesperance, their parishioner. They were originally separately charged (LesperanceJames CusickCasey Cusick), all with just trespassing, but have since been joined in one case. The night before the riot, father and son posed in front of the Trump Hotel with a fourth person besides Lesperance (though Lesperance likely took the photo).

Kenneth Harrelson: On July 1, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Harrelson, who was first arrested on March 10. Leading up to January 6, Harrelson played a key role in Oath Keepers’ organizing in Florida, particularly meetings organized on GoToMeeting. On the day of the riot, Kelly Meggs had put him in charge of coordinating with state teams. Harrelson was on the East steps of the Capitol with Jason Dolan during the riot, as if waiting for the door to open and The Stack to arrive; with whom he entered the Capitol. With Meggs, Harrelson moved first towards the Senate, then towards Nancy Pelosi’s office. When the FBI searched his house upon his arrest, they found an AR-15 and a handgun, as well as a go-bag with a semi-automatic handgun and survivalist books, including Ted Kaczynski’s writings. Harrelson attempted to delete a slew of his Signal texts, including a video he sent Meggs showing the breach of the East door. Pierce attempted to get Harrelson out on bail by joining in the bail motion of one of his co-defendants, which may either show how little he knows about defense work or how little he cares. On October 8, Harrelson replaced Pierce with Brad Geyer, and anti-vaxxer who just got slapped down by Amit Mehta for trying to make this case about that, instead of attacking democracy.

MINUTE ORDER denying Defendant KENNETH HARRELSON (10) and KELLY MEGGS’s (8) [476] Motion for Enlargement of Page Limit. Whatever motion Defendants intend to file, the court will stop reading it after page 45. See LCrR 47(e). The court will not allow this case to become a forum for bombastic arguments (“SCOTUS Could Not Have Foreseen the Holocaust,” see ECF No. 476-2, at 1) or propagating fringe views about COVID-19 or vaccinations (“A Human Experiment Unlike Any Other,” “Pseudo-Science Displaces Science,” “Mandatory Everything,” “C19 Conspiracy Structure,” see ECF No. 476-2, at 2). To this court’s knowledge, the D.C. Department of Corrections does not require any person held there to accept a COVID-19 vaccine. If that is the intended basis of Defendants’ motion, they must file a brief of no more than five pages (excluding exhibits) establishing such a mandatory policy before the court will accept a longer filing. Signed by Judge Amit P. Mehta on 11/01/2021.

8. Leo Brent Bozell IV: It was, perhaps, predictable that Pierce would add Bozell to his stable of defendants. “Zeeker” Bozell is the scion of a right wing movement family including his father who has made a killing by attacking the so-called liberal media, and his grandfather, who was a speech writer for Joseph McCarthy. Because Bozell was released on personal recognizance there are details of his actions on January 6 that remain unexplained. But he made it to the Senate chamber, and while there, made efforts to prevent CSPAN cameras from continuing to record the proceedings. He was originally arrested on obstruction and trespassing charges on February 12; his indictment added an abetting the destruction of government property charge, the likes of which have been used to threaten a terrorism enhancement against militia members. Pierce joined Bozell’s defense team (thus far it seems David B. Deitch will remain on the team) on July 6.

9. Nate DeGrave: DeGrave is part of what I’ve called the “disorganized militia” conspiracy, a handful of guys who met online, ordered a bunch of gear from Amazon, and then happened to be at several key places — the East Door of the Capitol and the Senate — during the riot.The night before DeGrave’s quasi co-conspirator Josiah Colt pled guilty as part of a cooperation agreement, July 13, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Nate DeGrave.

10 and 11. Nathaniel Tuck and Kevin Tuck: On July 19, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Nathaniel Tuck, the Florida former cop Proud Boy. On July 20, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Kevin Tuck, Nathaniel’s father and still an active duty cop when he was charged. This means he represents three of the people charged, together but in a conspiracy, for tagging along behind Joe Biggs the day of the riot.

12. Peter Schwartz: On July 26, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Peter Schwartz, a felon out on COVID-release accused of macing some cops.

13. Jeramiah Caplinger: On July 26, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Jeramiah Caplinger, who drove from Michigan and carried a flag on a tree branch through the Capitol.

Deborah Lee: On August 23, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Deborah Lee, who was arrested on trespass charges months after her friend Michael Rusyn. On September 2, Lee chose to be represented by public defender Cara Halverson.

14. Shane Jenkins: On August 25, Pierce colleague Ryan Marshall showed up at a status hearing for Jenkins and claimed a notice of appearance for Pierce had been filed the night before. In that same hearing, he revealed that Pierce was in a hospital with COVID, even claiming he was on a ventilator and not responsive. The notice of appearance was filed, using Pierce’s electronic signature, on August 30, just as DOJ started sending out notices that all Pierce cases were on hold awaiting signs of life. Jenkins is a felon accused of bringing a tomahawk to the Capitol and participating in the Lower West Tunnel assaults on cops.

15. Anthony Sargent: On September 25, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Sargent, yet another Florida Proud Boy, this one who tried to breach the North Doors.

16. David Mehaffie: On October 12, dubbed #TunnelCommander by online researchers and charged with orchestrating some of the worst fighting in the Tunnel, David Mehaffie, fired his superb public defender Sabrina Shroff and hired John Pierce.

17: Ronald McAbee: On October 25, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Ronald McAbee, a former Georgia Sheriff with ties to the Three Percenters charged in a sweeping indictment of those who dragged some cops out of the Tunnel and beat them.

Jonah Westbury: On October 26, Pierce filed a notice of appearance for Jonah Westbury and then, three days later, on October 29, he dropped off the case. I wonder if he just got the wrong Westbury family member?

18, 19, 20: Also on October 26, Pierce filed a notice to replace the existing lawyers for Isaac and Robert Westbury and Aaron James.

As I’ve noted in the past, John Pierce appears to believe he can gaslight his way to liberating these clients — or at least profiting wildly along the way.

Witness the bullshit narrative that one of his clients, Nate DeGrave, has released from jail, as tweeted out by Brad Geyer. Nates the one in this video wearing the all-black armor, and Ronnie Sandlin, the guy in orange, is his alleged co-conspirator. Other rioters tried to restrain DeGrave here.

DeGrave’s letter from jail is a transparent attempt to make false claims to sustain a fairy tale that he and others in the DC jail are 1) being detained merely for protesting and 2) being treated any differently from other people in the DC jail, including some who, because of COVID, have been there even longer than Jan6ers have.

One of his complaints is that he’s being fed baloney sandwiches, which he says is causing him to starve and/or spend money at the commissary.

We are undergoing SEVERE NUTRITIONAL DEFICIENCIES and STARVATION. For breakfast this morning, I received a tray of flavorless paste, two slices of bread, and a slice of bologna. Lunches usually consist of rice and beans, but we’ll get cold chicken/beef patties if we are lucky. For dinner, we are sometimes fed a diet of cheese sandwiches, and bologna and cheese 4 to 5 times per week. Without commissary, people like myself are FORCED TO STARVE.

He also asserts that the around 40 of Jan6ers in the DC jail (which includes at least one and possibly several Black men) are not white supremacists, but then describes the guards as “liberal migrants,” white supremacist code.

And last but not least, we experience racism from many guards on a daily basis, being the ONLY WHITE REPUBLICANS in the entire jail.

The false narrative is has been passed around the jail and to corrections officers that we are “white supremacists” (we are NOT). The inmate population is predominantly black, so we are at risk being here because of this false narrative. The guards are mostly liberal migrants from Africa who have been conditioned to hate us, and hate America. Jan 6ers have been mocked, beaten and ridiculed by guards for singing the National Anthem.

Much of what DeGrave complains about, though, are COVID restrictions that apply equally to other detainees at the jail, but which Jan6ers likely have exacerbated because so many of them are anti-vaxxers.

For the first 120 days in DC’s Gitmo, Jan 6ers experienced DAILY LOCKDOWNS for 23-24 HOURS before being allowed to leave our small 120 sq. ft cell.

[snip]

Masks are WEAPONIZED and used against us, even though we NEVER leave the facility. Officers have walked in with the SOLE INTENTION of needing to write 20-30 disciplinary reports against Jan 6ers, which adversely effects our chances of release and causes loss of privileges, phone time and commissary. Masks need to be covering both the nose and mouth AT ALL TIMES or we are threatened and locked down in our cells. Jan 6ers are always respectful to the employees around us, but C.Os maintain the need to invent reasons for discipline.

[snip]

If it’s a legal visit, we are placed in a 14 day quarantine, with no out of cell time; EVEN IF your attorney is VACCINATED and tests NEGATIVE for Covid.

Visits with friends or family members, for unvaccinated inmates, are NEVER ALLOWED. As a result, many people have skipped critical meetings with their council, and NEVER get an opportunity to see friends or family.

Mostly though, DeGrave is angry that after participating in an attack on the Capitol, including two alleged assaults on cops, he is being detained as a threat to the community and flight risk, which — it turns out — has consequences, including being kicked off social media by private corporations that don’t want to host seditious content.

And the jail MUST PAY for what they are doing to this country’s citizens. As a result of this unlawful detainment the last 9 months, I have lost everything. The successful business I spent 13 years of my life working on, my apartment in Las Vegas, social media accounts with a lifetime of memories…you name it. The government has essentially CANCELLED ME. Not only that, but following the arrest, my best friend of 12 years robbed my apartment, stole my cat, and hacked my personal Instagram with 100,000+ followers.

At the end of the letter comes the grift — the ask for financial help, in part to pay for commissary so he doesn’t have to eat baloney sandwiches, in part for what he deems, “legal expenses.”

If there’s anything you can do to help, I would appreciate anything at all.

Inmates here are being extorted with lack of nutrition, forcing me to spend most of what’s left on commissary which I can no longer afford. I need desperate help with my legal expenses and just help staying alive in here with commissary and all the expenses I still have on the outside as my livelihood and life has been stripped away from me. Thank you for any her you can afford, even if it is a few dollars it goes a long way in here.

It’s possible what DeGrave really wants is funding to profit off this grift — that has been the case in the past with John Pierce’s other indentured defendants.

But since DeGrave is suggesting that he needs money for his legal expenses — suggesting he needs money to pay John Pierce — it’s worth noting that DeGrave (like an growing number of Pierce’s clients) had good public defenders (like Shroff) or CJA counsel, like Joanne Slaight, who represented DeGrave from when he was arrested in January until Pierce took over in July. Slaight’s the one, not Pierce, who made a sustained effort to get DeGrave released on bail. Pierce has done little since he took over (hampered, no doubt, by his bout with COVID and the fact that one of his key assistants is not permitted to practice law). He has joined Ronnie Sandlin’s challenge to the application of 1512, but his efforts are among the more frivolous in what is otherwise a legitimate challenge to this application, arguing as it does that the entire vote certification is unconstitutional and that the means by which “corruptly” has been adjudged is “legal sophistry.”

But the solemn and formal proceedings relied upon by the government are on their face unconstitutional and following through with those proceedings was an unlawful act.

[snip]

A system of laws cannot function on the government’s proffered mechanism for distinguishing lawful from unlawful obstruction in this circumstance — “The jury will figure it out.” It is legal sophistry to claim that the defects in the statute raised by this motion will be solved by this Court fashioning instructions for a lay jury to distinguish “corrupt” obstruction from “noncorrupt” obstruction.

In other words, Pierce appears to have done more to encourage DeGrave to disseminate false claims about his own actions than what the taxpayer funded lawyer who preceded him did. And DeGrave at least claims that gaslighting serves, in part, to pay Pierce.

Felipe Marquez’ Plugged-In Misdemeanor Guilty Plea

Seven January 6 defendants are known to have pled guilty on Friday:

  • (Reportedly, though it hasn’t been docketed yet) Terry Brown, the last of a group of people arrested in the Capitol Visitor’s Center the day of the riot to plead out
  • Brandon Harrison and Douglas Wangler, who traveled to DC from Illinois together and, after Trump’s rally, walked to the Capitol and entered the East door after the Oath Keepers had already done so; they saw a pile of wood on the floor when they entered
  • Brandon and Stephanie Miller, an Ohio couple who bragged about witnessing history on Facebook
  • Cleveland Meredith Jr, who showed up — armed, but late — to insurrection but made credible threats against Nancy Pelosi (and did something else that remains sealed)
  • Felipe Marquez, who drove his Tesla Model 3 from Miami and claimed while inside the Capitol that, “we only broke some windows”

The Meredith plea — the only one that wasn’t a misdemeanor trespassing plea — was pretty interesting because his prosecutors still haven’t revealed the substance of some sealed filings that will be taken into consideration at sentencing. Plus, Judge Amy Berman Jackson, who was threatened by Roger Stone and some Proud Boys two years before they teamed up to set off an attack on the Capitol, seemed unimpressed with Meredith’s claims that his threats against Pelosi weren’t all that serious.

But the Marquez plea may be more interesting over time. At the very least, that’s because he may mark a decision by DOJ to let edge obstruction defendants plead down to 18 USC 1752, the more serious of the two misdemeanor trespassing charges.

As I’ve laid out repeatedly, DOJ has used 18 USC 1512(c)(2), part of the crime of obstruction, to charge those who allegedly expressed the clear intent to prevent the vote certification with a felony. Upwards of 200 people, total, have been charged with obstruction, including Marquez. But among those charged with obstruction, there’s a great range of actions taken on January 6. Those charged include those who participated in a conspiracy — like Graydon Young and Josiah Colt, Jacob Chansley, who left ominous comments for Mike Pence on his dais seat and blew off repeated orders to vacate the Senate Chamber, and Paul Hodgkins, who brought his Trump flag to the Senate floor but left when the cops instructed him to.

I laid out here how Hodgkins, after he was the first to plead guilty, was sentenced to 8 months in prison after getting a three level enhancement for significantly obstructing the vote certification. But since that happened, at least ten different defendants have challenged this application of obstruction, posing difficult decisions for a number of judges.

Indeed, in the last several days, a number of defendants charged with obstruction have explicitly waived Speedy Trial rights to await the outcome of these challenges. That’s going to create a backlog in the already enormous logjam of January 6 defendants.

So I wonder whether DOJ will begin let the edge 1512 cases plead down to 1752. Particularly given judges’ apparent willingness to jail the misdemeanor defendants, for defendants not given a “significant obstruction” enhancement like Hodgkins got, the sentencing guideline is not that different, with up to a year available under 1752 (and probation after that), versus a range of 8 to 14 months on obstruction (that in reality might be closer to 3 to 8 months). The primary (but nevertheless significant) difference would be the felony conviction.

To be clear, Marquez is not the first to plead down like this. Eliel Rosa pled to the less serious trespass charge, 40 USC 5104 after being charged with obstruction, but there may have been evidentiary reasons DOJ agreed to do that, and as an immigrant from Brazil, he risks deportation after his sentence in any case. Karl Dresch was charged with obstruction but pled to 5104 after serving six months in pre-trial confinement. Kevin Cordon, who was charged with obstruction but pled guilty at the same time as his brother — who was charged only with trespassing — pled to 1752 instead of obstruction, just like Marquez did.

In other words, in cases where there are other circumstances that make such a plea worthwhile to DOJ, they’re certainly willing to consider it.

Still, it’s possible that Marquez represents a shift on DOJ’s part to do that for more defendants, as part of an effort to avoid a big backlog pending the review of the 1512 charge.

Or, maybe not.

There were several other details of Marquez’ plea hearing of interest. The hearing started by talking about some kind of pretrial violation (possibly some kind of non-arrest run-in with law enforcement), which led to two new conditions being added to Marquez’s release, a mental health evaluation and a specific requirement to alert the government of any contact with law enforcement. That’s not how plea hearings usually start, but AUSA Jeffrey Nestler reaffirmed that DOJ wanted to go forward anyway. Judge Rudolph Contreras even asked whether the request for mental health evaluation raised questions about Marquez’ competency to plead guilty, though neither his attorney, Cara Halverson, nor Nestler, had any concerns about that.

Nestler, by the way, is one of the key prosecutors on the omnibus Oath Keeper case, and ably defended DOJ’s application of obstruction in that case in a hearing on Wednesday. Aside from that large group and cooperating Oath Keeper witness Caleb Berry, the only other January 6 case, besides Marquez’, that he is prosecuting is that of Guy Reffitt, who has ties to the 3%ers.

In addition to the oddities in Marquez’ plea hearing, there’s something not in his plea agreement that is standard boilerplate for all the plea agreements thus far: a cooperation paragraph. That paragraph is not a full cooperation agreement; rather, it simply requires the defendant to agree to be debriefed by the FBI. Here’s how it appears in Cordon’s plea agreement down from obstruction to 1752.

Your client agrees to allow law enforcement agents to review any social media accounts operated by your client for statements and postings in and around January 6, 2021, and conduct an interview of your client regarding the events in and around January 6, 2021 prior to sentencing.

Its absence suggests that Marquez has already been debriefed. Indeed, an April motion to continue the case described that the evidence against Marquez included, “social media data, cell phone extraction data, as well as custodial interview files,” suggesting he was interviewed on his arrest.

That Marquez may have already provided truthful information is of interest because he spent part of the riot in Jeff Merkley’s office. His statement of offense describes his actions there obliquely:

While inside the Capitol, Marquez entered the private “hideaway” office of Senator Merkley where he sat at a conference table with other rioters.

His arrest affidavit describes a video Marquez posted to Snapchat from his time there.

3:45 to 4:11 – This clip is from inside a conference room.2 Several people are seated and standing around a mahogany table. Some people say, “No stealing; don’t steal anything.” At 4:02, a hand is visible, holding a light-tan colored vape pen similar to the one MARQUEZ was holding in the car in the clip from 0:54 to 1:54. At 4:04, someone pushes over a table lamp and says, “Why would I want to steal this bullshit.”

4:11 to 4:20 (end) – In this clip MARQUEZ turns the camera lens to film himself. He is wearing a red “KEEP AMERICA GREAT” hat and has a yellow gaiter around his neck, similar to what he was wearing in the earlier clip from 0:54 to 1:54. MARQUEZ appears to still be indoors, with a distinctive blue piece of artwork – the same as seen in Senator Merkley’s hideaway office – on the wall behind him. This is a screenshot of MARQUEZ’s face from the video:

2 Based upon conversations with representatives of the United States Capitol Police, the conference room in which MARQUEZ is present appears to be Senate room S140, the private “hideaway” office of Senator Merkley within the U.S. Capitol. The artwork visible on the walls of the conference room in MARQUEZ’s Snapchat video is also visible on a video that Senator Merkley posted to Twitter on January 6, 2021, at 11:36 pm, documenting some of the damage to his office.

Still, none of these descriptions reveals what Marquez might have seen (and subsequently shared) while in Merkley’s office.

Presumably partly because there’s little to no security footage of what went down, the investigation into what happened in Merkley’s office is one of the most interesting subplots of the investigation. There have been a number of trespassers who seem to have been arrested just to get their footage of what happened.  There’s a defendant who has never been charged who was, nevertheless, given discovery on the laptop that got stolen from Merkley’s office. And in the last few weeks, Brandon Fellows (who like Marquez has been charged with just obstruction but spent time in Merkley’s office) got a CIPA notice, meaning the government wants to use classified evidence against him.

In short, we simply don’t know. There’s something interesting about this plea. But it’s unclear what that is.

Emmet Sullivan’s Revenge: Rupert Murdoch’s Rag Calls Mike Flynn’s Actions “Tantamount to Treason”

Once upon a time, Trump loyalists were thrilled that Judge Emmet Sullivan had gotten Mike Flynn’s case after Rudolph Contreras recused. They were sure that a judge who had fearlessly taken on prosecutorial abuse in the past would find prosecutorial abuse in the sweetheart False Statements charge that General Flynn got in lieu of a Foreign Agent charge.

In the days before Flynn’s scheduled sentencing two years ago, for example, Rupert Murdoch employee Kim Strassel stated with confidence that something had concerned the judge when he asked to see the documents Flynn claimed suggested misconduct.

It’s clear that something has concerned the judge—who likely sees obvious parallels to the Stevens case. The media was predicting a quick ruling in the Flynn case. Instead, Judge Sullivan issued new orders Wednesday, demanding to see for himself the McCabe memo and the Flynn 302. He also ordered the special counsel to hand over by Friday any other documents relevant to the Flynn-FBI meeting.

Given his history with the FBI, the judge may also have some questions about the curious date on the Flynn 302—Aug. 22, 2017, seven months after the interview. Texts from Mr. Strzok and testimony from Mr. Comey both suggest the 302 was written long before then. Was the 302 edited in the interim? If so, by whom, and at whose direction? FBI officials initially testified to Congress that the agents did not think Mr. Flynn had lied.

Judges have the ability to reject plea deals and require a prosecutor to make a case at trial. The criminal-justice system isn’t only about holding defendants accountable; trials also provide oversight of investigators and their tactics. And judges are not obliged to follow prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations.

Then Sullivan got questions on those issues answered and raised more pressing questions — such as what charges Flynn avoided with his plea deal.

COURT: All right. I really don’t know the answer to this question, but given the fact that the then-President of the United States imposed sanctions against Russia for interfering with federal elections in this country, is there an opinion about the conduct of the defendant the following days that rises to the level of treasonous activity on his part?

MR. VAN GRACK: The government did not consider — I shouldn’t say — I shouldn’t say did not consider, but in terms of the evidence that the government had at the time, that was not something that we were considering in terms of charging the defendant.

THE COURT: All right. Hypothetically, could he have been charged with treason?

MR. VAN GRACK: Your Honor, I want to be careful what I represent.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. VAN GRACK: And not having that information in front of me and because it’s such a serious question, I’m hesitant to answer it, especially because I think it’s different than asking if he could be charged under FARA or if there were other 1001 violations, for example. [my emphasis]

Those comments fed attacks from Fox News personalities in the two years that followed and Judge Sullivan became a more pointed target of employees of the News Corp empire. After he refused to immediately dismiss the prosecution against Mike Flynn, Fox personalities accused him of bias.

Sullivan earned the ire of Fox News hosts who have been arguing that Flynn’s prosecution was the canary in the coal mine of a coup against President Trump.

Former New York state judge Jeanine Pirro said Wednesday night that Sullivan should “recuse himself” from the case, adding “he should be embarrassed to put a robe on.”

“And now what he’s doing is he’s poisoning the 2020 election by trying to make it look like [Attorney General] Bill Barr,” she said. “He’s trying to destroy the whole thing so that Barr looks like the villain here.”

Sean Hannity offered an extensive broadside against Sullivan later in Fox’s prime-time programming.

“Mr. Sullivan, what part of General Flynn being ambushed and set up by [former FBI deputy director Andrew] McCabe and [former FBI director James] Comey don’t you understand?” Hannity said Wednesday night, accusing Sullivan of taking a “clearly political stand.”

He added: “You botched this from Day One, and you had a bias from Day One,” he seethed. “You reek of ignorance, you reek of political bias!”

After Neomi Rao ordered Judge Sullivan to rubber stamp Flynn’s exoneration, for example, Greg Jarrett included it in a long attack on the judge’s insistence on acting like a judge.

Again, Sullivan balked. Something was amiss. At this point, it became clear that Sullivan was not a neutral or objective jurist dedicated to following the law. He was a rogue judge with an agenda. His decisions reeked of dead fish.

[snip]

It’s anyone’s guess whether Sullivan will grudgingly admit that he was wrong — flagrantly so. After all, this is the same guy who falsely and preposterously accused Flynn of “treason” during a previous court hearing, then recanted when he realized (with prompting) that what he’d said was not just dumb, but anathema to the law governing treason.

All of this leads me to suspect that this judge’s grasp of the law is embarrassingly feeble. His ability to recognize his own disqualifying bias is shamefully absent.

In a piece declaring that “Mr. Flynn has finally received justice” earlier this month (after Mike Flynn first called for martial law), Strassel complained that Sullivan was churlish for noting that Flynn’s guilty plea, as a legal issue, remained intact.

Judge Sullivan finally, belatedly, churlishly dismissed the Flynn case as moot on Tuesday, two weeks after President Trump pardoned the former national security adviser. But the self-important Judge Sullivan couldn’t resist delivering a parting “verdict.” He issued a 43-page opinion in which he all but declared Mr. Flynn guilty of lying and perjury and the entire Justice Department corrupt.

But now the boss has weighed in. In an editorial begging Trump to accept his loss and work to save the Senate today, the NY Post describes Sidney Powell as a crazy person and Flynn’s call for martial law “tantamount to treason.”

Sidney Powell is a crazy person. Michael Flynn suggesting martial law is tantamount to treason. It is shameful.

To be clear, Flynn’s call for martial law wasn’t treason, just as secretly working for Turkey while serving as Trump’s top national security advisor wasn’t either.

But both Judge Sullivan and Rupert Murdoch appear to agree: Mike Flynn sold out this country.

Kraken Clemency: Did Trump Issue the Flynn Pardon Wednesday To Avoid Potential Conflict with Sidney Powell’s Batshittery??

I have to admit: given the certainty that Trump was going to pardon Mike Flynn eventually, I’m really grateful he did it on Wednesday, because it allowed for a truly epic headline, “Trump Pardons an Undisclosed Agent of Turkey Along with a Thanksgiving Bird.”

But I’m really mystified by the timing of it.

After all, there was still an outside chance that Judge Emmet Sullivan would agree to DOJ’s motion to dismiss, which would have eliminated Flynn’s guilty verdict more convincingly than this pardon. And, given that the pardon seems to exist only in Tweet form as of right now, Sullivan could still file his ruling, knowing that he’d be getting notice of a pardon sometime next week. Alternately, the early pardon could give Sullivan the opportunity to craft his other decisions, such as regarding Flynn’s motion to withdraw his plea, in ways that might have legal repercussions for Flynn and his son. So it seems risky to pardon Flynn before Sullivan rules.

I can think of several possible reasons for the timing. But the most intriguing is a tie between Sidney Powell’s efforts to sustain Trump’s most baseless conspiracy theories without any potential conflict for Flynn.

The upcoming Sullivan decision

Depending on how Trump words the pardon, the timing of this might still be an effort to pre-empt Sullivan’s decision. If Trump were to describe the pardon as all crimes Flynn committed from July 2016 to the present (meaning Wednesday), and if courts accepted that unspecific language, then it would cover not just Flynn’s lies to the FBI, but also his efforts to hide that he was an Agent of Turkey and his sworn materially conflicting statements before Judges Rudolph Contreras and Sullivan as well as the grand jury.

Or to put it another way, this may be an effort to write an even more abusive pardon in a way that few will notice.

Though I’ll notice.

The upcoming BuzzFeed FOIA release

On Tuesday, BuzzFeed will get another big drop of FBI 302s from the Mueller investigation. According to FOIA terrorist Jason Leopold, DOJ has not told them whether the drop will include the Flynn 302s, but does claim this will be the last release (which would seem to suggest it has to include the Flynn 302s).

Almost year ago, the government provided Flynn with his 302s, which make up 761 pages. They subsequently said that his cooperation with Mueller was not substantial and raised questions about his candor even after his initial interview. That’s consistent with Flynn’s own description of the early proffers, given that his Covington lawyers tried to get him back on track to cooperate after the first one.

Releasing the warrants in Flynn’s case was damning enough (though as a result of the timing, almost no one has scrutinized them closely). But these 302s may prove still more damning (not least because they should provide additional details of a meeting where Trump discussed reaching out to WikiLeaks after the Podesta emails dropped). They also may show that Flynn continued to lie to protect the President even while he was pretending to cooperate.

So Trump may have been tipped that if he wanted to limit the outrage over this pardon, he should get it done before the 302s come out on Tuesday, if indeed they will come out.

The conflict between Sidney Powell TV election lawyer and Sidney Powell TV defense attorney

Finally, I wonder whether some smart lawyer grew concerned that Sidney Powell was claiming to represent the President even while she was representing someone asking for a pardon.

On November 15, Trump explicitly named Powell as part of his team. On November 20, Powell appeared at Rudy the Dripper’s press conference. On November 22, Rudy and Jenna Ellis made a show of cutting ties with her.

Sidney Powell is practice law on her own. She is not a member of the Trump Legal Team. She is also not a lawyer for the President in his personal capacity.

According to Maggie Haberman, either he didn’t like her appearance and/or advisors convinced Trump to separate himself from her nutjobbery. Three days later, November 25, Trump pardoned Powell’s client. The next day, after days of promising to Bring the Kraken, Powell finally started releasing her epically batshit suits. Trump has promoted them.

Indeed, it even appears some Administration lawyers are still associated with Powell’s efforts.

I’m not sure I understand whether there would be a conflict between Powell representing Trump (for free, inevitably, as all lawyers do), making desperate efforts to overturn the election at the same time she was trying to ensure her client did no prison time. If that’s a conflict, it may still exist anyway given Powell’s admission to Judge Sullivan that she had repeatedly discussed Flynn with Trump’s campaign lawyer, Jenna Ellis. The fact that DOJ packaged up altered documents to support a Trump attack on Biden may make those ties more important anyway (or lead to more details about them becoming public).

But if Powell’s involvement made Pat Cipollone and/or Bill Barr — who presumably share the challenging task of helping Trump write pardons that don’t backfire — squeamish, it might explain the timing.

In Letter Confirming DOJ Altered Peter Strzok’s Notes, His Lawyer Identifies Additional Privacy Act Violations

Among a slew of last minute documents submitted in advance of today’s hearing in the Mike Flynn case, Peter Strzok’s lawyer, Aitan Goelman, confirmed what I laid out here and here: DOJ altered some of the exhibits submitted in their effort to blow up Flynn’s prosecution.

Some of Mr. Strzok’s notes included in this attachment appear to have been altered. On at least two occasions, there were handwritten additions, not written by Mr. Strzok, inserting dates, apparently designed to indicate the date or dates on which the notes were written. On at least one occasion, the date added is wrong and could be read to suggest that a meeting at the White House happened before it actually did.

Goelman included those both altered records pertaining to Strzok (there may be one related to Andrew McCabe as well), including the one that shows someone wanted to implicate Joe Biden in all this.

That may not be the most important thing Goelman established, however.

Among the things DOJ released the other night was yet another version of the Strzok and Lisa Page texts. When she sent them to Flynn’s lawyers, Jocelyn Ballantine admitted the relevant texts had been provided to Flynn in 2018, before he allocuted his guilty plea a second time.

We are also providing you with additional text messages between former DAD Strzok and Lisa Page (23516-23540). As you know, some of these messages were originally made available to Flynn’s former attorneys on March 13, 2018 through a publicly available link to a Senate webpage. On June 24, 2018, the government provided a link to a second website that contained additional text messages. In an abundance of caution, we are providing you additional text messages in this production; please note that purely personal messages have been deleted from this production.

DOJ seems to have re-released the texts in an effort knit together unrelated actions to suggest they all related to Mike Flynn. Among the texts included in this release, purportedly in support of blowing up Mike Flynn’s prosecution, I can identify texts pertaining to:

  • The investigation into Russia’s attack on the US
  • The Mid-Year Exam investigation into Hillary’s server
  • The general Crossfire Hurricane investigation
  • Extensive efforts to ensure the Crossfire Hurricane investigation remained secret
  • Efforts to ensure that Obama officials didn’t politicize the Mike Flynn intercepts
  • Specific Crossfire Hurricane sub-investigations, including substantial threads pertaining to Carter Page and George Papadopoulos
  • The opening of the Jeff Sessions false statements investigation
  • The bureaucratic set-up of the Mueller investigation
  • References to Kevin Clinesmith (and possibly some references to other Kevins)
  • Substantive critiques of Donald Trump (for example, pertaining to his desire to blow up NATO)
  • Discussions of Trump sharing highly classified Israeli intelligence with the Russians
  • Proactive ethical discussions about how to deal with the appointment of Rudolph Contreras, whom Strzok was friends with, to the FISA Court
  • Leak investigations, both into stories pertaining to Flynn or Trump and stories not related to Trump
  • Unrelated FISA applications
  • 702 reauthorization
  • Apparently unrelated cases, including things like CFIUS reviews

There are long swaths with half the side of the conversation left out, hiding what are clear changes of topic.

Then there are personal details, like talks about showers and anniversaries, as well as some emotional chatter and one declaration of love.

That makes Ballantine’s claim that, “purely personal messages have been deleted from this production,” utterly damning, particularly given the timing, September 23, and the fact that unlike past productions, this was not noticed to the docket in real time.

“Did your anniversary go ok? I don’t really want a lot of deta[]” is by any sane measure a purely personal message. It was not deleted or redacted from this production.

What DOJ decided to do, just days before a decision in the parallel lawsuits Strzok and Page have against DOJ alleging a violation of the Privacy Act for the release of personal information, was to release more personal information, information that had — in the past, under an earlier purported ethics review of what was releasable — been deemed personal information.

DOJ knit together a bunch of texts that DOJ admits were already public before Flynn allocuted his guilty plea a second time, but threw in yet more personal texts.

And then, on September 25, Amy Berman Jackson ruled that Page and Strzok should both get discovery to prove their Privacy Act (and in Strzok’s case, other claims) cases. That makes all of this — all the decisions that led up to to the release of these texts — discoverable in what I assume will be an expanded Privacy Act lawsuit.

It’s unclear what malicious thinking led DOJ to include more texts attempting to humiliate Strzok and Page (even while providing a slew of other information making it clear that Strzok did not have it in for Flynn). But they just likely made this entire process subject to discovery in a lawsuit overseen by Amy Berman Jackson.