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The Tripartite (At Least) Structure of the Russian Hack Investigation

As I mentioned in this post, on Saturday, Reuters offered the most comprehensive description of the structure of the FBI investigation into the DNC hack. As it describes there are “at least” three different distinct probes into the FBI hack: one led by counterintelligence agents based in DC, one in Pittsburgh targeted at the hack of the DNC itself, and one in San Francisco targeted at the Guccifer 2 persona.

That structure is interesting for a number of reasons, not least that, in recent years, FBI has assigned cyber investigative teams to geographical offices that have developed certain expertise. I’m most interested that FBI has split the Guccifer 2 side of the investigation off from the hack of the DC.

DC: The Counterintelligence investigation

Let’s start with the DC investigation. Contrary to what you may think, a good deal of the attention on Trump’s close advisors stems from behavior that barely involves the DNC hack, if at all, but instead focuses on larger discussions of quid pro quo. Here’s what has been publicly alleged, mostly in the Trump dossier. Reminder, these are only allegations! 

Paul Manafort, using Carter Page as a go between, conducts on-going quid pro quo about attacks on Hillary in response for distracting from Ukraine issues. (PDF 8)

Carter Page conducts a meeting with Rosneft CEO (and US sanction target) Igor Sechin in Moscow. The two discuss a quid pro quo tying 19% transfer of Rosneft to Page in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.(PDF 9, 30) On the same visit, Page meets top Kremlin official Diyevkin, where the latter explains to Page what kind of compromising information they had on both Trump and Hillary. (PDF 9)

A Kremlin figure describes Russian efforts to reach out to some in the US, including Jill Stein, Mike Flynn, and Carter Page. (PDF 15)

At a meeting in August, Yanukovych admits to Putin that he had paid off Manafort, but had covered it up. According to Steele’s sources, Putin doubts how well Yanukovych had covered his tracks. (PDF 20-21)

Trump lawyer Michael Cohen meets with Russian Presidential Administration figures, including Oleg Solodukhin, operating under the cover of the Rossotrudnichestvo organization, in Prague in August. According to two pre-election reports, this meeting was to clean up fall-out of prior contacts with Manafort (here described exclusively in terms of his involvement in Ukraine) and Page (described as the quid pro quo on sanctions). (PDF 18, 31-32) According to a post-election report, the meeting also discusses payments and cover-up of Europe-based hackers, who would be paid by both the Russians and Trump. (PDF 34-35) The role of Cohen — whose wife is Russian and whose father-in-law is a key Russian developer — as liaison to Russia is key. Note, information likely indicating intelligence sourcing is redacted in two of these reports. (PDF 30, 34)

The one other Trump figure mentioned in allegations of Russian ties, Roger Stone, is not mentioned in the dossier, though his role has exclusively been described as a potential knowing go-between with Wikileaks. (The error I mentioned I made in my the OTM interview was in forgetting Cohen, whose role is central, and instead mentioning Stone.)

In other words, while allegations of involvement with Russia do touch on the DNC hack, for both Manafort and Page, the evidence focuses more on old-fashioned influence peddling. The evidence against Flynn in the dossier is exclusively that of cultivation.

Only Cohen, though, is strongly and repeatedly alleged in the dossier to have had a role in both the influence peddling and arranging — and paying! — for the DNC hack (though a weak allegation against Manafort is made in an early report).

Yesterday, NYT reported that Cohen tried to pitch a crazy “peace” deal for Ukraine to Mike Flynn not long before the latter was caught on an intercept with Russia’s Ambassador.

A week before Michael T. Flynn resigned as national security adviser, a sealed proposal was hand-delivered to his office, outlining a way for President Trump to lift sanctions against Russia.

Mr. Flynn is gone, having been caught lying about his own discussion of sanctions with the Russian ambassador. But the proposal, a peace plan for Ukraine and Russia, remains, along with those pushing it: Michael D. Cohen, the president’s personal lawyer, who delivered the document; Felix H. Sater, a business associate who helped Mr. Trump scout deals in Russia; and a Ukrainian lawmaker [named Andrii Artemenko].

Note that Sater, who has mobbed up business ties with Trump the latter has denied, also allegedly has worked for the CIA.

All of this is a way of saying that several of Trump’s advisors — especially Cohen — have been alleged to have dodgy ties to Russian, but much if not most of that pertains to influence peddling tied to Ukraine and sanctions imposed in retaliation for Russian involvement in Ukraine. So even beyond the different technical and security requirements of the investigation (not to mention any sensitivity involving the CIA), such an investigation sensibly would reside in FBI’s CI world. Thus the DC investigation.

Pittsburgh: The DNC hackers

As Reuters describes it, the Pittsburgh inquiry is examining who hacked the DNC (curiously, it makes no mention of John Podesta or any other hack target).

The FBI’s Pittsburgh field office, which runs many cyber security investigations, is trying to identify the people behind breaches of the Democratic National Committee’s computer systems, the officials said. Those breaches, in 2015 and the first half of 2016, exposed the internal communications of party officials as the Democratic nominating convention got underway and helped undermine support for Hillary Clinton.

The Pittsburgh case has progressed furthest, but Justice Department officials in Washington believe there is not enough clear evidence yet for an indictment, two of the sources said.

It’s not just that Pittsburgh conducts a lot of cyber security investigations — though it has been involved in some key multinational cybercrime investigations (and perhaps as importantly, infrastructure take-downs). In addition to international partnerships in those investigations, it partners closely with Carnegie Mellon’s CERT, which is best known for developing an attack on Tor the FBI uses (the legal follow-up to the 2014 Operation Onymous operation that exposed it went through SDNY in Manhattan, though that would have been before FBI started assigning investigations by geography).

Pittsburgh is also where the most discussed indictment of a nation-state hacking group — that of Chinese People’s Liberation Army hackers, mostly for spying on negotiations — came through (most of the victim companies were there too, but that was probably because they could all serve as victims without compromising national security). I will be interested to see whether the FBI assigned this investigation to Pittsburgh before or after Crowdstrike declared the DNC hack a state-sponsored hack.

San Francisco: Guccifer 2

Finally, there is the investigation into Guccifer 2, the persona who claimed to have hacked the DNC, who took credit for handing the documents to WikiLeaks, and who allegedly had ties to DC Leaks. Here’s how Reuters describes this part of the investigation:

Meanwhile the bureau’s San Francisco office is trying to identify the people who called themselves “Guccifer 2” and posted emails stolen from Clinton campaign manager John Podesta’s account, the sources said. Those emails contained details about fundraising by the Clinton Foundation and other topics.

The language here is really curious. The strongest case that Russia’s GRU hacked a Democratic target involves Podesta. And Guccifer didn’t post any Podesta emails. Guccifer claimed to have posted Clinton Foundation documents, though the documents appeared to be DCCC documents, my comment on which elicited an unsolicited response from Guccifer.

Reuters is actually not the first outlet to report that San Francisco was investigating Guccifer. I believe credit for that goes to Ellen Nakashima’s report, the day before Obama imposed sanctions, on how the US might retaliate.

Criminal indictments of Russians might become an option, officials said, but the FBI has so far not gathered enough evidence that could be introduced in a criminal case. At one point, federal prosecutors and FBI agents in San Francisco considered indicting Guccifer 2.0, a nickname for a person or people believed to be affiliated with the Russian influence operation and whose true identity was unknown.

In December, at least, it appears the FBI did not know Guccifer’s identity though they still believed it to be tied to Russia. Nevertheless that part of the investigation had already been spun out to San Francisco, the other side of the country from the Pittsburgh hack investigation.

Now, there have always been reasons to doubt the interpretation that Russian metadata invoking Felix Dzerzhinsky was proof that Guccifer was Russian, rather than disinformation casting blame on Russia. Here are two more recent pieces making that argument. And in Guccifer’s most recent posting — posted on January 12 but fairly obviously written and posted in advance — the persona used proper English. Nevertheless, that’s presumably not why this part of the investigation got spun off.

There are several other possibilities explaining why the Guccifer investigation is in San Francisco. That office, too, does a ton of cyber investigations, but virtually all of those involve Bay Area companies targeted as victims. So it’s possible the San Francisco office is leading the investigation because of some tie with an area company. Guccifer posted on WordPress, which is headquartered in San Francisco, so that could explain it. It’s also possible FBI believes there is a tie between Guccifer and Shadow Brokers. The latter persona is not mentioned by Reuters, but they are surely also being investigated, perhaps even separately from the Hal Martin investigation in Maryland. If that’s the case, the victim American firewall companies exposed in the first release are all headquartered in Silicon Valley (though they were initially victimized by NSA’s TAO hackers, unless the companies knew NSA was using those back doors).

There are two other interesting cases that might suggest why the Guccifer part of the investigation is out in San Francisco. First, the corrupt government agents who stole Bitcoin while they were investigating Silk Road were investigated and tried out there. I’ve always suspected that was done to make it harder for Ross Ulbricht to access information on that investigation in discovery (if that was the intent, it worked like a charm!). I’m not suggesting there’s anything like that going on here, but I can imagine reasons why the FBI might want to firewall some parts of this investigation from others.

Finally, note that Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikulin, the credential theft hacker arrested in Prague in October, was investigated out of San Francisco, explicitly because his alleged victims are also located in the Bay Area. There have always been hints that that arrest might tie into the Russian investigation (not least because Nikulin is Russian), but this would seem to suggest there’s a tangential tie to it. So perhaps by the time FBI split up this investigation that theory had been developed.

Update: Laura Rozen reminds me via Twitter that Russia’s San Francisco Consulate was one of the locales from which diplomats were expelled.

A final comment. As interesting as it is that this investigation has split into three, I find it just as interesting that EDVA is not involved in it, which is where most international hacking investigations take place. I’ve got no explanation for why that might be, but it is as interesting a question as why the Guccifer investigation got sent out to San Francisco.

One thing is clear, though: For some reason, FBI thought it best to split two parts of what have widely believed to have been part of the same operation — the hacking and (some of) the leaking — and conduct them completely across the country from each other.

Marcy has been blogging full time since 2007. She’s known for her live-blogging of the Scooter Libby trial, her discovery of the number of times Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded, and generally for her weedy analysis of document dumps.

Marcy Wheeler is an independent journalist writing about national security and civil liberties. She writes as emptywheel at her eponymous blog, publishes at outlets including the Guardian, Salon, and the Progressive, and appears frequently on television and radio. She is the author of Anatomy of Deceit, a primer on the CIA leak investigation, and liveblogged the Scooter Libby trial.

Marcy has a PhD from the University of Michigan, where she researched the “feuilleton,” a short conversational newspaper form that has proven important in times of heightened censorship. Before and after her time in academics, Marcy provided documentation consulting for corporations in the auto, tech, and energy industries. She lives with her spouse and dog in Grand Rapids, MI.

On the DNC-FBI Spat Over the DNC Server

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense issued a statement in response to the media coverage following the CrowdStrike claim that malware in an artillery app had a role in massive casualties among Ukraine’s howitzer units. The Google translation (note, it has not yet been translated into English, which itself may say something about intended audience) of it reads,

In connection with the emergence in some media reports which stated that the alleged “80% howitzer D-30 Armed Forces of Ukraine removed through scrapping Russian Ukrainian hackers software gunners,” Land Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine informs that the said information is incorrect .

According Command Missile Forces and Artillery Land Forces of Ukraine, artillery weapons lost during the time of ATO times smaller than the above and are not associated with the specified cause. Currently, troops Missile Forces and Artillery Army Forces of Ukraine fully combat-ready, staffed and able to fulfill the missions.

Ministry of Defence of Ukraine asks journalists to publish only verified information received from the competent official sources. Spreading false information leads to increased social tension in society and undermines public confidence in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Understand what this is: it is in no way a denial that malware infected the artillery app (though it’s also, given that it comes from a country at war with Russia that wants people to stop using this to implicate Russia, not confirmation the malware is Russian). Rather, it is a correction for local journalists to an avowedly pro-Russian source used by Crowdstrike claiming that Ukraine faced 80% losses. And it is a statement that artillery losses from the period in question are due to something else (perhaps the drones that Crowdstrike admitted were involved in the fighting).

Mostly, it’s a complaint that Crowdstrike’s speculative report made Ukraine look bad. As I’ve noted, the report was released before Crowdstrike had spoken to the app developer (and as this statement makes clear, to Ukraine’s MOD), to explain why its previously “medium” confidence that GRU had hacked the DNC was now “high.”

I raise all that as background to the spat Buzzfeed’s Ali Watkins reported on yesterday between the DNC and FBI. In the morning, she reported the DNC claim that the FBI had inexplicably never, itself, accessed the DNC servers.

Six months after the FBI first said it was investigating the hack of the Democratic National Committee’s computer network, the bureau has still not requested access to the hacked servers, a DNC spokesman said. No US government entity has run an independent forensic analysis on the system, one US intelligence official told BuzzFeed News.

“The DNC had several meetings with representatives of the FBI’s Cyber Division and its Washington (DC) Field Office, the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and it responded to a variety of requests for cooperation, but the FBI never requested access to the DNC’s computer servers,” Eric Walker, the DNC’s deputy communications director, told BuzzFeed News in an email.

Over the course of the day, many people explained that that’s fairly normal. Crowdstrike would have imaged the server, which would provide FBI what it needed.

But the snipe to Watkins was not the first time DNC has presented their case in a light that makes FBI look as bad as possible — they did that with the NYT, too. And so it was inevitable that the FBI would eventually push back, as they did later in the day with Watkins.

“The FBI repeatedly stressed to DNC officials the necessity of obtaining direct access to servers and data, only to be rebuffed until well after the initial compromise had been mitigated. This left the FBI no choice but to rely upon a third party for information,” a senior law enforcement official told BuzzFeed News in a statement. “These actions caused significant delays and inhibited the FBI from addressing the intrusion earlier.”

Which promptly led the same DNC that originally leaked a claim making the FBI look bad to bitch about “haters.”

A DNC source familiar with the investigation tried to downplay that report on Thursday, hours before the FBI statement was issued. The fact that the FBI didn’t have direct access to the servers was not “significant,” the source said.

“I just don’t think that that’s really material or an important thing,” the source continued. “They had what they needed. There are always haters out here.”

In general, I think people are right that you can learn what you need to about a typical breach from an imaged server and the server logs. Indeed, the FBI rebuttal here doesn’t even address whether they needed to get the server. Rather, they just said that there was a delay in their access to the data, not that they didn’t eventually get the data they needed.

And it’s true that there was a delay.

FBI gave the DNC the information they needed to start responding to the FSB hack in September 2015, but the FBI wasn’t brought in formally until maybe June 2016. That doesn’t necessarily excuse that they didn’t escalate sooner (the FBI may have had other reasons not to and I expect we may one day learn that the FBI contacted people beyond just the contractor IT guy), but it does mean that the FBI repeatedly tried to help and the DNC did not accept that help until months later.

Underlying all this is surely the distrust that stems from a political party believing the FBI was conducting a witch hunt of its principal (they’d be proven right a month after the breach became public), though the FBI agents investigating the DNC hack were surely different than the ones investigating Hillary’s server. There may have even been other reasons the DNC didn’t want the FBI nosing around their servers.

Still, we now know they did not ever access DNC’s servers themselves.

And I think in this case they should have, for two reasons.

The Hill story covering this bickering includes this quote from a former FBI agent describing one reason why.

“In nine out of 10 cases, we don’t need access, we don’t ask for access, we don’t get access. That’s the normal [procedure],” Leo Taddeo, a former special agent in charge of the cyber division of the FBI’s New York office, told The Hill.

“It’s extraordinarily rare for the FBI to get access to the victim’s infrastructure because we could mess it up,” he added. “We usually ask for the logs and images, and 99 out of a hundred times, that’s sufficient.”

Asking for direct access to a server wouldn’t be necessary, Taddeo said, “unless there was a reason to think the victim was going to alter the evidence in some way.”

You don’t need access to the server itself unless you’ve got reason to believe the victim altered the evidence. From the very first, you had an entity, Guccifer 2.0, challenging the attribution Crowdstrike made on the server. Abundant analysis has proven that Guccifer is a liar, but Chinese and Iranians and Americans lie just as often as Russians do.

Plus, months after the hack, people started claiming that the source for the files that got to Wikileaks came from an insider. Which, if true (I don’t think it is, but nevertheless it is a competing theory, one that given the animosity within the Democratic party last year is not impossible), would mean that the victim might have altered the evidence.

There’s another reason why the FBI should have double checked the forensics, if they hadn’t already: because (we learned six months after the fact) Crowdstrike only ever had medium confidence that GRU had hacked the DNC based on the forensics they examined.

While CrowdStrike, which was hired by the DNC to investigate the intrusions and whose findings are described in a new report, had always suspected that one of the two hacker groups that struck the DNC was the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, it had only medium confidence.

Now, said CrowdStrike co-founder Dmitri Alperovitch, “we have high confidence” it was a unit of the GRU. CrowdStrike had dubbed that unit “Fancy Bear.”

And Crowdstrike only came to have high confidence in that attribution by writing a paper that multiple Ukrainian sources (not exactly Russian shills) have now pushed back on. That is, nothing in the original forensics changed, as far as we know; external evidence, of whatever quality, led to a change in confidence.

Which means the forensics itself is not a slam dunk.

I’m beginning to see a hole in all the other security firms’ validation of Crowdstrike’s original attribution, which I hope to return to (though not before next week). In any case, it’d be useful for FBI to have really vetted this work, given that we’ve turned this into an international incident.

So, yeah, the FBI never obtained the DNC server full of political information the government really shouldn’t possess, particularly not an agency perceived to be really hostile to that political party.

But maybe, in this case, they should have.

Marcy has been blogging full time since 2007. She’s known for her live-blogging of the Scooter Libby trial, her discovery of the number of times Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was waterboarded, and generally for her weedy analysis of document dumps.

Marcy Wheeler is an independent journalist writing about national security and civil liberties. She writes as emptywheel at her eponymous blog, publishes at outlets including the Guardian, Salon, and the Progressive, and appears frequently on television and radio. She is the author of Anatomy of Deceit, a primer on the CIA leak investigation, and liveblogged the Scooter Libby trial.

Marcy has a PhD from the University of Michigan, where she researched the “feuilleton,” a short conversational newspaper form that has proven important in times of heightened censorship. Before and after her time in academics, Marcy provided documentation consulting for corporations in the auto, tech, and energy industries. She lives with her spouse and dog in Grand Rapids, MI.