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Latest Carter Page Scoop May Not Be That Incriminating

Several months before Ali Watkins (followed by ABC, though that didn’t stop ABC from claiming credit) confirmed that a person named in the complaint against Evgeny Buryakov is Carter Page, Rayne was examining potential connections between that case — in which Buryakov eventually plead guilty to being a Russian spy (after his two colleagues, working under official cover, had returned to Russia) and allegations of Russian influence on Donald Trump.

While many people are insinuating that this confirmation damns Page, that’s not at all clear.

As the complaint — which was unsealed on January 26, 2015 — describes, Victor Podobnyy tried to recruit Page in the period leading up to April 2013. Podobnyy complained that Page left on a trip to Moscow without returning his call. In that complaint, Podobnyy emphasized Page’s interest in getting Gazprom business.

[Page] wrote that he is sorry, he went to Moscow and forgot to check his inbox, but he wants to meet when he gets back. I think he is an idiot and forgot who I am. Plus he writes to be in Russian [to] practice the language. He flies to Moscow more often than I do. He got hooked on Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could rise up. Maybe he can. I don’t know, but it’s obvious that he wants to earn lots of money.

Podobnyy then jokes with fellow spy Igor Sporyshev about (presumably) Russia blowing “a couple of borrowed million” before screwing Page over.

Podobnyy: I also promised him a lot; that I have connections in the Trade Representation, meaning you[,] that you can push contracts [laughs]. I will feed him empty promises.

Sporyshev: Shit, then he will write me. Not even me, to our clean one.

Podobnyy: I didn’t say the Trade Representation… I didn’t even indicate that this is connected to a government agency. This is intelligence method to cheat, how else to work with foreigners? You promise a favor for a favor. You get the documents from him and tell him to go fuck himself.

The complaint then describes a June 13, 2013 FBI interview with Page in which Page describes meeting Podobnyy at an energy symposium. Page told the FBI agents he shared his outlook on the current and future of the energy industry and provided documents to him about the energy business. That is consistent with Podobnyy’s mocking description of their relationship.

Again, all of that occurred in 2013, and it was made public in early 2015. Page even complained to BuzzFeed that the complaint had made it obvious (back in 2015) that he was the one the Russian spies were recruiting and mocking.

Page suggested that the complaint was written so that it was obvious he was the Gazprom-connected man Podobnyy talked about recruiting.

“In this city? Give me a break,” he said. “It is so obvious.”

Which is all a way of saying that Page knew that he had been recruited by Russian spies in 2013 and knew how they were trying to recruit him before he went to Russia and allegedly met with Rosneft President Igor Sechin. Here’s how Christopher Steele’s dossier described the July 7 or 8, 2016 meeting between Page and Sechin:

[T]he Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally not-committal in response. [Report dated July 19, 2016, sourced to a Russian source close to Sechin]

[snip]

[T]he Roseneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP’s associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted. [Report dated October 18, 2016, sourced to a close associate of Sechin ]

Importantly, Steele’s sources reported that Russia was dangling the same thing that showed up in Page’s 2013 conversations with Podobnyy: business with Rosneft. That could either be taken as a sign the Russian integrated information they learned in 2013 — that Page wanted to get rich working with Rosneft (which would have been obvious anyway). Or it could be taken as a sign that they dangled something that Page would have known the Russians were already talking to him about.

Note that the two reports on his meeting with Sechin conflict on one key detail: whether Page took the bait. The first report (at a time when Steele was not as urgently trying to ensure Trump would lose the election) stated that Page was non-committal. Having a huge deal of the sort he had been pursuing for three years dangled before him, Page did not immediately jump. The later report, however, did seem to promise a quid pro quo dealing precisely the same thing he had got caught talking to Russians about three years earlier.

Now consider the other allegation about Page from the dossier. It claims that a senior colleague in the Presidential Administration Head, Divyekin, dangled something else: kompromat on Hillary (as I explained here, in context this is just about intelligence gathered while she was First Lady and Secretary of State, even though this report was written a year after FSB started hacking the DNC, four months after GRU allegedly started hacking the DNC and John Podesta, and more than a month after the former two things were public). But even here, this is a dangle.

Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of ‘kompromat’ the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP’s Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican’s campaign team.

However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had ‘kompromat’ on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

In the context of having had another Russian spy explicitly state he would dangle promises but not deliver, it’s unclear how Page would take this information. But he would presumably at least consider what he had learned in 2013 about dealing with Russian spies, which is that they might not deliver on their promises.

Page strikes me as a dummy. So maybe he didn’t learn anything from being targeted in 2013. Or maybe the inconclusive language relayed here, even if true (Page still denies the Sechin meeting) can be explained by the fact that Page had already been recruited at least once by a Russian spy, with the embarrassing result that (he believed) everyone in NY knew he had been taken for a chump in 2013.

But there are two other parts of the complaint that — given what we’ve learned since Rayne wrote about this — deserve new scrutiny.

First, in a discussion on April 10, 2013, Podobnyy had a discussion with his boss at SVR. The boss asked Podobyy what Sporyshev’s cover was. “What is his cover? The Chamber of Commerce?” Podobnyy corrected him, explaining that Sporyshev worked as a Trade Representative.

The exchange is interesting because one of the people believed to be a key figure in the Steele dossier, described as Source D in parts of the dossier, founded a Russian American Chamber of Commerce in 2006. The figure, Sergei Millian, has insinuated himself into Trump’s circle since that time, including posting pictures of himself on inauguration day. It seems as if Podobnyy’s boss knew of someone who was working under the cover of some kind of Chamber of Commerce. There are two other “Chambers” he might have been thinking of — the US-Russian Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. But Millian’s organization certainly looks like a cover, and the reference of a an SVR manager to a Chamber used as cover could back that claim.

Finally, there’s the point Rayne raised in her post. Buryakov’s cover was working at Vnesheconombank, the same bank whose FSB-tied head Jared Kushner met with in December. The key to busting Buryakov was an undercover FBI employee pretending to represent the interests of a “wealthy investor looking to work with [Vnesheconombank] to develop casinos in Russia.” As Rayne noted, Buryakov and the UCE toured some Atlantic City casinos at a time when Trump still had some there. And while Trump may not be the only wealthy casino owner considering business opportunities in Russia in 2013, he definitely was doing so (recall that the Golden Shower incident allegedly happened in 2013, so before the casino meetings).

The reason all that is interesting is because of the claimed ties between Trump associates like Felix Sater and the FBI. While Sater has served as an informant, not an FBI employee (and Sater’s informant role was already public by 2013, meaning the Russians would be unlikely to treat him as a real entrée to reach Trump), there’s still other reasons to think Trump might have been the purported investor used to set up Buryakov (which, again, was Rayne’s point).

In any case, we know that a figure that ended up in Trump’s inner circle was recruited as early as 2013 for information. That doesn’t necessarily mean subsequent attempts, such as they occurred, would be more or less successful (indeed, if Page weren’t such a dummy you’d figure they’d be less successful, if only because Page had already had to deal with the FBI over his Russian ties). But it does raise interesting questions about that network of spies and any subsequent efforts to reach out to Trump’s associates.

The Temporal Feint in Adam Schiff’s Neat Narrative

I did four — count them! four! — interviews on the Russian hearing yesterday. And one thing I realized over the course of the interviews is that people were far more impressed with Adam Schiff’s opening speech than they should have been.

I want to look closely at this passage which — if it were accurate — would be a tight little presentation of quid pro quo tied to the change of platform at the July 18-21, 2016 RNC. But it’s not. I’ve bolded the two claims that are most problematic, though the presentation as a whole is misleading.

In early July, Carter Page, someone candidate Trump identified as one of his national security advisors, travels to Moscow on a trip approved by the Trump campaign. While in Moscow, he gives a speech critical of the United States and other western countries for what he believes is a hypocritical focus on democratization and efforts to fight corruption.

According to Christopher Steele, a former British intelligence officer who is reportedly held in high regard by U.S. Intelligence, Russian sources tell him that Page has also had a secret meeting with Igor Sechin (SEH-CHIN), CEO of Russian gas giant Rosneft. Sechin is reported to be a former KGB agent and close friend of Putin’s. According to Steele’s Russian sources, Page is offered brokerage fees by Sechin on a deal involving a 19 percent share of the company. According to Reuters, the sale of a 19.5 percent share in Rosneft later takes place, with unknown purchasers and unknown brokerage fees.

Also, according to Steele’s Russian sources, the Trump campaign is offered documents damaging to Hillary Clinton, which the Russians would publish through an outlet that gives them deniability, like Wikileaks. The hacked documents would be in exchange for a Trump Administration policy that de-emphasizes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and instead focuses on criticizing NATO countries for not paying their fare share – policies which, even as recently as the President’s meeting last week with Angela Merkel, have now presciently come to pass.

In the middle of July, Paul Manafort, the Trump campaign manager and someone who was long on the payroll of Pro-Russian Ukrainian interests, attends the Republican Party convention. Carter Page, back from Moscow, also attends the convention. According to Steele, it was Manafort who chose Page to serve as a go-between for the Trump campaign and Russian interests. Ambassador Kislyak, who presides over a Russian embassy in which diplomatic personnel would later be expelled as likely spies, also attends the Republican Party convention and meets with Carter Page and additional Trump Advisors JD Gordon and Walid Phares. It was JD Gordon who approved Page’s trip to Moscow. Ambassador Kislyak also meets with Trump campaign national security chair and now Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Sessions would later deny meeting with Russian officials during his Senate confirmation hearing.

Just prior to the convention, the Republican Party platform is changed, removing a section that supports the provision of “lethal defensive weapons” to Ukraine, an action that would be contrary to Russian interests. Manafort categorically denies involvement by the Trump campaign in altering the platform. But the Republican Party delegate who offered the language in support of providing defensive weapons to Ukraine states that it was removed at the insistence of the Trump campaign. Later, JD Gordon admits opposing the inclusion of the provision at the time it was being debated and prior to its being removed.

Later in July, and after the convention, the first stolen emails detrimental to Hillary Clinton appear on Wikileaks. A hacker who goes by the moniker Guccifer 2.0 claims responsibility for hacking the DNC and giving the documents to Wikileaks. But leading private cyber security firms including CrowdStrike, Mandiant, and ThreatConnect review the evidence of the hack and conclude with high certainty that it was the work of APT28 and APT29, who were known to be Russian intelligence services. The U.S. Intelligence community also later confirms that the documents were in fact stolen by Russian intelligence and Guccifer 2.0 acted as a front. [emphasis on most problematic claims mine]

What Schiff tries to do here is suggest that the Russians offered Trump kompromat on Hillary, Trump’s team changed the GOP platform, and then in response the Russians started releasing the DNC emails through Wikileaks.

Later in the hearing, several Republicans disputed the nature of the change in the platform. Both in and outside of the hearing, Republicans have noted that the changed platform matched the policy in place by the Obama Administration at the time: to help Ukraine, but stop short of arming them. All that said, the story on this has clearly changed. The change in the platform clearly shows the influence of Russophiles moving the party away from its hawkish stance, but it’s not enough, in my opinion, to sustain the claims of quid pro quo. [Update: One of the outside the hearing arguments that the platform was not weakened is this Byron York piece b linked, which argues the platform actually got more anti-Russian.]

The bigger problem with Schiff’s neat narrative is the way it obscures the timeline of events, putting the release of DNC emails after the change in platform. That is true with regards to the Wikileaks release, but not the Guccifer 2 release, which preceded the platform change.  Moreover, the references in Steele’s dossier Schiff invokes are not so clear cut — the dossier alleges Russia offered kompromat on Hillary unrelated to the stolen emails before any discussion of the Wikileaks emails. I’ve put what Schiff’s timeline would look like if it were not aiming to play up the quid pro quo of the RNC below (note this timeline doesn’t include all Steele reports, just those specifically on point; see also this site for a comprehensive Guccifer related timeline). It shows several things:

  • The changes to the platform preceded the meetings with Sergey Kislyak. Indeed, the first public report on the change in platform even preceded the Kislyak meetings by a day.
  • The stolen documents began to be released well before the platform got changed.
  • The early Steele report on discussions of sharing a dossier of kompromat on Hillary pertains to a dossier dating back decades (even though these reports all post-date the first Guccifer releases, so could have included a discussion of hacked materials). The first explicit reference to the DNC hack comes after Wikileaks started releasing documents (and earlier reports which ought to include such references don’t).
  • The later Steele report tying the Wikileaks release to a change in policy came after the policy had already changed and documents had already been released.
  • The alleged quid pro quo tied to the early July Carter Page meeting was for the lifting of sanctions, not the shift on NATO and Ukraine; the Steele dossier describes the latter as the quid pro quo in exchange for the Wikileaks release only after the emails start coming out from Wikileaks.

Also note: the report that first ties Wikileaks (but not Guccifer) to a quid pro quo is one of the reports that made me raise questions about the provenance of the report as we received it.

This is not lethal for the argument that the Trump campaign delivered on a quid pro quo. For example, if there was extensive coordination, Trump could have changed his policy in March after learning that the Russian military intelligence hack — the one allegedly designed to collect documents to leak — had started. Or perhaps the Guccifer leaks were a down-payment on the full batch. But there’s no evidence of either.

In any case, the narrative, as laid out by Adam Schiff, doesn’t hold together on several points. Trump’s team has not yet delivered on the quid pro quo allegedly tied to the Rosneft brokerage fees that were paid to someone (it’s not public whom) in December — that is, the lifting of sanctions. As laid out here, the descriptions of an offer of a dossier of information on Hillary prior to the Republican platform pertained to stuff going back decades, not explicitly to Wikileaks; the shift of discussion to Wikileaks only came after the emails had already appeared and any Ukraine related policy changes had already been made.

There’s plenty of smoke surrounding Trump and his associates. It doesn’t require fudging the timeline in order to make it appear like a full quid pro quo (and given Jim Comey’s reliance on “coordination” rather than “collusion” in Monday’s discussion, it’s not even clear such quid pro quo would be necessary for a conspiracy charge). Adam Schiff can and should be more careful about this evidence in future public hearings.

Update: Given how remarkably late the references to the stolen emails are in the dossier, I’m linking this post showing how later entries included a feedback loop.


March 19: John Podesta phished (DNC compromise generally understood to date to same time period).

March 31: Trump reportedly embraces pro-Russian stance in foreign policy meeting with advisors.

April 19th: DCLeaks.com registered.

June 8th: DCLeaks.com posts leaks (from post dates).

June 13th: First archived record of DCLeaks posts.

June 15: Crowdstrike report names Russia in DNC hack, first Guccifer 2.0 releases via TSG and Gawker.

June 18: Guccifer releases at WordPress site.

June 20: Steele report presents obviously conflicting information on exchanging intelligence with Trump. A senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure said “the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents, including … Hillary CLINTON, for several years.” A former top level intelligence officer still active in the Kremlin stated that the Kremlin had been collating a dossier on Hillary, “for many years, dating back to her husband Bill’s presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts. … Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues.” A senior Kremlin official, however, said that the dossier “had not as yet been made available abroad, including to TRUMP or his campaign team.”

July 7-8: Carter Page in Moscow. Allegedly (per later Steele dossier reports) he is offered brokerage fees for the sale of a stake in Rosneft in exchange for ending sanctions on Russia.

July 11-12: Platform drafted.

July 18-21: RNC.

July 18: First report of changes to platform.

July 19: Sergey Kislyak meets numerous Trump associates after a Heritage sponsored Jeff Sessions talk.

July 19: Steele report provides first details of Carter Page meeting in Russia during which Divyekin raises “a dossier of ‘kompromat’ the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP’s Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican’s campaign team.” In context (especially because the same report also warns Trump of kompromat Russia holds on him), this seems to be the dossier going back years also mentioned in the June 20 report, not Wikileaks emails. Certainly no explicit mention of Wikileaks or the hack appears in the report, even though the report is based off July reporting that post-date the first Guccifer 2.0 leaks.

July 22: Wikileaks starts releasing DNC emails.

July 26: Steele report describing conversations from June describes Russian hacking efforts in terms already publicly known to be false. For example, the report claims FSB had not yet had success penetrating American or other “first tier” targets. FSB had success hacking American targets the previous year, including the DNC. This report includes no discussion of the DNC hack or Wikileaks.

Undated July, probably because of report number between July 26 and 30: An “ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP” includes the first reference to the DNC hack and WikiLeaks:

[T]he Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to the Wikileaks platform. The reason for using WikiLeaks was “plausible deniability” and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

July 30: A Russian emigre close to Trump describes concern in the campaign about the DNC email fallout. This report mentions that the Kremlin “had more intelligence on CLINTON and her campaign but he did not know the details or when or if it would be released.” In context, it is unclear whether this refers to stolen documents, though the reference to the campaign suggests that is likely.

August 5: Steele report describes Russian interference as a botched operation, discusses wishful thinking of Trump withdrawing.

August 10: Steele report discusses the “impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date” claiming Russia’s role in the DNC hack was “technically deniable.” This report conflicts in some ways with the August 5 report, specifically with regards to the perceived success of the operation.

September 14: Steele report referencing kompromat on Hillary clearly in context of further emails.

October 18: More detailed Steele report account of Carter Page meeting, including date. It asserts that “although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP’s intention to lift Russian sanctions if elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate’s authority.”

October 19: More Steele report accounting of Michael Cohen’s August attempts to clean up after Manafort and Page.

The Feedback Loop in Christopher Steele’s Dossier

Last week, at least three media outlets have provided new details about the relationship between former MI6 officer Christopher Steele — the author of the Trump dossier — and the FBI. First WaPo reported that Steele had reached a verbal agreement that the FBI would pay him to continue his investigation of Russia’s involvement with Trump after still unnamed Democrats stopped paying him after the election. CNN then reported that FBI actually had paid Steele for his expenses. Finally, NBC reported Steele backed out of the deal before it was finalized. Chuck Grassley just sent a letter to Jim Comey asking for more information about the proposed arrangement with Steele.

I’m with Grassley on this. According to WaPo and NBC, FBI would only have paid Steele after the election, presumably regardless of the outcome; by that point Steele’s research couldn’t affect the outcome of the investigation. Nevertheless, the possibility that FBI may have used information from a Democratically paid oppo researcher does raise questions of propriety. Add in the discrepancies in these three reports about whether FBI did pay for Steele’s work, and Grassley is right to raise questions.

I’m also interested in what the relationship says about the way in which political necessities may have impacted the content of Steele’s dossier. All three reports attribute the termination of any FBI-Steele relationship, at least in part, to Steele’s frustration with the FBI. WaPo goes on at some length, explaining that Steele got pissed when Jim Comey reopened the Hillary investigation on October 28, and then grew angrier after the NYT reported the FBI had not confirmed any link to Russia.

Ultimately, the FBI did not pay Steele. Communications between the bureau and the former spy were interrupted as Steele’s now-famous dossier became the subject of news stories, congressional inquiries and presidential denials, according to the people familiar with the arrangement, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter.

[snip]

In October, anticipating that funding supplied through the original client would dry up, Steele and the FBI reached a spoken understanding: He would continue his work looking at the Kremlin’s ties to Trump and receive compensation for his efforts.

But Steele’s frustration deepened when FBI Director James B. Comey, who had been silent on the Russia inquiry, announced publicly 11 days before the election that the bureau was investigating a newly discovered cache of emails Clinton had exchanged using her private server, according to people familiar with Steele’s thinking.

Those people say Steele’s frustration with the FBI peaked after an Oct. 31 New York Times story that cited law enforcement sources drawing conclusions that he considered premature. The article said that the FBI had not yet found any “conclusive or direct link” between Trump and the Russian government and that the Russian hacking was not intended to help Trump.

WaPo doesn’t lay this out in detail, however. Here’s what happened on those days in October:

October 28: Comey informs eight committee chairs he will reopen the investigation, which promptly (and predictably) leaks.

October 30: Having been officially briefed on the dossier, Harry Reid writes Comey accusing him of a Hatch Act violation for releasing the information on Clinton while withholding what we know to be information in the dossier.

October 31, 6:52PM: David Corn publishes story based on dossier.

October 31, 9:27PM: NYT publishes article describing multiple investigations into Russian interference, stating “no evidence has emerged that would link him or anyone else in his business or political circle directly to Russia’s election operations.”

October 31, 10:52PM: NYT edits article, adding “conclusive or direct” as a caveat in the sentence “Law enforcement officials say that none of the investigations so far have found any conclusive or direct link between Mr. Trump and the Russian government.”

Notably, assuming the times in Newsdiffs (from which I got the NYT timing) are correct, Steele had already gone public before the NYT published its article. That suggests he (like Harry Reid) believed his research should be part of a competing public story. And by going public in what was obviously a Democratically-seeded article, Steele likely made it far more difficult for FBI to continue the relationship.

Already, these new timeline details raise questions about the degree to which Steele’s concerns that the Trump Russian investigation should have more prominence than the email investigation may have influenced his work. Even if Jim Comey did do something colossally stupid by announcing the reopening of the investigation, that shouldn’t affect Steele’s interest in providing the best intelligence to the US, regardless of the public impact, unless he was always motivated primarily by his role as campaign oppo researcher.

The pointless Alfa Bank report that nevertheless seems to reinforce the dodgy Alfa server story

But I also wonder whether it relates to the content. Consider report 112, dated September 14. It pertains to “Kremlin-Alpha Group Cooperation.” It doesn’t have much point in a dossier aiming to hurt Trump. None of his associates nor the Russian DNC hack are mentioned. It does suggest that that Alfa Group had a “bag carrier … to deliver large amounts of illicit cash to” Putin when he was Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg, though describes the current relationship as “both carrot and stick,” relying in part on kompromat pertaining to Putin’s activities while Deputy Mayor. It makes no allegations of current bribery, though says mutual leverage helps Putin “do his political bidding.”

As I said, there’s no point to have that Alfa Bank passage in a dossier on Trump. But it does serve, in its disclosure, to add a data point (albeit not a very interesting one) to the Alfa Server story that (we now know) FBI was already reviewing but which hadn’t been pitched to the press yet. In Corn’s piece, he mentions the Alfa Bank story but not the report on Putin’s ties to it. It may be in there because someone — perhaps already in possession of the Alfa Bank allegations — asked Steele to lay out more about Alfa’s ties with Putin.

Here’s one reason that’s interesting, though. Even aside from all the other reasons the Alfa story is dodgy, it was deliberately packaged for press consumption. Rather than the at least 19 servers that Trump’s spam email was pinging, it revealed just two: Alfa Bank and Spectrum Health (the latter of which got spun, anachronistically, as a DeVos organization that thus had to be tight with Trump). Which is to say, the Alfa story was dodgy and packaged by yet unknown people.

The discovery of direct collusion during the intelligence review of the Russian hack

More interesting still is what happens in the period that — according to public reporting, anyway — Steele was working for free.

Contrary to what Steele’s anger suggests, there was no real evidence of direct Russian ties to Trump outside of the famous PeeGate incident (and even if that happened, he was not a knowing participant). In the first report, there’s a claim that “the Kremlin has been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence … including Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton,” but the part of the report that purportedly describes that sharing states that the Kremlin file on Hillary “had not yet been made available abroad, including to TRUMP or his campaign team,” seemingly contradicting the claim. A subsequent report describes a Presidential Administration official discussed the “possible release [of the dossier] to the Republican’s campaign team,” but without any confirmation that occurred (or even that Trump knew about it).

A subsequent report includes a claim of a “well-developed conspiracy of co-operation between [Trump’s team] and the Russian leadership managed through Paul Manafort and Carter Page. It continued to suggest a quid pro quo between the Russian hack and a shift on Ukraine and NATO policies. But in subsequent discussions of Manafort and Page’s corruption, it drops this claim entirely. Even when Michael Cohen enters the narrative, its about managing fallout over Manafort’s Ukrainian corruption.

There are claims that Trump was trying to set up business in Russia, followed by repeated descriptions of Russians not succeeding in getting him to do so.

In other words, in spite of the fact that there were some really damning allegations in the reports, the subsequent reporting didn’t necessarily back the most inflammatory aspects of them.

After the election, there’s just one report, dated December 13. That dates it to after the CIA’s leak fest reporting that Putin hacked the DNC not just to hurt Hillary and the US, but also to elect Trump. It dates to after Obama ordered an IC report on the hack. It dates to after John McCain delivered yet another copy of the dossier to FBI. It slightly precedes a Crowdstrike report (also done for free) bumping its formerly non-public “medium” confidence Russia’s GRU hacked the DNC to “high.”

And after previous reports describing Michael Cohen’s meetings as serving to cover up Manafort’s corruption and Page’s non-consummated Rosneft deal, this one alleges “the operatives involved [in the DNC hack] had been paid by both TRUMP’s team and the Kremlin,” the first such allegation. That is, over a month after the election but less than a month before its leak, the kind of detail backing direct collusion reappeared in this report.

Chuck Grassley’s questions

Which brings me back to Grassley’s letter. In addition to asking about payments, whether the agreement ever went into force, and whether and how Steele’s material served as a basis for FBI reports or even warrants, Grassley asks a question I’ve long wanted to know: Why we got this version of the memo, which is obviously just a partial selection of the complete dossier (rather like the Alfa story).

  1. How did the FBI first obtain Mr. Steele’s Trump investigation memos?  Has the FBI obtained additional memos from this same source that were not published by Buzzfeed?  If so, please provide copies.

We will actually learn a lot about the validity of the dossier if we see what other parts got dealt to the FBI, and if so whether the copy released to the public was cherry picked for the most damning information.

Devin Nunes Doesn’t Think Donald Trump Should be Subject To the Kind of “Witch Hunt” He Conducted with Edward Snowden

We know what a Devin Nunes-led investigation into possible Russian compromise looks like. Just in December, after all, the House Intelligence Committee released their investigation into Edward Snowden.

Using the Snowden investigation as a guide, we know that HPSCI believes that if there’s an ongoing investigation, it should avoid speaking to anyone who knows evidence first-hand. It can instead rely on the impressions of people who don’t like the target of the investigation, as HPSCI did for claims that Snowden went to a hackers conference in China. It can also avoid reviewing official records, including public school records or even official Army records. Rather than do that, it may rely on imprecise citations of public reporting, interpreted in the light designed to be most damning. Any lies told — such as Snowden’s cover story that he’d be undergoing epilepsy treatment or Mike Flynn’s lies to Mike Pence — are themselves evidence of the worst possible guilt. Numbers are interpreted in the most damning possible light, even if more recent and informed numbers suggest something far less damning; those damning numbers came, in Snowden’s case, from a decision made by former DIA Director and recently fired National Security Advisor Flynn to assume any contact involved potential compromise.

Very importantly, HPSCI’s standard is that if anyone alleges contact between Russians and the target of an investigation, they should believed, even if that person is not in a position to know first hand. According to HPSCI standard, it is permissible to rely on dubious translations of Russian comments.

That’s the standard a Devin Nunes-led investigation holds to — or at last held to, with Snowden — before it deems an American citizen a traitor (irrespective of the very specific requirements of a treason charge).

Now, you can certainly argue that that’s a horrible standard for an intelligence committee investigation into allegations that an American citizen is spying for Russia. I have made that argument myself. But that is the standard HPSCI very recently set for serious allegations of possible intelligence compromises involving Russia.

Which is mighty curious, because Devin Nunes just gave a press conference claiming, categorically, that no Trump campaign personnel had any contact with any Russian official. That, in spite of public reporting relying on an interview with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak that said his contacts with Trump campaign advisor Mike Flynn went back before November 8. That’s pretty good evidence that Trump’s campaign was in contact with a Russian official. (Later in his presser, Nunes acknowledged that Flynn spoke with Russia, though suggested that happened after Trump became President-Elect.)

And if Nunes applied the same standard to Trump’s associates he applied to Edward Snowden, then clearly the allegations in the Trump dossier should be presumed to be true (again, I’m not advocating for this, I’m talking about what would happen if HPSCI applied the same standard). That would mean Carter Page’s contacts with Kremlin Internal Affairs official Diyevkin would count as evidence of a contact. Carter Page’s other contacts were not named. Michael Cohen’s, which were alleged to be even more inflammatory, were done with Russian Presidential Administration figures working under cover, but would seem to meet the Nunes HPSCI standard. Paul Manafort’s contacts were with Ukrainians.

Finally, if HPSCI applied the same standards they did with Snowden, then the claims from Sergei Ryabkov that there were discussions before the election should amount to sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim.

Devin Nunes invoked McCarthyism in insisting his committee shouldn’t just investigate American citizens without evidence. But he apparently extends that standard differently to men on whose transition team he served.

FISA Is Not a Magic Word

The NYT had an article yesterday reporting on investigations into three (not four) of Donald Trump’s associates. The lead explains that authorities are reviewing “intercepted communications” in an investigation.

American law enforcement and intelligence agencies are examining intercepted communications and financial transactions as part of a broad investigation into possible links between Russian officials and associates of President-elect Donald J. Trump, including his former campaign chairman Paul Manafort, current and former senior American officials said.

The article differs from many of the reports on investigations into Trump because it is not so breathless and shows far more understanding of how DOJ works. Sadly, most readers appear not to have gotten this far into the story, which admits it’s not even clear whether the investigation is primarily about ties between Trump and the DNC hack.

It is not clear whether the intercepted communications had anything to do with Mr. Trump’s campaign, or Mr. Trump himself. It is also unclear whether the inquiry has anything to do with an investigation into the hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s computers and other attempts to disrupt the elections in November.

A number of people, including — bizarrely! — former DHS Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs Juliette Kayyem have asked why the NYT article doesn’t mention FISA.

Great piece. Honest ? Is there reason why it doesn’t mention word FISA? I don’t know other ways to intercept comms.

Kayyem asks that, even about an article that partially raises another — the most common — way intercepts get done: by targeting foreigners.

The counterintelligence investigation centers at least in part on the business dealings that some of the president-elect’s past and present advisers have had with Russia. Mr. Manafort has done business in Ukraine and Russia. Some of his contacts there were under surveillance by the National Security Agency for suspected links to Russia’s Federal Security Service, one of the officials said.

The Russians alleged to have bought off Manafort, and the Russians alleged to have hacked the DNC are all legal targets without a FISA order (unless they’re targeting in the US, and even then, in some cases you wouldn’t need a FISA order). But these people are described as Russians and Ukrainians in Europe, so no FISA order needed. Moreover, the BBC article that started this line of reporting made clear the investigation arises from an intercept from a Baltic ally. Even if the US did the spying, foreign targets could be collected on under EO 12333 or under Section 702 of FISA without an individual order, and the Manafort sides of those conversations would be read. Indeed, those communications would be read precisely because a US person was having conversations with targets of interest.

So to review, here are the ways that the government might collect data in this case.

  • As the BBC reported, the US gets intercepts from its foreign partners, and appears to have done so here.
  • For foreign targets like those described, much US surveillance takes place under EO 12333. The NSA is collecting on switches and satellites carrying such communications, and to the extent that they’re not encrypted (or encrypted using technology the NSA has broken) those communications are readily available without a court order.
  • Those foreign targets located in Europe are also legal targets under Section 702. For national security cases (including counterintelligence ones) NSA routinely shares the raw feed off such collection with FBI, and FBI is not only allowed to read both sides of those conversations, but to go back and search for US persons in them without any suspicion of wrong-doing.
  • This counterintelligence investigation is primarily about money changing hands. That’s Treasury’s job, and its methods of coercion for collecting information don’t usually involve courts. Banks are obliged to hand over certain kinds of suspicious transfers in any case. Treasury also gets to go to SWIFT and get what it wants. That’s not an “intercept” in the traditional sense, but is likely a key piece of evidence in this case.

The issue, then, is when someone like Manafort becomes the target of the investigation and/or when Russians in the US (but not exclusively at an Embassy) are targeted. In that case, the following might explain intercepts.

  • In some respects, Manafort’s behavior reeks of classic influence peddling, a lobbyist gone wrong. To the extent that’s the case, it might be investigated under regular criminal law with pretty much the same secrecy that FISA will give you (especially given that multiple sources are leaking like sieves about FISA orders now). So FBI could have obtained a criminal warrant targeting Manafort’s communications.
  • To target Manafort anywhere in the world, the FBI/NSA would need a FISA order. Domestically, that’d be a traditional order(s). Given the overseas connection, they’d likely get a 705b order, allowing them to keep spying if Manafort were to leave the country.
  • To target Russians who are in the country but not at the Russian embassy, the government would need a FISA order.

To be sure, there were earlier reports that FBI asked for FISA orders in June and July, finally obtaining one (not three) in October. Even there, the original BBC report suggested the Americans were not the primary targets, but foreign targets, though it misstates who could actually be targeted (and seems to think Russian banks would require a FISA order).

Lawyers from the National Security Division in the Department of Justice then drew up an application. They took it to the secret US court that deals with intelligence, the Fisa court, named after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They wanted permission to intercept the electronic records from two Russian banks.

Their first application, in June, was rejected outright by the judge. They returned with a more narrowly drawn order in July and were rejected again. Finally, before a new judge, the order was granted, on 15 October, three weeks before election day.

Neither Mr Trump nor his associates are named in the Fisa order, which would only cover foreign citizens or foreign entities – in this case the Russian banks

A more recent, but breathless, version of the story originally misstated the standard for FISA, but does get closer to suggesting Trump’s associates are the targets.

Note that in one place NYT refers to “investigations” plural.

The F.B.I. is leading the investigations, aided by the National Security Agency, the C.I.A. and the Treasury Department’s financial crimes unit.

It is possible that there are separate investigation(s), one targeting Manafort for clear influence peddling, another targeting Roger Stone for apparent involvement in the hand-off of DNC documents to Wikileaks, and a third for corrupt business dealings on the part of Carter Page. It is also possible that such independent investigations could converge on the election, if what the Trump dossier claims is true. It is further possible that if all of those investigations converged into one election-related investigation, there’d still be no way to prove Trump knew of Russian involvement; right now, only his associates have been “targeted,” to the extent even that has occurred. (Roger Stone, of course, is an old hand at giving the President plausible deniability about the rat-fucking done in his name.)

Finally, there’s one more (delicious) detail most people have missed. Just last week the intelligence community rolled out its new EO 12333 sharing guidelines. I suspect such guidelines were in place between FBI and NSA before then; for a variety of reasons I think they may have been sharing such data since … September. But as I’ll show in a follow-up, one very clear objective for the expanded EO 12333 sharing is to give FBI (and CIA) direct access to raw EO 12333 collected information for counterintelligence purposes. That means all those intercepts on Russian and Ukrainian people talking to Manafort, going back over a year? At least as of January 3, the FBI (and CIA) can have those, including Manafort’s side of the conversation, in raw form.

The Released Trump Dossier Is Not the Complete Dossier

Update: Also note that these reports are not done in the same typeface, with variations between sans serif and serif fonts, changes to margins, and at least one report changing font size mid-report. I’ve marked those below as well, and will continue to work on margin size. I’ve been informed that this is a way the Brits track leakers, which means this copy should be identifiable to a particular leaker. 

I want to return to a point I made here about the dossier — billed as an oppo research project — on Donald Trump’s ties to Russia.

This is not the complete dossier. It was selectively released.

The gaps are immediately identifiable from the report numbering, which (as released) goes like this:

  • 080: June 20, 2016, serif
  • 086: July 26, 2015 (citing events in 2016), serif
  • 095: not dated, serif
  • 94: July 19, 2016, serif
  • 097: July 30, 2016, sans, justified
  • 100: August 5, 2016, serif, note typeface size change
  • 101: August 10, 2016, sans
  • 102: August 10, 2016, sans
  • 136: October 20, 2016, serif, wider margins
  • 105: August 22, 2016, serif
  • 111: September 14, 2016, serif
  • 112: September 14, 2016, serif
  • 113: September 14, 2016, serif
  • 130: October 12, 2016, larger sans
  • 134: October 18, 2016, smaller serif
  • 135: October 19, 2016, serif
  • 166: December 13, 2016, serif

You might think some of this is just about pages being out of order but someone — perhaps Buzzfeed? — wrote in page numbers by hand on the lower right.

So the reporting was frequent, sometimes more than daily. It must have started sometime in April, if not before (which explains how a project started by a Republican challenger to Trump ends up with a June 2016 report; we just don’t have the first 79 reports); it’s even possible the earlier reporting included more details on Hillary. Over that time, the reporting protocol changed (no longer identifying each source with a letter). And the reports continue into December, well past the election, and well past the time a Hillary supporter — ostensibly the funder for this project — might want to influence the election.

Reports 94 and 095 are especially weird, as it appears that the temporal sequences is broken. 095 reports on the general scope of the campaign against Hillary. 94 reports on meetings between Carter Page and Igor Sechin.

None of this explains why those gaps exist or what the oddness in reports 94 and 095 stem from. But it is a real reason to question the provenance of the copy BuzzFeed got.

Update: I’ve been informed that these kinds of typeface changes are a way the Brits use to track leakers.

So they may know who the leaker is here.

Here are two screen shots showing the justification and typeface change that happens at report 097.

Here’s page one of report 100. The last line seems to extend beyond the right margin.

The next page of report 100 has noticeably smaller typeface and an apparently different left margin.

Report 101 is back to right justified sans typeface, but much smaller than the one used in report 097. These screen caps are both 100X100 pixels.